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ABSTRACT 
The thesis presents an empirical study of the telecommunications reform 
experience of Thailand between the mid 1980s and 2000s in an attempt to explain 
the effect of national institutional arrangements upon the reform process. This 
time period permits an exploration of the development of the reform as well as its 
major impediments in relation to three different political settings. The progress of 
reform on the three basic refonn issues (privatisation, liberalisation, and 
regulation) is thoroughly examined to understand the consequences produced by 
different industry environments. An historical institutionalist study of the Thai 
experience identifies the political tensions among the reform's interested parties 
as well as the unwieldy political settings that were the dominant features that 
heavily influenced the reform story. The thesis places a special emphasis on the 
latest political regime (the hegemonic era) since it provided a different industry 
outlook compared to the previous two regimes (the bureaucratic and pluralistic 
eras), allowing substantial progress towards reform to be made. The 
telecommunications reform in Thailand is not complete. Thus, it may be too early 
to confirm the advantage of the strong politics on the reform in the long run, 
especially considering the possibilities of rent-seeking or the overuse of political 
power of the hegemonic govenunent. In any case, the Thai reform experience 
confirms that an institutionalist framework is helpful, and that institutional 
arrangements really matter in the policy-formation, policy-implementation and 
policy-outcome of a particular country. 
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CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION 
Telecommunications industry reform is a crucial policy area for a country in 
enhancing its infrastructure as well as developing its economy. There are 
different pressing reasons (both internally and externally generated) that suggest 
the need for such a reform. However, it appears that telecommunications reform 
programmes, especially among developing countries, have faced a number of 
problems in implementation, often resulting in a suboptimal outcome. National 
institutional arrangements seem to have been the fundamental problem that 
hindered the reform process in many cases. The telecommunications reform 
experience of Thailand was no different; it faced a number of difficulties both 
structurally and politically during the two decades (under three different political 
regimes) of the reform attempt. In fact, within a broad historical institutionalist 
framework, the case of Thailand offers an excellent case in which to study the 
effects of institutionalism and the reform programme. It is found that industry's 
institutional arrangements (most notably the political tensions among the reform's 
interested parties and the weak political structures) caused considerable obstacles 
to the reform programme both in the policy-making and policy-implementing 
process. 
However, the Thai case is of special interest in the sense that the rapid change of 
the political environment from being weak and unstable to being powerful and 
centralised in 2001 produced an entirely different context for reform both at the 
national and industry levels. As regards the telecommunications reform 
programme, the newly emerged environment appeared to be able to ease a number 
of long-term unresolved issues (even if they were not totally rectified), and that 
was enough to drive the reform to make satisfactory progress. This thesis 
therefore looks at how regime change in Thailand has interacted with the progress 
of telecommunications reform. It thus provides an analysis of the interaction 
between the macro institutional context and the meso level of a key sector of the 
economy. 
CENTRAL QUESTIONS 
The study of the Thai telecommunications reform experience within a broad 
historical institutionalism framework is a potentially interesting topic. According 
to Pierson and Skocpol (2002), the fact that the framework stresses the relevance 
of national institutions, as well as their contextual factors to the political choices 
and policy outcomes helps the study to become more thorough and dynamic. It 
tries to put more institutions in context to understand how they relate to one 
another by drawing attention to the way political situations are structured (Thelen 
& Steimno, 1992). 
2 
Given the lack of generally accepted definition of institutions in the international 
literature on historical materialism', the current thesis believes that institutions are 
social structures or social mechanisms (either formal or informal) that embedded 
in the polity or political economy. Institutions should be able to constitute the 
framework within which policy is made and provide rules, norms, and procedures 
that systematically distribute power amongst actors and structure their choice. 
Thus, under a particular circumstance, institutions should be able to make 
understanding the policy formation, policy implementation, and policy outcome. 
Anyhow, one also has to keep in mind that institutions themselves are not the only 
determinant of the policy process; rather other contextual factors or the 
consequence produced by institutions are also important to take into 
consideration. This is in fact consistent to Thelen & Steinmo (1992: p. 3), as they 
propose that "institutions constrain and refract politics but they are never the sole 
'cause' of outcomes. " 
Among historical institutionalists, they believe that nations are characterised by 
long-established institutional differences, for example Thatcher (1999) proposes 
that these domestic arrangements "not only differ among states, but are also 
deeply rooted and resistant to change" (p. 1). It is these arrangements that 
influence each nation to have its own political choices and outcomes 
2; they 
generate a distinctive national trajectory (Hall & Taylor, 1996), and thus "path 
dependency" (Guy Peters, 1999, p. 64). As argued by Pierson and Skocpol, "once 
1 Detailed discussion about "institutionalism" will be provided in Chapter 2. 
2 According to Thelen and Steinmo (1992), although it is believed that institutions are able to 
influence politics, they are never the sole "cause" of political outcomes. Some other factors (e. g. 
new ideas, technology, economic changes, intemationalisation, etc. ) also usually play an important 
part in political choices (Thatcher, 2000). 
3 
actors have ventured far down a particular path, however, they are likely to find it 
very difficult to reverse course" (2002, pp. 699 - 700). This however does not 
necessarily mean that this nationally specific path or national institutions are 
permanent; their resistance to change could be overcome with "the right 
configuration of circumstances" (Thatcher, 1999, p. 323)3. Once this happens, the 
new institutional arrangements should evolve and become new constraints to both 
the country's decision making process and policy outcomes. 
As for the case of Thai telecommunications reform, the two decades of reform 
experience under three different political settings should provide enough materials 
to illustrate the roles of domestic institutionalism on the reform activities. The 
differences in the prevailing political arrangements as well as the involvement 
from interested parties were found to be the dominant features of the industry that 
constituted different settings for industry's institutionalism, which then led to 
different consequences for the refonn programme. As such, this notion leads to 
the central questions of the thesis being that, "What has been the effect of national 
institutional arrangements upon the process of telecommunications refonn, and 
how far have they obstructed it? " 
3 The work of Thatcher (2004) can provide a clear example. By focusing on the case of 
telecommunications regulatory reform among four European countries (United Kingdorn, 
Germany, France, and Italy) during the 1990s, he finds that international pressures for change were 
strong enough to counter balance or even overcome the effects of domestic settings 
in blocking 
change or orienting it in nationally specific directions. 
4 
BACKGROUND 
The dramatic increase in international trade towards the end of the twentieth 
century made a substantial impact on almost every country around the world. The 
flourishing of free trade and the free flow of investment derived mainly from the 
removal of barriers and the higher degree of interdependence among countries. A 
number of trade negotiation rounds (e. g. the General Agreement of Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), Europe's Maastricht Treaty, or the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA)) have all contributed to a more interdependent economy. 
Concurrently, the advent of an ideology of neo-liberalism 4 among developed 
countries during the 1980s also facilitated the boom in international trade and 
investment. The ideology's stress on "laissez-faire" did not only apply among the 
core advocating states (e. g. the United Kingdom and the United StateS)5; other 
countries were also influenced by these states to start implementing a similar 
policy. The policy recommendations from the major Bretton Woods institutions 
(e. g. the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund: IMF) as well as the 
conditionality for a country to become a part of the global society (e. g. to become 
a member of the World Trade Organisation: WTO) were effectively used to 
6 
promote economic reform within a number of developing countries 
4 In short, the ideology refers to a political-econornic philosophy that de-emphasises goverm-nent 
intervention in the domestic economy and argues that markets are best left to have a relatively free 
rein. 
5 The rise of neo-liberalism coincided with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the UK (known as 
"Thatcherism") and the presidency of President Ronald Reagan in the US (known as 
"Reaganomics"). 
6 For example, according to Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus (2001), it is found that most of the 
documents from these organisations (e. g. World Bank's World Development Report or IMF's 
World Economic Outlook) were all indicative of some kinds of benefit the reform yields for the 
implementing economy. 
5 
All the above then contributed to the more widespread belief that free (and fair) 
trade as well as the unrestricted flow of capital will greatly benefit the local 
economy, both at the macro and micro levels. A number of economies were 
convinced to engage in economic reform in order to be in line with global change 
and to gain the ideal benefits of liberalisation. Understandably, national economic 
reform also led to suggestions for reform at the industry level; every industry 
accordingly needed it in order to prepare for this more open and competitive 
environment. 
As for the telecommunications industry, it was unsurprising to find that the 
industry was directly affected by the momentum of the economic reform in most 
economies. Petrazzini (1995, p. 1) explains, "As one of the few industries that cut 
across and integrate social and economic activities, telecommunications holds a 
strategic position in the building of a dynamic and flexible national economy. 
The sector is central to the national and international flows of capital and 
commerce. " This could be why among the public services and state industries that 
are being restructured in most nations, telecommunications has usually emerged 
as the spearhead and showcase of a broader reform programme. 
Like most other countries, the development of the Thai telecommunications 
industry over several decades was also influenced by the wave of refon-n. 
However, the real reform action was found to be of a severely limited nature and 
faced a great many problems in implementation. The first concrete reform 
attempt was introduced in 1986 when the industry opened up for private 
6 
Participation for the first time (however, with a number of restrictions). Apart 
from this, other attempts at reform were unfortunately overwhelmed by a number 
of difficulties. The country's specific constraints (e. g. the unwieldy 
telecommunications law and the lack of an independent regulatory agency) as well 
as interference from interested parties usually contributed to the slowing down, or 
even cessation of, any workable reform programme. 
From a current perspective, the opportunity cost of having an outdated 
telecommunications industry structure seems to be higher as time goes by. The 
domination by inefficient operators, ineffective regulation, and inadequate 
competition can be seriously damaging to consumer welfare and national 
prosperity (Hausman, 1997). It is quite apparent that the cost of sluggish 
telecommunications reform becomes simply too high for any country to accept. 
As for the situation of Thailand prior to the reform, Petrazzini (1995, p. 136) 
describes: 
In the late 1980s Thailand still had one of the poorest telecom service records in Southeast 
Asia. Lack of long term planning, financial constraints, managerial and technological 
problems, poor coordination between the two companies, and other deficiencies plagued the 
country. 
Nonetheless, in the late 1990s, the internal demand for better service together with 
the pressures exerted from outside the country eventually made the need to reform 
more intense than ever. As proposed by Niyomsilpa (2000), global 
telecommunications liberalisation has recently played an important role in shaping 
Thailand's policy direction in telecommunications; the conclusion of GATT's 
Uruguay Round as well as the financial bail-out package has served as a clear 
7 
warning sign of things to come. In consequence, the last two governments of 
Thailand, led by PM Chuan Leekpai (1997 - 200 1) and PM Thaksin Shinawatra 
(2001 - 2005 and 2005 - the present), have shown a finn intention to refonn the 
telecommunications industry by putting the reform programme high on the 
agenda 
7. 
After a few decades of attempts at reform, recent Thai experiences reveal that 
neither local demand for reform nor the strong pressures from outside the country 
constituted the key factor in driving progress in the reform. Although these 
factors, especially the external pressure, were unarguably good catalysts in 
initiating a serious attempt at reform, it appeared that neither the reform 
experiences from developed countries, the detailed reform implementation plans 
provided by international organisations, nor the conditionality asked for by 
international financial institutions were able to make any appreciable progress in 
practice. 
With abundant experience to draw on from other places, most previous 
goverranents of Thailand should have been thoroughly acquainted with the basic 
issues in dealing with the reform programme, which are the privatisation of state- 
owned telecommunications enterprises (SOTEs), the establishment of an effective 
regulatory regime, and the liberalisation of the industry. However, it is interesting 
to find that the telecommunications reform programme of Thailand appeared to 
make only limited progress, even though it had been being worked on for almost 
' See details in Section 5: Communication policies. The Policy of the Government of PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra delivered to the National Assembly on 26 February 2001. 
8 
two decades by as many as nine different governments. It turned out that 
difficulties within the process derived domestically from both structural and 
political reasons, and that these were found to be closely interrelated in practice. 
In this regard, Petrazzini (1995) explains that reforms are not only the mechanical 
outcome of policy implementation; rather, they are the product of complex and 
dynamic interaction among conflicting intents. The attempts to change the old 
structures that were not enhancing the reform process (e. g. the attempts to amend 
the old telecommunications law or to establish an independent regulatory agency) 
inevitably affected a number of parties, especially those who were already 
satisfied with the protected environment. This kind of situation "generally 
aroused considerable domestic opposition" (Petrazzini, p. 192), which therefore 
made the reform a political issue. Unsurprisingly, it was this conflict of 
individual interests among various interested parties that emerged to become the 
main problem that consistently hindered the telecommunications reform 
programme of Thailand, especially when Thai political structures were weak and 
very vulnerable to political pressure. 
Since the beginning of 1986, the telecommunications reform programme of 
Thailand has been carried out under three different types of political 
environments. At first (between 1986 and 1992), the reform was implemented 
under the so-called "bureaucratic era", during which the country's politics (as well 
as the politics within telecommunications) was simply dominated by the military 
(Niyomsilpa, 2000). Subsequently, the public resistance to the military's 
autocratic administration gave rise to a more open and pluralistic political 
9 
environment. A number of interested parties, which became more politically 
powerful (e. g. academics, non-govenunental organisations (NGOs), the public, 
etc), began to get involved and tried to assert their influence in the reform process, 
either to protect their existing interest or to find new benefits. Finally, in 2001, 
the pluralistic regime was replaced by a more or less hegemonic political 
environment; the overwhelming victory in the 2001 General Election 8 of Thaksin 
Shinawatra and his "Thai Rak Thai" party (TRT) gave Thailand a very powerful 
premiership as well as a very stable, centralised, and well-insulated government. 
This consequently justifies the appropriateness of naming this latest era the 
hegemonic era. 
Considering the three refonn issues that need to be dealt with, the Thai experience 
reveals that different political eras produced different consequences for these 
issues. Institutionally, the lack of political will to refonn in the bureaucratic era 
and the dispersion of interests among interested parties in the pluralistic era were 
the main reasons for the sluggish reforms then. However, the fact that there has 
been significant progress in reform during the hegemonic era suggests some 
interesting implications. It is possible to argue that the newly emerged political 
era had created a more reform-enhancing arrangement within the industry. 
8 The 2001 General Election was the first election conducted under the country's new Constitution, 
which was drafted and promulgated in 1997 with the intention of reforming country's political 
system. 
10 
METHODOLOGY 
The central questions guide the choice of the approaches and methods to be used 
(Burnham, Gilland, Grant, & Layton-Henry, 2004). The thesis is thus deliberately 
designed to be a single qualitative in-depth case study focusing on Thai 
telecommunications reform programme between 1986 and 2005. The 
broadcasting industry, however, will be excluded from this study, as in Thailand, 
it is a separate industry from telecommunications, which can be seen from the fact 
that the law requires these two industries to have their own regulators9. As for the 
time period covered, the year 1986 is chosen as the starting point because it is the 
year that the first concrete reform attempt was evolved, while 2005 is selected as 
the cut-off point, as January 2005 was the end of the first four-year tenn of the 
PM Thaksin Shinawatra's administration (which also meant the end of the first 
four-year period of the new telecommunications politics). 
The single in-depth case study approach is believed to be the best way to 
investigate the distinctive historical institutionalisms of the Thai 
telecommunications reform programme. Although the single case study approach 
has on occasion been criticised for its lack of generalisability, Grix (2001) argues 
that one in-depth case study of a relatively under-researched area can be 
embedded in, and compared with, the existing body of literature and studies to 
gain useful insights into a particular region, or to establish similar patterns 
' However, there are a few specific tasks where the telecommunications and broadcasting 
regulators have to work together (e. g. the task to produce the frequency allocation master plan). 
Please see details in the Act on Organisation Allocation Frequency Waves and Supervising 
Radio/Television Broadcasting and Telecommunications Businesses B. E. 2543 (2000). 
11 
between well-researched regions and the chosen study; therefore, it is also capable 
of contributing to the advancement of specific theories. In fact, the single in- 
depth case study also has its strong points. Punch (1998, pp. 155 - 6) points out 
the benefits of a single case study: 
The first is what we can learn from the study of a particular case, in its own right ... the case being studied might be unusual, unique or not yet understood, so that building an in-depth 
understanding of the case is valuable.... Second, only the in-depth case study can provide 
understanding of the important aspects of a new or persistently problematic research area.... 
Discovering the important features, developing and understanding of them, and 
conceptualizing them for further study, is often best achieved through the case study strategy. 
Burnham et al. (2000, p. 53), further argue that, despite its limitations, "case 
studies enable researchers to focus on a single individual, group, community, 
event, policy area or institution, and study it in depth, perhaps over an extended 
period of time", which makes the approach one that is widely used and has had 
considerable application in social science research. In fact, the thesis' central 
questions posed also suggest the appropriateness of the single case study. The 
thesis does not strive to compare the reform experience of Thailand with other 
countries; rather, it intends to see within an historical institutionalist framework, 
the obstacles and the progress of the refonn under the different types of political 
regimes. In other words, it is possible to compare a single case over different 
periods so that there is a "within country temporal comparison" 
The qualitative method also appears to be a suitable altemative for the thesis. The 
thesis is a case study of the policy process and a quantitative model might not be 
helpful as many variables, if they could be turned into numerical values at all, 
would often be nominal rather than even ordinal as has been pointed out by 
Rudestarn and Newton (2001, p. 27), 
12 
Quantitative method is especially useful for looking at relationships and patterns and 
expressing these patterns with numbers. Descriptive statistics describe these patterns of 
behavior, whereas inferential statistics use probabilistic arguments to generalize findings from 
samples to populations of interest. 
Neither the data to be collected nor the analysis of data is readily available, or 
even entirely capable of being quantified into numbers. On the contrary, as the 
thesis is also trying to understand the perceptions of the parties involved in the 
reforrn process, the data to be collected deals extensively with open-ended 
answers. For example, the information obtained from interviews may differ 
markedly from one interviewee to another, as it depends heavily on personal 
experiences and the perceptions of each interviewee and, most importantly, the 
questions asked are also not identical for all interviewees. They have to depend 
on the area of expertise of each interviewee. As for data analysis, the quantitative 
method also seems to be inappropriate; answering the posed central questions 
appears to make more sense when explaining via logical extensions of arguments 'r- 
than when making affirmations from quantitative evidence. For instance, when 
the research focuses on change in the political environment of the country, it is 
difficult to measure such a change in numerical terms; on the other hand, it is 
possible to measure the change by explaining the real incidents that took place or 
by elaborating the experiences of the people who were actually involved in the 
situation. 
Data collection 
In order to select the method of data collection, it is inevitable to return to the 
central question, as it once again determines the appropriate methods (Grix, 
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2001). In this case, elite interviewing and documentary analysis appear to be the 
most appropriate choices. As the thesis' main questions talk about the 
institutional arrangements and their effects upon the process of 
telecommunications reform programme of Thailand, the issue is found to be novel 
and relevant literature seems to be scarce. The on-site direct interview with 
members of the local elite who are aware of such institutional changes (and of the 
impacts of those changes) was chosen as the main source of the primary data. At 
the same time, the research also needs a lot of secondary data to complement the 
analysis; thus, documentary analysis is chosen to be the main collection tool for 
the rest of the relevant infonnation. 
Primary data 
To gather all the necessary primary data, two periods of fieldwork were conducted 
in Bangkok, Thailand. As argued by Burnham et al. (2004) and Rudestam and 
Newton (2001), it is appreciated that the research process is complex, uncertain, 
and never as straightforward as the ideal. There is a marked tendency to have to 
repeat steps to build on the previously obtained findings (also known as the 
"research wheel"10). The fieldwork was accordingly planned on the assumption 
that it would require two phases of work in the field. The first fieldwork took 
place at the end of 2003. In fact, it was in many ways a trial attempt (or a "pilot 
study") to see whether the researcher's general perceptions or understandings of 
the Thai telecommunications reform programme were correct; besides, it was also 
'0 Please find the details of "research wheel" in Chapter I of Rudestarn and Newton (2001) or 
Chapter 2 of Burnham et al. (2004). 
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intended to verify if some critical issues (e. g. the outstanding refonn issues or the 
change of telecommunications politics) really existed. The pilot interviews that 
were conducted among selected respondents (out of the full list of interviewees) 
provided a number of benefits to the researcher. Not only did it benefit in ternis 
of research content, and defining the parameters of the research, it was also 
beneficial in familiarising the researcher with the procedures as well as the 
unforeseeable problems of the interview. After that, the second round of 
fieldwork was performed subsequently during the second half of 2004 to collect 
the rest of the relevant data. 
The qualifications of the targeted interviewees as well as the infon-nation needed 
suggested the appropriateness of elite interviewing. Mentioned by Leech (2002a, 
p. 663), "elite interviewing can be used whenever it is appropriate to treat a 
respondent as an expert about the topic in hand". Burnham et al. further point out, 
"When it is carried out effectively, this technique can make a considerable 
contribution to the understanding of political phenomena" (2004, p. 205). In fact, 
elite interviewing implies both the targets to be studied, which is an "elite" of 
some kind, and the research technique to be used, which is usually in the semi- 
structured (or unstructured) mode (Burnham et al. ). 
As for the sampling method, the specific qualifications of interviewees suggested 
the non-random sample method. The list of interviewees was carefully selected to 
include the industry elite who were eligible and experienced in the Thai 
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telecommunications industry"; they also had to be closely involved with the 
industry during the chosen period. These qualifications are critical since the data 
in the thesis strives to deal with complex issues deeply rooted in the reform 
programme and the recent sophisticated change in the reform environment. 
Hence, the thesis did not need a large sample size to answer the central questions, 
instead the answers sprang from the analysis of insights from a group of elite 
members who were directly involved and knowledgeable in the field. The 
interviewees chosen were basically high-level actors who were involved with the 
Thai telecommunications reform programme in various respects, who together, 
were believed to cover every important reform aspect. The sample of 
interviewees was made up from pertinent politicians (e. g. the Minister of 
Infonnation Communications and Technology: MICT 12) , high-level govenunent 
officials, telecommunications regulators, senators, high-level management of the 
SOTEs, high-level management of private telecommunications operators, SOTEs' 
labour unions, and academics. While a summary table of the interviewees is 
presented in Table 1.1, detailed information on the names and positions of all 
interviewees as well as the separate table of the anonymous respondents' 3 are 
shown in Appendix A. 
11 Most of the interviewees were deliberately chosen to be respectable and well-known figures in 
particular fields (e. g. Uthaisang for policy making, Tangkitvanich for the academic perspective, 
and Pornsutee as a government official). However, some of interviewees (e. g. the acaden-: tics) 
were also obtained from the "snowball" method. 
12 Resulting ftorn the bureaucratic reform in 2002, the MICT was established and took over all the 
telecommunications-related tasks, including the telecommunications reform, from the Ministry of 
Transport and Cominunications (MOTC). After the separation, the MOTC accordingly changed 
its name to the Ministry of Transport (MOT). 
13 According to the confidentiality agreement made with the respondents, the names and positions 
of some respondents will not be disclosed. 
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Table 1.1 
Summarv of interviewe&S 
Area of expertise Interviews conducted 
Fiel lwork phase I Policy maker 1 
Government official at MOTC 1 
Government official at MICT 1 
Government official at PTD 1 
Government official at MOF I 
Private operator I 
Fieldwork phase 2 Policy maker 3 
Regulator 3 
Senator 2 
Government official at MICT I 
Government official at MOF I 
SOTE management 2 
SOTE labour union 2 
Private operator 2 
Academic/Industry expert 4 
NGO I 
Total 27 
Note: MOF = Ministry of Finance; PTD = Post and Telegraph Department. 
The first round of fieldwork, which was carried out quite early in the research 
process, was undertaken with the purpose of getting the big picture of the recent 
situation and the existing problems of the reform programme of the country. 
Therefore, the interviews conducted were more or less unstructured and fewer 
interviews were conducted. The topics discussed were deliberately not very 
specific in order to encourage flexibility and to "open up avenues of investigation, 
including infonnal discussion, previously unthought of' (Grix, 2001, p. 77). 
Although Leech (2002b) argues that data gained from unstructured sessions is 
hardly a consistent source for comparative purposes, the unstructured interview in 
the guise of an exploratory conversation around a structured theme appears to be 
useful in giving the researcher an opportunity to gain a better understanding of a 
particular topic (Burnham et al., 2004). 
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As for the second round of the fieldwork, elite interviewing (using the semi- 
structured technique) was conducted extensively to collect more detailed sets of 
data while still being able to maintain "a certain degree of flexibility" and allow 
for "the pursuit of unexpected lines of enquiry during the interview" (Grix, 200 1, 
p. 76). In other words, elite interviewing appears to be a good way to draw out 
accumulated experiences from knowledgeable experts to use for academic 
purposes; the technique is believed to "bring the worlds of the practitioner and the 
academic together in a hopefully fruitful mutual dialogue" (Burnham, 2004, p. 
219). In undertaking interviews, the researcher drew up a check-list of topics to 
be covered (also known as an "interview guide" (Devine, 1995, p. 138)), 
although, in practice, the discussion of those topics was not necessarily pre- 
ordained. 
In any case, in the event each interview was handled differently, the questions 
asked were varied depending on the respondents and their areas of expertise. 
Structured interviewing (or the questionnaire) was deliberately excluded from the 
project owing to some of its unsuitable qualities for the thesis. While the main 
benefit of structured interviewing is to achieve a high degree of standardisation or 
unifonnity in the fonnat of answers (Grix, 2001), it unfortunately does not fit well 
with the main considerations of the thesis. It was not a useful approach to give an 
identical set of questions to all interviewees. Rather, the expectation was to gain 
different answers from different interviewees depending on their respective areas 
of expertise. In fact, even on the same question, the answer could be highly 
variable depending on the respondents' background, standpoint, or perception. 
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Although elite interviewing seemed to be the most appropriate technique for the 
thesis, some difficulties were experienced from time to time during the research 
stage. First of all, in line with the most common problem with elite interviewing, 
the tight schedule of respondents caused difficulty in setting up appointments. 
Even when the interview had been set up, there were several times that the 
appointment had to be postponed or even cancelled in the middle of a 
conversation. econdly, there were also many instances whereby the interviewees 
provided a lot of information on the areas that they knew best, which were 
unfortunately irrelevant to the research content, were time-consuming and 
unproductive, and encroached upon the chance to explore more relevant 
questions. As a result, there were several occasions when a follow-up telephone 
interview had to be done to complete all the topics. It is also important to point 
out that discussions over sensitive issues, such as issues that related to the 
government or some politically powerful persons, were a hindering factor. 
Although the researcher realised the importance of building "rapport" (Leech, 
2002b, p. 665) from the beginning of the session, it was still difficult to build 
"trust" with respondents. Unease was usually observable especially among 
interviewees who could still potentially gain or lose from political influence. 
Therefore, the confidentiality of data and the anonymity of the informant had to 
be promised in order to accommodate those interviewees, and it is for this reason 
that there must be a separate list of anonymous respondents in Appendix A. All in 
all, since these problems were largely solvable, the elite interviewing technique 
appeared to be an excellent tool in collecting the empirical data and it therefore 
formed the basis of this thesis. 
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Altogether, 27 elite interview sessions were conducted, which was deemed 
reasonable considering the time constraints as well as the amount of data 
obtained. The fact that the later interviews appeared to add relatively little to the 
stock of infonnation or understanding suggested the "saturation point" of the 
research had been reached (Burnham et al., 2004, p. 208). One has to bear in 
mind that, after the saturation point, additional interviews may not be worth the 
time invested in terms of a marginal additional return. According to Grant (2000, 
p. 4), by adding up the time spent in "setting up the interview; travelling to and 
from it; the interview itself, preparing the transcript; and analysing the transcript, 
then figures of at least twelve hours per interview are not unrealistic. " In fact, 
Burnham et al. (2004) also suggest that twenty to thirty interviews seem to be a 
reasonable target for a research in which elite interviewing is the principal 
method. 
For each interview session, the interview was prepared and carried out in a very 
cautious fashion. The researcher was very careful with most details (e. g. the 
questions must not be hostile or in any way lead the interviewee to particular 
conclusions). The set of individuals being interviewed can be considered as a 
major strength of the thesis, as they included many of the key individuals involved 
in telecommunications reform in Thailand. All interviewees were very high-level 
telecommunications actors in the country; they were obviously very experienced 
and knowledgeable about the industry as well as the reform programme. Most 
importantly, the combination of the whole set of interviewees appeared to 
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represent most parties who held a stake in the reform, which makes the data 
obtained more balanced and more thorough. 
Secondary data 
Documentary analysis was used extensively to collect the secondary data. The 
relevant documentary evidence came in all formats, such as books, book chapters, 
journals, articles, research papers, previous theses, govenunent reports, country 
legislation, operators' financial statements, or even local newspapers. 
Fortunately, unlimited access to the library, inter-library loans, electronic 
databases,, and the archive services at the Modem Records Centre, University of 
Warwick helped the researcher to become more familiar with the subject as well 
as able to investigate the relevant infonnation that already existed. In the first 
place, the documentary analysis was a very important tool to gain general 
knowledge of the telecommunications industry reform, for example, the reasons 
that make countries reform their telecommunications, the normal issues associated 
with the reform programme, and so forth. However, at the later stage of the 
research, documents with specific relevance to the case of Thailand became the 
dominant material analysed, which inevitably meant that these documents are 
sometimes only published in the local language. The Chulalongkorn and 
Thammasat University central libraries, the MOF library, the SOTEs academic 
centres, as a result, became other main sources for documentary data. 
Interestingly, for more updated data (e. g. the political related issues, the most 
updated reform progress, or criticism of the reform programme), various local 
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newspapers or articles were used to obtain more updated insights. They are 
believed to provide a "feel" for the view and opinions of the printed press, or the 
wider opinions they represented at that time (Grix, 2001). Anyhow, with the full 
awareness that "the media landscape is very broad and represents a wide range of 
diverse interests" (Grix, p. 83), it was found that the use of these printed media 
was a useful complement to the interviews on many occasions. All in all, by 
spending time in the location and keeping the overall tasks in mind, the 
documentary analysis carried out during the fieldwork was certainly a very 
helpful tool in providing the researcher with a clear understanding of the local 
issues as well as a better opportunity to access all the data. 
Data analysis 
To manage the primary data collected, each interview was either noted or 
recorded depending on the interviewees' choice. Both the note and tape were 
summarised or transcribed shortly after the interview session while the interview 
was "still fresh in the researcher's mind" (Grant, 2000, p. 14). Most interviews 
were therefore kept in both audio and document formats. On the other hand, data 
obtained from the secondary sources was also summarised and kept within an 
organised filing system. To start the analysis, all the data in hand must be "ready 
for easy access" (Grix, 2001, p. 87). The outline of the provisional chapters and 
their break-down topics became very useful as they helped in sifting through and 
analysing stacks of documents, interview transcripts and other data from the 
fieldworks. By doing this, the researcher acquired plentiful raw data on every 
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topic, which was ready for further interrogation and analysis. In fact, it was found 
that the compilation of data from diverse sources on one particular topic was able 
to provide the researcher with a richer and deeper understanding, which therefore 
was beneficial to the thesis as a whole. 
However, some sensitive issues that the thesis set to find out could not be simply 
obtained directly or easily from the interviewees. In this regard, the 
"triangulation" technique was brought in to improve the chances of getting better, 
more reliable, data and to minimise the chance of biased findings (Grix, 2001, pp. 
83 - 85). Data obtained from primary and secondary sources on similar topics 
were used and triangulated with each other. In fact, the primary data obtained 
from different interviewees were also cross-checked to avoid hidden political 
influence on interviewees (if any). For example, the sensitive question on 
whether the government under the leadership of PM Thaksin Shinawatra has 
affected the SOTE labour unions so that they have become less active in the 
telecommunications political arena was not asked solely in the form of a direct 
question to members of the labour unions, as they tended to be reluctant to 
answer. To deal with this kind of circumstance, the same query was also put to 
other interviewees (e. g. academics, NGOs, SOTE management, MICT and MOF 
government officials) who were likely to know the answer and be more at ease 
with sharing their comments. 
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CONTRIBUTIONS AND ORIGINALITY 
Wellenius and Stem (1994) propose that there is no standard blueprint for sectoral 
reform; instead, an industry reform programme requires a "case by case" analysis. 
Sector design and implementation strategies must be crafted to fit the specific 
economic, political, and institutional features of each nation. Despite the 
differences among nations, Newbery (1999) and Williamson (1994) argue that the 
analysis of reform experiences from any country, whether they are successful or 
not, is valuable and worth exploring to understand the implications of reform 
attempts in different places. In fact, this kind of information is a rich source for 
later researchers or policy makers. Especially for the governments who are going 
to reform their economy, they should be as well informed as possible on every 
aspect of the reform strategies and consequences, whether there are any 
similarities or differences, in order to use them as lessons and to avoid any 
potential problems that may occur, as "opportunities for restructuring are rare and 
hard to reverse, so such choices need to be well infonned" (Newbery, 1999, p. 
386). Although there already seems to be an abundance of telecommunications 
reform literature available (for instance, the studies of Annstrong, Cowan and 
Vickers (1994) and Vickers and Yarrow (1988) on the UK experiences, the 
studies of Crandall and Waverman (1995) on the US experiences, and the studies 
of Wallsten (1999) and Wellenius (1994) on the Latin American experiences), it 
appears that the study of the topic among Asian countries is still inadequate 
(Singh, 2000). This thesis is therefore intended to contribute to a more general 
academic literature on an institutional analysis of the telecommunications industry 
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reform in relation to the political environment through an intensive study of the 
Thai case. The value of the thesis can be seen both from the micro and macro 
standpoints. 
At the micro-level, as an in-depth case study, it implies a very specific approach 
to phenomena "through thorough analysis of an individual case" (Kumar, 1999, p. 
99). Therefore, the historical institutionalist study of the Thai telecommunications 
reform process (as well as its obstacles) and the analysis of the political 
environments and their impacts on the reform process, which have been suggested 
in the main questions of the thesis, should at least be of value to the country's 
policy makers and other telecommunications and political analysts concerned with 
the Thai situation. Not only does the current thesis have different focused points 
from other existing studies on the Thai telecommunications industry, but the 
thesis also builds on and develops earlier studies 14. It provides the most up-to- 
date analysis of telecommunications reform programme of Thailand both in terms 
of its obstacles and its progress. It also introduces the advent of the hegemonic 
politics (both at the national and industry levels). It is undeniable that the new 
politics created a dramatic change within the industry arrangements, which as a 
result produced a substantial impact on the reform programme as a whole. As the 
hegemonic regime constitutes the present era at the time of writing the thesis, it 
cannot be forecast how long this regime is going to last. However, the fact that so 
many important events and changes happened within the industry in the first four 
years of the regime alone is enough to clearly indicate the importance of this 
" Please see the discussions on the existing studies of Thai telecommunications reform 
programme in Chapter 2. 
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period, which should not be overlooked, as it is undoubtedly an important 
historical period in the industry's development. 
On a larger scale, by being a qualitative single case study, the specific focus on 
the case of Thailand could be argued to have limited generalisability15. However, 
the fact that the study centres on the Thai reform experience does not necessarily 
mean that it does not have any validity in the larger context. For example, Noll 
(1999) and Singh (2000) argue that empirical knowledge about neo-liberal reform 
of the telecommunications industry among developing countries still remains as 
the main gap in the pool of knowledge. As for the case of Thailand, it is true that 
the Thai telecommunications industry presents some specific and deeply- 
embedded arrangements (e. g. the legal or the Build-Transfer- Operate (BTO) 
concession scheme). However, under closer examination, there are a number of 
similarities that the Thai reform experiences are able to share with other countries 
or even to provide some conceptual contributions to existing knowledge. 
First of all, consistent with the general idea of the historical institutionalism, the 
thesis reveals that the local political context is a key shaping factor in the design, 
implementation, and outcome of an industry reform programme. It could either 
enable the reform to make good progress or seriously hinder the programme. The 
Thai case can be used as a good illustration in this respect since the 
telecommunications reform programme has passed through at least three different 
political settings, in which each setting usually had its own affangements and 
15 According to Grix (2001, p. 33), "Critics of this type of research point out that studies are 
usually small-scale and not generalisable beyond the case researched. " 
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therefore produced different consequences for the reform process. It is found that 
national institutions produced by neither the bureaucratic nor pluralistic eras 
enhanced the reform process; however, the dramatic change in local political 
context in the hegemonic regime was found to be the key explanation for the 
impressive reform progress recently. It appears that the chronic problem of 
interest dispersion is effectively dealt with when the hegemonic government 
utilises its superior political power to capture any powerful vested interests (either 
voluntarily or under compulsion) and make them yield to the reform. Therefore, 
according to the Thai experience where the politics and interest of stakeholders 
are so diffuse, it is reasonable to argue that the semi-authoritarian character of the 
hegemonic regime is a necessary condition to execute reform. 
Moreover, the thesis is also able to contribute in visualising the impacts of 
external reform forces onto a particular country. The fact that Thailand, since 
1997, has encountered a number of external pressures (e. g. the neo-liberalism 
ideology, the financial crisis, or the WTO commitment) makes the study of the 
Thai case an exemplar to understand such impact. It is found that external forces 
that could overcome the institutional inertia and therefore become the real trigger 
of the reform were unable to carry the reform to ultimate success. The reform 
momentum that seems to be strong enough at the beginning was usually 
intercepted by a number of problems embedded within the industry and the 
country themselves. Therefore, it could be argued that national institutional 
arrangements as well as their contextual factors play a crucial role in reforming an 
industry. Domestic arrangements can be a strong counteraction vis-d-vis external 
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forces: in the case of Thailand, domestic institutions appear to be the real 
explanatory factors that bring about reform. 
As for originality, the time covered and the recent changes in political 
environment (both at the national and industry levels) appear to be the important 
factors that provide the originality of this thesis. Although there were several 
existing studies of the Thai telecommunications industry (e. g. those of 
Keeratikrainon, 2002 and Niyomsilpa, 2000), those studies had different focus 
points and, most importantly, confined their observations to and drew their 
conclusions from year 2000 information at the latest' 6. What is now, however, 
deserving of closer study is the fact that there were dramatic changes within the 
industry's politics, as well as the entire telecommunications reform programme, 
after the coming of PM Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001. It brought the industry 
environment and the reform programme to a new and interesting outlook. An in- 
depth study on such a topic under the new political regime, which is almost totally 
different from the previous ones, is therefore novel; it is surely beneficial to know 
how political enviromnents would have consequences for industry's 
institutionalism, and therefore the reform programme. Besides, the primary data 
used also contribute to the thesis' originality. A series of elite interviews that 
were mostly done in late 2004 and the beginning of 2005 with very high-level 
figures in the Thai telecommunications industry should provide the thesis with 
very exclusive, insightful, and up-to-date data. Not only because it was obtained 
from important figures of the industry, but it was also a set of data collated when 
16 A brief description of the works of Niyornsilpa and Keeratikrainon will be provided in Chapter 
2. 
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the reform had already moved into a phase of greater clarity. For instance, this 
thesis is the first academic work that utilises the data obtained from direct 
interviews with the telecommunications regulators (which was established in 
October 2004), as well as the management and labour unions of the already 
corporatised SOTEs (the Telephone Organisation of Thailand (TOT) was 
corporatised in July 2002, while the Communications Authority of Thailand 
(CAT) was corporatised in August 2003). 
The study of the Thai telecommunications reform programme, following the 
stated central questions, is expected to provide some findings that are original to 
this thesis. For example, the thesis is going to propose that the dispersal of 
interest among politically powerful interest groups was the main problem with the 
earlier Thai reform programme; the thesis is going to argue that the politics of 
Thai telecommunications (at least between 2001 and 2005) is strong, centralised, 
and very well insulated from any outside pressures; and, finally, the thesis is 
going to show that the change in the telecommunications political environment to 
a more or less hegemonic type strongly impacts the industry's earlier institutional 
arrangements and such change is a key attribute of the impressive progress of the 
refonn recently, as it is this which is able to effectively deal with the previous key 
problem - interest dispersion. 
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THESIS STRUCTURE 
The thesis comprises nine chapters. The first chapter provides the introduction to 
the thesis, the methodology used, as well as the contributions and originality of 
the thesis. Chapter 2 presents the literature review, which highlights works, 
theories, concepts, or debates that are relevant to this thesis. The review of 
literature therefore provides the general understanding of the existing knowledge 
surrounding the research topic. Importantly, it also reveals if there are any gaps in 
the knowledge relating to this particular research area that this thesis can fill. 
Chapter 3 introduces the three different political regimes that the reform had 
passed through. The chapter brings forward how different political enviromnents 
would have consequences on industry politics and therefore the reform 
programme as a whole. It focuses mainly on the arrival of the new politics, and 
also the new leadership of the country, which appears to have had large effects on 
telecommunications politics, industry institutional arrangements, and the entire 
reform programme. After that, Chapter 4 provides comprehensive information 
nu about the Thai telecommunications industry as well as its reform programme 
since the beginning. It reveals some unique arrangements of the industry, which 
heavily influence the development of the industry to what it is at the present. The 
chapter also talks about the pressures for Thailand to reform its 
telecommunications industry and also raises the country's outstanding reform 
issues that effectively hinder the reform programme. 
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The subsequent chapters, Chapters 5 to 7, provide an in-depth analysis of the three 
outstanding reform issues of Thailand. Each chapter is devoted to one issue, 
which are the privatisation of SOTEs (Chapter 5), the conversion of existing 
telecommunications "Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO)" concessions (Chapter 6), 
and the establishment of the telecommunications independent regulatory body 
(Chapter 7), respectively. The problems experienced in dealing with each issue 
are also explored and, most importantly, the reasons that lie at the root of those 
problems are also investigated. 
Chapter 8 explores how the new political regime managed to produce a lot of 
progress within the reform programme. It examines how the hegemonic 
government has affected the previous key problem of the reform (interest 
dispersion), the three reform issues, and therefore the reform programme as a 
whole. The final chapter (Chapter 9) recapitulates all the findings and identifies 
the implications that can be drawn from the case. Towards the end, it also 
discusses the limitations of the current thesis and suggests some future research 
opportunities. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
Telecommunications have become a necessity for the well being of a country, 
both socially and economically. In a social context, telecommunications have 
become a basic need for most of the population. The ability to be connected with 
others as well as to receive information has almost become a basic human right 
that every country strives to deliver to its citizens. In fact, it is believed to be an 
important tool in reducing the social gap, promoting equality among people in the 
society, and therefore increasing social welfare. In an economic sense, 
telecommunications is also very important. It is becoming one of the most crucial 
factors for the modem economy of today. It appears to be an important parameter 
in promoting economic development (Scherer, 1994). As such, Petrazzini (1995) 
further stresses the importance of telecommunications in the near future in 
expectation of the convergence of telecommunications and computers. Such 
technology will surely become an invaluable resource for a country to remain 
competitive and flourish both at the national and international levels. 
Over previous decades, the telecommunications industry in different countries 
gradually emerged and diverged. Some countries began with state-run industries, 
with some others being privately run. However, after a certain period, the flaws 
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within the industry, either government failure, market failure, or advances in 
technology, usually began to appear, which as a result exposed the need to refonn 
the industry. In fact, the idea of telecommunications industry reform has existed 
for a long time. It is actually something both developed and developing countries 
had either implemented, or were in the process of implementing. 
On the academic side, although there are plenty of theories or explanations that 
can be brought forward to explain the need for as well as the obstacles to refonn, 
the studies of telecommunications reform itself, on the other hand, are also able to 
provide a pool of knowledge for academics of many persuasions. Indeed, as the 
reform programmes are still ongoing in many places around the world, the new 
knowledge or findings can still be expected to yield insightful and valuable 
revelations. 
As for the current chapter, the first part will be concerned with the review of 
relevant theoretical materials, which contribute to the understanding of the broad 
picture of the reform programme and its important issues. The chapter will then 
put more focus on the real world telecommunications reform experiences to view 
the similarities and differences among the nations. The literature relating 
specifically to Thailand will also be mentioned towards the end to determine 
whether there is any knowledge gap for further exploration. 
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INSTITUTIONALISM 
Before getting deep in to the theoretical materials relating to the industry reform, 
it is worth having some discussions of different understandings of the term 
'institutions'. which a number of scholars (e. g. Hall & Taylor, 1996; North, 1990 
and Steinmo,, 2001) claim a crucial role in the policy process (ranging from policy 
formation, policy implementation, to policy outcome) in any political system. 
Within the scientific community, the generally accepted definition of an 
institution is still under debate (Guy Peters, 1999 and Immergut, 1998). It is 
found that there is a wide range of definitions of institution proposed by new 
institutional i sts. Some scholars (e. g. Hall & Taylor, 1996) see institutions as the 
formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the 
organisational structure of the polity or political economy. On the other hand, 
some other scholars (e. g. Thelen & Steinmo, 1992) raise a range of examples 
a "'bout what constitutes an institution ranging from formal government structures 
(legislature) through legal institutions (electoral laws) through more amorphous 
social institutions (social class), and appear willing to accept all of this disparate 
set of structures as components of the institutional apparatus they will use to 
explain political phenomena. 
Even though there is no clear definition of institution, institutions have been used 
for a long time as central objects of study in various fields (e. g. social science, 
political science, and economics). As for political science, institutions are 
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believed to be the foundation of all political behaviours (Steinmo, 2001). They 
can be used to explain how government policy choices are made, and seek to 
determine what the policy outcomes are likely to be, given a particular political 
decision-making process and context. Broadly speaking, there are two main 
analytical approaches in the studying of institutionalism 17 , which are historical 
institutionalism and rational-choice institutionalism (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). 
Even though both schools share a concern with the question of how institutions 
shape political strategies and influence outcomes, goals of scholars in these two 
schools separate these approaches in some rather fundamental ways. 
According to Steim-no (2001), historical institutional i sts are primarily interested in 
the studying of institutions in order to understanding and explaining specific real 
world political outcomes. Historical institutionalists however rarely insist that 
"institutions are the only causal force in politics" (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 10); 
they rather see institutions as intervening variables through which battles over 
interest, ideas, and power are fought. Historical institutionalists also believe that, 
under particular institutional settings, the policy choices made will have a 
continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future - 
referred to as "path dependency" (Krasner, 1984). The fact that institutions are 
deeply rooted and resistant to change (Thatcher, 1999) should help maintain the 
path during period of institutional stability. However, it is also found that, 
17 However, to some other institutionalists, institution analytical approach could be separated in 
another way. For instance, Hall and Taylor (1996) propose three different analytical approaches, 
which are (1) historical institutionalism, (2) rational-choice institutionalism, and (3) sociological 
institutionalism; or Immergut (1998) propose another set of three approaches, which are (1) 
historical institutionalism, (2) rational-choice institutionalism, and (3) oganisational theory 
institutionalism. 
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periodically, such path can be disrupted when institutional stability is punctured - 
referred to as "punctuated equilibrium" (Krasner) - by the right configuration of 
circumstance, such as the internationalisation or the change of political regime 
(Guy Peters, 1999 and Thatcher, 1999). Once the punctuated equilibrium 
happens, it usually brings about relatively abrupt institutional change, after which 
institutional stasis should again sets in (Krasner). 
On the other hand, as argued by Steimno (2001), the goal of rational-choice 
institutionalism is different. Rational-choice institutional i sts see institutions as 
important features of a strategic context, imposing constraints on self-interested 
behaviour (Thelen & Steimno, 1992). Rational-choice scholars tend to focus on 
rules of the game that causes political actors to strategically choose a particular 
political choice to maximise their own ends, which after all should help in 
understanding and predicting political behaviour. As argued by Weingast (2002), 
although the rational-choice institutionalism has much in common with other 
approaches to institutions, rational-choice has it distinctive features, most 
importantly, providing the micro-foundations of institutional analysis. The theory 
has no means of explaining why political systems move from one arrangement to 
another; rather, the greatest achievement of rational-choice institutionalism has 
been to provide tools for studying political outcomes in particular institutional 
settings (Steinmo). All in all, rational-choice institutionalism usually focuses on 
the micro-level at a specific point in time; thus, it appears to be more suitable to 
explain a particular situation. It is incapable of generalising its study in the macro- 
level or in the history process. 
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NATIONALISATION AND THE ARGUMENTS 
The era of "nationalisation" began when a number of developed countries applied 
protectionism and created a number of state owned enterprises (SOEs) to foster 
economic growth in the decades following the Second World War (Clarke & 
Pitelis, 1993). At that time, a high level of state involvement was believed to be 
essential to enhance the economic growth of the country. As mentioned by 
Bishop, Kay and Mayer (1995), nationalisation was believed to be a powerful 
economic justification after the privately run services showed so called "market 
failures" 18 
. The concept was especially appropriate for an industry with the 
characteristic of a natural monopoly or economy of scale. Nationalisation 
therefore suggested that goods or services would be most cost-efficient if 
produced by only one producer (usually meaning the state). In a way, as cited by 
Vickers and Yarrow (198 8), the idea of nationalisation also goes hand in hand 
with the thought of Karl Marx, as he opposes the private ownership as the means 
of production by arguing that public management will do better than private 
management in terms of economic efficiency, especially for a monopolised 
industry. The telecommunications industry was always a classic example of a 
nationalised industry. Both natural monopoly and economies of scale were 
apparent characteristics when it was reliant on fixed line technology; therefore, 
the telecommunications industry in most economies was among the first industries 
to be nationalised. 
" Armstrong et al. (1994) categorises market failures into three classes, which are (1) problems of 
asymmetric information, (2) problems of externalities, and (3) problems of monopoly power or 
market power. 
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However, following the expansion of state control and SOEs, it was found that the 
state in many countries had over-extended itself in attempting to intervene or 
control private enterprise through various measures (e. g. licensing, price control, 
and so forth), and that these attempts turned out to hinder economic growth rather 
than stimulate it. Moreover, performance of state-run businesses, compared to 
private, was very controversial, and it became uncertain whether they constituted 
a good way to create and sustain economic growth. As a result, the idea of 
"government-bureaucratic failure" was raised by many scholars (e. g. Chang and 
Rowthorn, 1995 and Niskanen,, 1975) as an argument against nationalisation. 
This argument became widely disseminated in many countries. In fact, the 
nationalisation concept was challenged on many occasions from both the 
economic and political perspective. 
From the economic perspective, Niskanen (1975) is a strong advocate of the 
goverranent failure theory. After testing a series of hypotheses, he concludes that 
government expenditure is excessive; goverment production is less efficient than 
private; government production is more capital-intensive than it needs to be; 
consolidation of bureaus decreases competition, increases monopoly power, and 
increases budgets. He further argues that market failure is not a justified reason 
for govermnent intervention or domination. In this regard, Vickers and Yarrow 
also argue on similar lines that, 
The history of the nationalised industries has shown that ... a system of control that relies 
heavily upon agents' intemalisation of the public interest objectives is unlikely to produce 
good performance. In the event ... the results of the policy 
failure have included widespread 
goal displacement, lack of clarity in corporate objectives, overlapping responsibilities and 
excessive ministerial intervention in operational decisions. These in turn have had detrimental 
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effects on the pricing, investment and internal efficiency performance of the nationalised 
industries (1988, p, 15 1). 
As for the more recent works, Weiss (1995) states that there has been a 
considerable reappraisal of the role of the government, and it was found that from 
being regarded as an engine of development in the early days, the government 
later came to be seen as part of the problem, rather than the solution. In this 
regard, Bishop et al. (1995) also disagree with direct intervention by the 
government. They argue that it was ineffective and unjustifiable to try to correct 
market failure by direct intervention; they propose that a far better solution was 
private ownership combined with regulation targeted directly on the identified 
source of market failure. 
As for the political perspective, Friedman (1962) and Stigler (198 8) share similar 
observations on the risks associated with a government-led economy. Firstly, 
there is a possibility that the government would be captured by special interests or 
powerful organised groups. Although, in theory, the "public interest" is supposed 
to be the main concern of the nationalised industry, Horwitz (1989) argues that the 
behaviour of the state is frequently found to betray or pervert the public interest 
standard19. Secondly, the unintended inefficiencies embedded in the government 
agencies could be transferred to the goods or services provided by the state. A 
number of existing studies on the inferiority of the state-run service compared to 
the private-run (e. g. the studies of De Alessi in 1980 and Weiss in 1995) could be 
19 Horwitz (1989) also provides the general reasons for the perversion of public interest. Most are 
the "influence model", which is comprised of (1) instrumental, (2) structural, and (3) capture. 
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seen as good evidence in this respect20 . As a result, the state-run services thus 
might not be as good as they are claimed to be in the ideal of nationalisation. 
In a nutshell, the nationalisation concept was significantly undennined by the 
govenunent failure theory. The government failure enthusiasts believe that 
govenunent control and intervention are undesirable because they distort the 
market and the price structure, which will surely have adverse effects on the 
economic performance of the country at a later time. Although there is substantial 
evidence suggesting drawbacks of government direct intervention within the 
economy, it is inappropriate to generalise that state ownership and government 
intervention are necessarily the sources of economic inefficiencies. There are 
exceptions in the real world. The "East Asian Economic Model" (EAEM) puts in 
question the wide application of the government failure concept. According to 
Singh (2000) and Weiss (1995), the countries in East Asia (e. g. South Korea, 
China, and Singapore) experienced impressive economic growth and remarkable 
infrastructure expansion, including telecommunications, during the 1990s, even 
though they were under strict government controls and promotional measureS21. 
Weiss has appropriately summarised the situation of the EAEM in commenting 
that, "the reconciliation of this contradictory experience probably requires an 
understanding of the political-economy framework in those countries that allow 
control to be devised and applied with positive effects" (1995, p. 7). 
20 More discussions will be provided later in the chapter under "ownership" topic. 
21 Singh (2000) however expresses reservations on the EAEM. He proposes that, as economic and 
political liberalism make an entrance in East Asia, it is hard to predict if its current institutions will 
be able to enforce the property rights as effectively as they have done in the past. 
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY REFORM 
Setting aside the case of the EAEM, where Singh (2000) has noted that it may 
work at a particular stage of development under specific conditions, the 
legitimacy of government control and intervention in the economy seems to be 
declining in most other countries. In order to revive the economy from state 
domination, the role of the state as a producer has to be reconsidered; while all 
economic distortions also have to be fixed. Although these prescriptive 
statements could be found in a number of conventional wisdoms,, the most notable 
one is widely known as the "Washington Consensus". The consensus is 
considered an important milestone of the industry reform as well as of the rise of 
neo-liberalism. According to Looney (2003), the consensus is a set of free-market 
economy guidelines produced by the multilateral agencies that are based in 
Washington, DC (e. g. the World Bank and the IMF). Within the consensus, 
countries were encouraged to promote liberalisation by reducing barriers against 
imports and eventually aiming to achieve free trade. Privatisation of SOEs and 
industry deregulation were also key elements in the consensus policies. In short, 
the substance of the consensus was to encourage countries to carry out economic 
and industry reforms; the governments were expected to withdraw from economic 
activity and intervene as little as possible. Ultimately, freeing the market was 
seen as the most important factor in promoting successful and sustainable 
development22 
22 Afterward, some critics (e. g. Stiglitz) argue the Washington Consensus that it seemed rather 
deepen the problems of some recipient countries. Anyhow, regarding of industry reform, Fine et 
al. (2001, p. xiii) propose that "it is imperative to stress that the gradually forming Post- 
Washington Consensus remains deeply conservative in the fiscal and monetary matters; it does not 
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Looking at the telecommunications industry, the nationalised telecommunications 
industry in various countries was also impacted by the wave of economic reform. 
The previous dominant roles of the state in all functions within the industry (i. e. 
policy maker, regulator, and operator) had been systematically reformed. 
Beginning in the more developed countries (e. g. the US and the UK), the 
telecommunications industry reform was carried out by a number of developing 
countries at a later time. The fact that there were more than 90 developing 
countries that started to reform their telecommunications industry during 1990 - 
1998 is an obvious indication of the importance of the trend of 
telecommunications industry refonn (Izaguirre, 1999) 
Reasons to Reform 
Although different countries entail different circumstances, there are several 
common factors that explain the need to reform the telecommunications industry 
in most countries, which are the inefficiency of the SOTEs, the deterioration of 
the natural monopoly rationale, and the global trend and pressure from 
transnational forces. 
First and foremost, the inefficiency of the SOTEs is usually the primary reason for 
a country to reform its telecommunications industry. The government failure 
theory seems to hold with most state-run telecommunications services. There are 
a number of studies affirming the inferiority of the state-run service compared to 
in principle oppose liberalisation and deregulation, and it is broadly in favour of free trade and 
privatisation. " 
42 
private-run service. For example, Boardman and Vining (1989) find statistical 
evidence showing that the public sector firms in many developed countries (e. g. 
Italy, France, Gen-nany, Britain, Japan) perfonn worse than private firms under 
every criterion considered, which were profitability, sales per employee, and sales 
per asset. Moreover, Weiss (1995) also tries to examine the root of the 
inefficiency of the SOTEs. He suggests that the broad and conflicting objectives 
(between the performance and social responsibility) usually led the SOTEs to 
demonstrate poor performance in both main objectives. 
Secondly, the natural monopoly theory that used to justify the state domination in 
the past has also been seriously undermined recently due to more advanced 
technology. Newbery affirms that, "Before the digital revolution, the local 
network was a classic natural monopoly. Economies of scope argued for a single 
network provider. However, after the digital revolution and the ensuing rapid 
growth in traffic, the advantages of a single provider rapidly decreased" (1999, p. 
315). Wallsten (1999) and Wellenius and Stem (1994) also assert that 
technological innovation (along with the growth in demand) are motivations for 
the industry's liberalisation and privatisation. In fact, Weiss (1995) argues that, 
under today's environment, the state is no longer justified in being the service 
provider, except only when it is clear that the state initiatives are sensible, either 
because the state has an obvious comparative advantage in such an area or 
because appropriate private initiatives will not be forthcoming; unfortunately, 
neither of these reasons is convincing in the telecommunications industry in most 
places in the twenty first century. 
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The last impetus to reform is influence from transnational forces. The leading 
intemational organisations (e. g. the World Bank, the IMF, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)) 
unanimously endorse the telecommunications industry reform to all their recipient 
countnes 23 .T ese organisations believe that a country and its people will benefit 
from the reform, which includes the privatisation of SOTEs, the liberalisation of 
the industry, and the initiation of an effective regulatory regime. Although 
institutionalists would believe that a nation usually has a certain level of resistance 
to change, it is found that "resistance can be overcome if countries become closely 
interlinked through ideas, supranational institutions, and market integration. " 
(Thatcher, 1999, p. 319). In fact, by the late 1980s, recommendations from these 
intemational organisations have become (or believed to be) more or less normal 
practices, and are almost unavoidable for most developed and developing 
countries if they want to stay shoulder to shoulder with other countries in the 
modem economic environment (Fine et al., 2001). 
Impacts of telecommunications reform 
With regard to the impacts of the telecommunications industry reform on the 
economy, the experiences from developed countries provide convincing evidence 
that the economy as a whole benefits from the reform, especially in the long run. 
Many scholars (e. g. Bailey and Pack, 1995 and Wellenius and Stem, 1994) 
propose that the reform provides a more favourable environment for the 
23 For example, please see details in Letters of Intent (LOI) Thailand made with the IMF or the 
commitment on basic telecommunications service Thailand made with WTO (shown in Table 4.9). 
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development of the industry as well as for the growth of the economy in general; 
at the same time it also helps in promoting social welfare among the people within 
the society. The relationship between telecommunications reform and the overall 
economy perfon-nance can also be illustrated quantitatively. The studies 
conducted by Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000), Fink, Mattoo and Rathindran (200 1) 
and Wallsten (1999) all reveal that telecommunications refon-n usually has a 
positive relationship with the increase of sector performance through a better 
industry environment and the pressure for more healthy competition. 
The benefits of telecommunications reform became even more apparent when it 
was endorsed by the results of the seminar arranged in Washington, DC in 1991. 
The seminar specifically focused on telecommunications reform. It was jointly 
hosted by the World Bank, the ITU, and the Commonwealth Telecommunications 
Organisation. The event brought together over one hundred participants who 
were involved in the telecommunications reform programme from more than 40 
countries. The purpose of the seminar was to examine the experiences from 
various countries that were implementing the reform in the telecommunications 
industry. According to Wellenius and Stem (1994), the seminar clearly revealed 
that, in order to overcome persistent shortfalls in the development of 
telecommunications, it was necessary to attract private investment and new 
entrants into the business as well as to shift the role of government from being the 
industry dominator to the sector policy maker as well as the regulator. The 
seminar further revealed that telecommunications reform obviously produced a 
number of positive results for the reforming economy. For instance, the industry 
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benefits from higher productivity; the services are more varied and of a higher 
quality; and, so far, most stakeholders are content with the reform programme. 
All in all, telecommunications reform is now widely considered as a strategic 
policy for a country to maintain and develop its competitiveness at all levels - the 
national, regional, or even firm levels. Unsurprisingly, it is found that a number 
of countries in every region chose to apply the telecommunications reform as a 
spearhead to strengthen their macro economy and their national competitiveness 
(Wellenius & Stem). 
Political environment and the reform programme 
The political environment is considered one of the crucial factors for the refonn 
programme. There are some studies addressing how the political environment 
could affect the telecommunications reform programme. However, the findings 
of these studies provided a mixed picture. Some showed that a country with an 
open and pluralist political system is more favourable to the success of the reform 
programme, while others revealed different results. 
On the one hand, studies of scholars like Duch and Schiller found that an open 
and decentralised political system is complementary to the reform programme. 
The experiences of the UK (Duch, 1991) and the US (Schiller, 1982) share the 
same finding in that it was the large corporate telecommunications users who 
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asked for market liberalisation and refonn of the traditional arrangement for 
service provision. As for the case of the UK, Duch (1991, p. 257) concludes, 
The recent British experience also provides an important insight into the political factors that 
facilitate privatization and the lowering of industry entry barriers. Pluralist institutions in 
Britain have favoured the development of strong demand for change, and they have afforded 
government the flexibility to implement far-reaching changes based on the support of 
minimum winning coalitions. 
As the demand for reform arose from the majority of industry stakeholders 
themselves, the resistance thus turned out to be minimal, which accordingly 
enabled the reform to move forward quite smoothly. However, one has to keep in 
mind that although the demand for reform among these developed countries arose 
from within the industry, it did not necessarily mean a resistance-free reform, 
especially in the implementation stage. For instance, in the case of the UK, 
although it was the users (the Telecommunications Managers Association (TMA), 
which included the largest 400 corporations operating in Britain) that played a 
central role in demanding telecommunications reform in Britain (Duch, 1991), the 
privatisation of BT still faced resistance from employees and management. This 
is why PM Margaret Thatcher had to make a strategic executive decision to 
privatise BT intact as an integrated dominant firm. Even though the government 
claimed the desire for rapid privatisation as a reason, it seemed that the decision 
was actually made to appease the BT employees and management and to make the 
privatisation happen (Armstrong et al., 1994). 
On the other hand, Petrazzini (1995) has a different view. He argues that Duch's 
claim might not necessarily hold, especially among the cases of less developed 
countries (LDCs). By focusing on many different LDCs (e. g. Argentina and 
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Mexico), Petrazzini proposes an entirely opposite conclusion that a closed and a 
centralised political envirom-nent is suitable in carrying out the refonn 
programme. He finds that the reform initiation among these countries was 
exogenous to the industry; it was normally initiated by the executive branch with 
the objective of relieving a country's financial difficulty, not in searching for 
higher efficiency or better services. Therefore, the refonn usually encountered 
strong resistance from societal actors with a vested interest in the industry. He 
surnmarises his findings, 
Relatively closed political systems (i. e., those in which the state enjoys a considerable 
autonomy from civil society and presents a significant concentration of power in the 
executive) are more successful in introducing reform in the sector than more open polities 
(i. e., those in which the state is vulnerable to pressures from civil society and where political 
power is dispersed throughout the political system) (Petrazzini, p. 195). 
Williamson and Haggard (1994) also have similar beliefs to Petrazzini's. They 
studied the cases of economic reform in many different developing countries (e. g. 
Chile, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey) and found that, where the level of 
social conflict over economic policy is high and democratic institutions are weak, 
66 reform needs, or at least is easier with, an authoritarian regime" (p. 567). 
Approaches to reform 
According to Collings (1994), there are four main approaches normally used in 
reforming an mdustrY24 . Although all approaches 
have the same ultimate goal, 
they are quite different in the implementing stages. Each approach has its own 
24 The approaches are (1) piecemeal approach, (2) gradualist approach, (3) goal-oriented approach, 
and (4) strategic approach. For details of each approach, see Collings (1994, pp. 5 67 -58 1). 
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strengths and weaknesses. It is therefore difficult to tell which approach may be 
used as a reform prototype or will produce the best outcome for the implementing 
economy. In this respect, Collings proposes that, "successful completion of sector 
refonn will require significant resources and depend on access to the necessary 
data and policy guidance to ensure that the sector reform is geared particularly to 
national circumstances rather than some generic model of sector development. " 
(1994, p. 574). Besides, the fact that Cowhey suggests that, "the structure of 
political incentives and political institutions in each country powerfully shapes 
how the country will reallocate the property rights and reorganize the regulation 
of the communications system" (199 1, p. 3) should be able to further stress the 
importance of national institutionalism to the industry reform programme. 
Although many scholars (e. g. Thatcher, 1999 and Wellenius & Stem, 1994) agree 
that the industry reform programme is a case-by-case analysis, as it depends 
largely on the domestic arrangements, it does not mean that the experiences from 
other places are irrelevant. Valuable lessons can usually be drawn from 
experiences. Despite differences between nations, reform experiences (either 
successes or failures) are crucial for the reforming economy (Newbery, 1999). In 
fact, these governments should be well informed on every aspect of the reform 
strategies and their consequences in order to adapt those lessons to fit their own 
situations. 
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BASIC ISSUES OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM 
In order to implement the reform programme, several distinct but closely related 
basic issues have to be considered, which are ownership, competition, and 
regulation (Noll, 1999 and Petrazzini, 1995). Although most countries realised 
that these issues are crucial for successful reform, reform programmes in some 
countries still produce unsatisfactory outcomes. This once again was resulted 
from the fact that each country has different circumstances and limitations; 
therefore, the implementation of each reform issue must be done differently. 
Importantly, the reforming country also has to be aware that these reform issues 
are all inter-related; the results produced from one issue surely affect the others, 
and therefore, the entire programme as a whole. 
Ownership 
Adam Smith 25 touches upon the issue of the state ownership and operating 
performance as early as 1776, 
In every great monarchy in Europe, the sale of crown lands would produce a very large sum of 
money, which, if applied to the payment of the public debts, would deliver from mortgage a 
much greater revenue than any which those lands have ever afforded to the crown. When the 
crown lands had become private property, they would, in the course of a few years, become 
well improved and well cultivated (as cited in Vickers & Yarrow, 1988, p. 1). 
25 Adam Smith is widely known for his free market perspective. He vigorously attacks most forms 
of government interference in the economic process, arguing that such interference creates 
inefficiency and high prices in the long run. However, Smith's idea also has a counter argument. 
One of the most renowned arguments is made by Polanyi (1957). Polanyi believes that the 
development of the market should go hand in hand with the development of the state. In fact, he 
argues that the powerful state was needed to push changes in social structure that allowed for a 
competitive capitalist economy, and that a capitalist economy required a strong state to mitigate its 
harsher effects. 
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For a more updated premise, Weiss (1995) links the matter of ownership to the 
perfon-nance of organisation in his study; he asserts that the relationship between 
the owner and the employee of a particular organisation is critical to the 
prosperity of the organisation 26 . With public ownership, property rights are 
diffused and no one is the real owner; consequently, there is no individual willing 
to seriously monitor or control the SOE. Although it can be argued that the SOE 
is owned and controlled by the state, however, this form of control is weak or 
forces the SOE to have contradictory objectives between commercial and social 
aspects. 
On most occasions, reform of ownership implies the privatisation of SOEs. The 
essence of the privatisation is to fundamentally increase private participation in 
the activities that were previously dominated by the state; therefore privatisation 
covers a wide variety of forms, ranging from management contracts, contracting 
out, to divestiture. However, most of the available literature places the main focus 
of the privatisation strategy on the divestiture alternative. This could be attributed 
to the fact that this strategy has received the most attention in the policy 
discussions and has been used most in the real world. 
Some scholars have criticised that ownership plays relatively the least significant 
role in the reform result compared to the other two reform issues, which are 
26 The principal-agent relationship can be applied to explain the importance of the ownership. By 
comparing the owners and managers of an organisation as a principal and agent respectively, 
Martin and Parker (1997) propose that the diffusion of the owners causes "noise" to distort the 
information flow between the principal and agents. Therefore, privatisation is viewed as the 
change of the nature of the relationship to reduce this "noise" and therefore facilitate the more 
effective incentive systems that bind agents to the principals' goals. 
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competition and regulation. According to Singh (2000) and Yarrow (1986), 
where the market is reasonably competitive, competition and regulation are likely 
to be the more important determinants of economic performance than ownership. 
This is consistent with Dempsey (2000), who proposes that there is only a minor 
difference in whether a firm is privately or publicly owned as long as it operates 
in a competitive market. Nonetheless, there are also several studies that mention 
the unclear results of the impact of ownership on the firm's performance. By 
applying statistical methods, the widely cited empirical work of Millward (1988) r- 
finds that there is no clear statistical relationship to support the claim that 
ownership is the key factor that allows the SOE to have a lower operating 
efficiency than a private firm. Rowthom and Chang (1993) further assert that 
private ownership per se does not guarantee better performance. Works that 
equate efficiency with private ownership probably contain some misleading 
points; they argue that public enterprise could be as efficient as the private if it is 
free from political interference. 
On the other hand, many more studies have been done to show that ownership 
does matter to the firm's operating performance, especially in a highly 
competitive and well-regulated enviromnent. Privatising the SOE will materially 
affect the incentive structures and hence the behaviour of management. De Alessi 
(1980) finds a lot of evidence showing that ownership really does affect the 
behaviour of the firm in a systematic and predictable manner 27 . He suggests that 
27 De Alessi (1980) raises the "residual claimant theory" to explain the superiority of the privately- 
owned to the publicly-owned. Providing "the profit" (also known as "the residual" in property 
rights literature) as an incentive, private firms tend to work harder and more efficiently than the 
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government-owned fin-ns, relative to privately-owned firms, are less successful in 
satisfying consumer needs, are less efficient, and incur higher costs. The analysis 
of Boardman and Vining (1989) also reveals a similar result. Their statistical 
analysis was conducted to test the performance of public, mixed, and private firms 
in a competitive environment. They find that the SOEs and the mixed enterprises 
performed substantially worse than privately-owned firms. Moreover, a similar 
verdict still holds when Wallsten. (2001) applies an econometric analysis to his 
data on the telephone services from various countries. His study reveals that state 
monopoly provision correlated with lower telecommunications penetration and 
higher long-distance prices than privately provided services; additionally state- 
owned monopolies provided worse rural services. 
In summary, although there is no conclusive evidence about the sole effect of the 
ownership on the firm's performance, it is possible to conclude that a firm's 
performance, including the quality of service, will dramatically improve if the 
SOE has been privatised in a competitive and well-regulated environment. 
Competition 
In the context of the industry reform, competition and liberalisation are closely 
linked. Most of the time, liberalisation is the vehicle to create competition 28. In 
places where there is a free and fair competition, the benefits of competition for 
public enterprises to achieve "the residual" since the rights to profits are clearly defined for private 
firms while they are diffuse and uncertain for public enterprises. 
'8 Rowthorn and Chang (1993) explains the term "liberalisation" as the allowance of private 
companies to compete for the contracts previously limited to publicly owned bodies. Therefore, 
the ultimate goal of liberalisation is to create competition. 
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the industry and the economy are undisputed 29 . Scholars such as Newbery (1999) 
and Schultz (1994) agree that competition will provide both incentives for 
efficiency and a means to transfer the gains to customers. As proposed by 
Clifford (1993), competition enhances efficiency by dissipating the rents that 
accrued to some well-organised groups (e. g. the incumbents or workers). It forces 
producers to set the price closer to the real cost in order to compete with other 
producers, which means lower profits for producers; it also forces workers to 
work more efficiently to reduce costs and increase productivity, which means the 
lower rents of labour. In fact, a number of existing studies reveal the efficacy of 
competition in most cases. Wallsten (1999) applies an econometric analysis to 
Latin American and African telecommunications reform data; he finds that 
competition is the most successful agent of change. It correlates with the 
increases in the per capita numbers of main lines, pay phones, and connection 
capacity; it also correlates with the decrease in the price of local calls. In addition, 
Mattoo, Rathindran and Subramanian (2001) also apply econometrics to test the 
wisdom of competition and find that the openness of the service industry has a 
direct influence on the long run growth perfonnance of the industry. 
In order to create competition within the industry, one particular theory has to be 
referred to, namely "the theory of the contestable market" (Baumol, Panzar 
Willig, 1982). The theory explains that the threat of potential competition is at its 
29 However, one has to note that the benefits of competition could be seen differently from the 
political scientists' aspect, as they would be more interested in distributive impacts, which go 
beyond net welfare gains and losses. 
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most potent in a contestable market 30 . In such circumstances, the 
incumbents are 
compelled to do their best to meet customers' needs with maximum efficiency; 
otherwise, other newcomers will simply take their business and customers away 
(Clarke & Pitelis, 1993). In short, the reform in the context of competition 
suggests that the government has to promote contests within the market, as the 
impediments to entry and exit are the most influential factors that interfere with 
market efficiency. 
Regulation 
Regulation is a set of legal restrictions promulgated by government administration 
agencies. It attempts to produce or prevent outcomes (which might not otherwise 
occur) through rulemaking supported by a threat of sanction or a fine. In the 
economic sense, regulation is usually set to correct or prevent inefficiencies 
caused by market failures within an economy 31 . As such, regulation is justified 
when the market is unable to function properly to discipline the economic actors 
(Peacock, Rickettes & Robinson, 1984). Without effective regulation, the 
dominant incumbents would be able to exploit their customers to earn abnormal 
profits and produce socially unacceptable forms of discrimination. 
Telecommunications regulation was first introduced in North America around the 
beginning of the 1930s when competitive markets could not work properly due to 
30 "Contestable market" means a market in which existing firms are vulnerable to hit-and-run 
entry. All firms have access to the same production, methods, and hence their cost functions are 
identical. Moreover, entry involves no sunk cost: a firm can enter the market without making 
irrevocable expenditures, so there is no exit barrier (Baumol et al., 1982). 
" The detailed definition of "regulation" can be found in 1996 Oxford Dictionary of Politics. 
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the domination of a single private operator (namely, American Telephone and 
Telegraph Corporation: AT&T). The purposes of regulation pointed out by 
scholars such as Smith (1997), Toema (1999) and Vickers and Yarrow (198 8), are 
similar, which can be generalised as: regulation is laid down in order to protect 
consumers from abuse by firms with substantial market power, to support 
investment by protecting investors from arbitrary action by the government, and 
32 to promote economic efficiency . In other words, effective regulation should be 
in harmony with the idea of public interest theory (Organisation for Economics 
Cooperation and Developing [OECD], 1988); not only because it is intended to 
draw the benefits of fair competition among operators, but also because it is used 
to promote social welfare within the entire society. 
Some scholars have mentioned that regulation is sometimes seen as a substitute 
for competition when real competition has not actually arrived. For instance, 
Prosser states, "Regulation would merely be a stop gap until the development of 
effective competition. " (1989, p. 142). The idea is also shared with Littlechild (as 
cited in Grimstone, 1999), as he proposes that competition is indisputably the 
most effective means of protecting consumers against monopoly power. 
Regulation is essential as a means of preventing the worst excesses of monopoly. 
It is not a substitute for competition; rather, it is a means of holding the fort until 
the competition arrives. However, some other experts (e. g. Newbery, 1999 and 
Schultz, 1994) further add that regulation is still needed even in the liberalised 
32 Generally, regulation is often thought of as an activity that restricts behaviour and prevents the 
occurrence of certain undesirable activities, known as "the red light" concept. However, 
regulation can also be designed to be enabling or facilitating efficiency, know as "the green light" 
concept (Baldwin & Cave, 1999). 
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market in order to control the incumbent's market power as well as to take care of 
social issues. Schultz (1994, p. 473) provides a clear evidence, "no country to 
date has been prepared to transfer a public corporation into the private sector 
without imposing some degree of continuing public or social control over its 
activities. " Real experience also supports these scholars' propositions. For 
example, the study of the regulation of the liberalised utility industries in Britain 
perfonned by Young (2001. p. 5) reveals that, 
After liberalisation in utilities, what was expected to be a move to greater freedorn, has in fact 
resulted in far more regulation than had been expected. The light touch that had been hoped 
for has been turned out to be an unexpected heavy hand, and the regulators themselves have 
also been the subject of fierce criticism. 
It appears that regulation is still needed even in the liberalised and competitive 
market; it is also undeniable that the regulations in practice sometimes put 
burdens (e. g. cost in time and on administrative activities) on both the regulated 
and the state itself, which, according to Peacock et al. (1984), it would be 
expected to see producers shift these extra costs elsewhere in so far as market 
conditions permit. The LTK experience of the 2005 "Hampton review" appears to 
have been a sound attempt by the state to deal with such problems 33 . Whereas 
regulation cannot be abandoned, the government can still try to minimise burdens 
and transaction costs. As for the Hampton review, it suggested a fon-nula 
(principally regulatory merger) to streamline the existing regulatory regime to 
make it more efficient and cause fewer burdens on both the regulated and the 
state, while still being able to maintain or even improve regulatory outcomes 34 
3' However, it is found that utility regulation was specifically excluded from the terms of reference 
of the review. 
" Please find more details in the 2005 Hampton review on regulatory inspections and enforcement 
on the Treasury web site (30 October 2005, www. hm-treasury. jzov. uk). 
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Apart from industry rules, another crucial part of regulation is to have a regulator 
who faithfully pursues allocative objectives (Peacock et al., 1984). Derbyshire 
(1999) stresses that the tasks of the regulator are important, as they affect a 
number of stakeholders in the industry. The regulator has to understand and find 
the balance of interest of all stakeholders. However, there are a number of 
arguments about the competence of regulators. The first and the most famous 
argument is the 1971 "capture theory" of the Chicago school (Stigler, 1971). The 
theory mentions the possibility that the regulator would not work for the sake of 
the public, as it is interfered with and eventually captured by the industry it 
regulates 35 . Secondly, Toema (1999) also questions the independence of the 
regulatory body since it has to work under the broad policy guidelines set up by 
the policyrnakers, in other words the politicians. In fact, such notion is even more 
compelling considering the fact raised by Thatcher (2002) that the regulator is a 
non-majoritarian institution; "they are created by legislation; hence elected 
officials are their principals. They are organisationally separate from 
governments and headed by unelected officials. They are given powers over 
regulation, but are also subject to controls by elected politicians and judges. " (p. 
125). Lastly, Dieter (1993) challenges the efficacy of the newly established 
regulatory body since it is hard to believe that the state, as a regulator, would 
suddenly become an efficient regulator, considering the fact that it, as an owner, 
just failed to run the SOTEs effectively. 
35 "The capture theory" as well as its argument will be discussed in details later under the 
discussion on "the regulatory reform". 
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Relationships between the issues 
Although it seems that each refonn issue is distinct, they are in fact closely 
interrelated in reality. All the issues need to be considered and implemented 
systematically. With abundant reform experiences in the telecommunications 
industry, it is now possible to surnmarise the interaction of all three refonn issues, 
or even that between any pair of them. 
Regulation andprivatisation 
Successful privatisation must be accompanied by competent regulation. 
Regulation has to be capable of keeping a rein on the privatised SOE, as it usually 
comes with a market dominant character right after being privatised. Besides, the 
regulation must be capable enough to create incentives for the privatised SOE to 
operate more efficiently. These are reasons why Mattoo et al. (2001) mention that 
privatisation without regulation may be costly to consumers and may not improve 
the services at all. A real case was proposed by Wallsten (1999) when he found 
that, among 30 countries in Africa and Latin America during 1984 - 1997, 
privatisation combined with regulation had a positive correlation with good 
connection capacity and high labour efficiency. 
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Regulation and competition 
Regulation and competition are closely related and complement each other in the 
enhancement of efficiency in the reformed industry. Inadequate regulation and 
inefficient competition can seriously damage consumer welfare and national 
prospenty (Newbery, 1999). Although competition is accepted as an effective 
mechanism to increase efficiency and to protect consumer benefits against a 
monopoly power, however, regulation is always needed, especially in a newly 
reformed industry where competition is still weak and is not contestable (Vickers 
& Yarrow, 1988). In fact, that the industry is already competitive does not mean 
that it needs no further regulation. By looking at the case of UK utilities, it was 
found that regulation became more intense and complex than expected after the 
industry had been liberalised (Young, 2001). 
Competition and Privatisation 
Although it is generally perceived that the benefits of competition for the 
industry's efficiency is superior to the benefits of privatisation per se (Bailey & 
Pack, 1995; Fink et al., 2001 and Wallsten, 2001), both competition and 
pnvatisation theoretically share the same objective, which is the efficient 
functioning of the market and enterprises (Nestor & Nigon, 1996). Fink et al. 
(2001) propose that competition and privatisation have positive evidence on their 
interaction; which means privatisation without pressure from competition may not 
cause any improvements to the industry. This claim is also supported by Newbery 
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(1999); he states that competition and privatisation are naturally complementary 
and, if possible, should be done together. 
Interaction of all reform issues 
When taking all the three basic reform issues into consideration, it seems that 
privatisation of the SOE will relatively be the least important element, while 
competition and regulation are the most critical requirements to promote 
efficiencies within the reformed industry (Dempsey, 2000 and Singh, 2000). 
However, none of the studies demonstrate that effective privatisation is irrelevant 
to the successful reform programme. On the contrary, all three issues turn out to 
be complementary to each other. The study of Fink et al. (2001) affirms that a 
comprehensive reform programme, which includes all the basic issues, has the 
highest chance of producing the optimal outcomes both in terms of industry 
efficiency and stakeholder protection. All in all, it does not seem to be an 
exaggeration to say that a successful industry reform programme should consist of 
the privatisation of any SOE, the liberalisation of the industry, and the 
introduction of a competent regulatory regime. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM EXPERIENCES 
The initiation of deregulation in the US and privatisation of the SOTE in the UK 
led the idea to reform the telecommunications industry among both developed and 
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developing countries around the world. The benefits from the reform were 
promoted so that it became a widely accepted strategic policy to sustain economic 
growth, to enhance competitiveness, and to improve social welfare within a 
country. The fact that, in the early 1990s, all members in the OECD were at 
various stages of restructuring their telecommunications industry could show the 
global credence in the refonn (Wellenius & Stem, 1994). 
Experiences from developed countries 
The most frequently cited case studies of the telecommunications reform 
programme among the developed countries in the existing literatures are those of 
the UK and the US. Interestingly, the difference in background and historical 
industry development made the telecommunications industries of these two 
countries differ markedly before the reform. It is therefore not surprising to see 
that they employed different reform strategies, both in terms of approach and 
implementation. 
The United Kingdom 
The telecommunications reform programme in the UK began in the early 1980s 
under the administration of PM Margaret Thatcher. The UK experience could be 
a good reference point where the industry, before the refonn, was nationalised and 
dominated by the state. 
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As in many other places, the UK telecommunications services provision in the 
past was absorbed into the responsibility of the Post Office from 1912 due to the 
natural monopoly argument 36 . However, in the early 1980s, the 1981 
Telecommunications Act once again separated British Telecom (BT) out of the 
Post Office and abolished BT's legal monopoly over network operation. 
Unfortunately, the abandonment of BT's monopoly right did not threaten BT's 
dominance because the industry did not have sufficient competition at that time 
(Armstrong et al., 1994). Instead, the real problem that threatened BT was the 
tight financial controls over the nationalised industries. The need to raise funds 
for BT's investments became the pressing factor for BT privatisation in 1984. 
The break up (and privatisation) of BT unsurprisingly provoked strong opposition 
from the BT management and employees. However, the government wisely made 
a strategic move by privatising BT intact as an integrated firm to reconcile the 
conflict and to smooth the way for the privatisation (Armstrong et al. ). Although 
it was true that such a decision was undertaken in a very anti-competitive way, the 
British government tried to make up for this with a strong regulator to promote 
competition and protect consumer welfare. 
As for industry regulation, the 1981 Telecommunications Act also required the 
establishment of the telecommunications regulator, the so-called Office of 
Telecommunications (Oftel) 37 . Its main 
duties were to monitor and enforce 
operators' license conditions as well as to act as an adviser to the govenunent on 
36 The telegraph service had been brought under state control at an earlier date. 
37 In 2003, Oftel was replaced by Ofcom (Office of Communications). The duties of Oftel have 
been inherited by Ofcom. Since then, Ofcom has become the regulator for the UK 
communications industries, with responsibilities across television, radio, telecommunications and 
wireless communications services (Ofcom Web Site, I November 2005, www. ofcom. org. u 
). 
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licensing matters and the regulatory environment in general. Though the 
privatisation of BT intact in 1984 tended to create an anti-competitive market 
enviromnent, B eesley and Littlechild (19 8 9) argue that Oftel did a good j ob in 
containing BT's dominant market power and promoting fair competition between 
the incumbent and newcomers. Brown, Hossain and Nguyen (2004) recently 
examine the performance of the LTK regulatory system and propose that, "the 
system seems successful. The prices of telecom services have been reduced, the 
quality of service has improved and customers now have a choice of suppliers and 
services. " (p. 59). 
With regard to competition, the LTK government chose to create competition by 
adopting a duopoly competition policy in the opening phase of both landline and 
mobile businesses. Mercury Telecommunications Limited was allowed to operate 
as the sole competitor for BT on nationwide landline services (Vickers & Yarrow, 
1988), while Cellnet (in which BT had a majority stake) and Vodafone were the 
two companies that were allowed to operate in the mobile business. However, the 
duopoly policy was terminated in 1991 when the operating license was granted on 
a merit basis, as a result of which, there were over 150 operators competing with 
BT by 1995 (Newbery, 1999). 
All in all, the telecommunications reform in the UK is considered successful. 
Competition is on a level playing field; operators are competing against each other 
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efficiently while enjoying reasonable returns (via the "price-cap" regulation 38); the 
regulator does its job neutrally and professionally 39 ; the consumers are happy with 
the advantages of the reform programme. This conclusion was actually affirmed 
by academically backed-up evidence. The cost-benefit analysis of the UK 
telecommunications refonn, based on data in 1990, conducted by Galal, Jones, 
Tandon and Vogelsang (1994) reveal that the refon-n programme benefited 
shareholders, government, and consumers across the board. 
The United States 
The experience of the US telecommunications industry reform provides a 
different lesson from the UK experience. The telecommunications services in the 
US have never been nationalised or run by the state because this is prohibited by 
law (Crandall & Wavennan, 1995). Unlike the case of the UK where the industry 
was dominated by a state owned firm, telecommunications services in the US 
were dominated by a privately owned operator (AT&T) from the start. 
For decades, AT&T was the dominant integrated firm with a more or less 
complete monopoly over apparatus manufacturers, supply and network operations 
both at the local and long-distance level. Although the US has had the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) as the industry regulator since 1934, it could 
38 "Price-Cap" (RPI - x) regulation was invented by the telecommunications regulator and first 
used in the pricing of telecommunications services. It is perceived as an effective strategy to 
increase operators' efficiency and to protect consumers' welfare (Littlechild, 2001). 
39 Although there have been continuing criticisms over the industry dominance of BT, there were a 
number of cases where Oftel came out and forced BT to correct its actions (e. g. with regard to 
claims that BT has hampered customers switching operators ("Telecoms watchdog, " 2002) and to 
claims that BT has charged its rivals too much for wholesale internet access ("BT told to cut, " 
2003)). 
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not do very much. Melody (1997, p. 195) explains, "The FCC admitted its 
inability to regulate AT&T. Many fonner regulators in the US and Canada have 
spoken of the inability of regulatory agencies to resist the power of the regulated 
monopolies. " Therefore, the impetus to reform the telecommunications industry 
in the US was rather to correct the market failure problem where the market could 
not work to discipline the dominant private companies; they tended to exploit 
their customers to earn monopoly profits and to emerge in socially unacceptable 
forms of discrimination, such as cream-skimming (Schultz, 1994). 
With these specific characteristics, reform in the US basically related to regulation 
and competition. To be precise, the US government used extensive regulation to 
foster more efficient competition. According to Prosser (1989, p. 139), "For the 
US policymakers, they cannot just set rules designed to let the competition 
flourish and then stand back. They also need to be ready to intervene to keep 
markets open. " The classic case that obviously shows state intervention designed 
to create competition was the verdict of the Modification of Final Judgement 
(MFJ) in 1982 to split AT&T into seven Regional Bell Operating Companies 
(RBOCs), the so-called "Baby Bells", to limit AT&T's market power and lessen 
its incentive to distort the market4o. Although the regulation was able to improve 
competition to a certain extent, it did not appear that the telecommunication. s 
industry of the US was enjoying optimal benefit from such improvement. 
Crandall and Waverman (1995) claim that the "Rate-of-Retum" (ROR) price 
regulation was the reason; it is found that the technique was inefficient because it 
40 Right after the separation, each Baby Bell was confined to operating in limited and discrete 
areas. However, the Justice Department later allowed those "Baby Bells" to operate outside their 
regions to stimulate further competition (Crandall & Waverman, 1995). 
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reduced any incentive to improve efficiency, provided an incentive for excessive 
capitalisation, and created an opportunity for cross-subsidising competitive forays 
from monopoly revenue 
41 
. 
In summary, telecommunications reform in the US has been done through rule 
making and adjudication by regulators at both federal and state levels, through 
frequent court reviews of regulatory action, and through court-supervised 
settlements of antitrust litigation. Crandall and Waverman (1995) have concluded 
from the recent US telecommunications reform that the US is not very successful 
in eliminating the distortions in regulated rate structure; thus, it is reluctant to 
allow full and open competition and is yet still heavily regulated. 
Experiences from developing countries 
Not only is telecommunications reform perceived as a need among developed 
countries, but developing countries also realise it is a fundamental necessity. 
A number of developing countries around the world are at some stage of reform. 
Among the countries that participated in the WTO's Basic Telecommunications 
Agreement, 44 (out of 72) were developing countries who committed to 
significantly promoting competition within their local telecommunications 
markets. The fact that developing nations have different backgrounds as well as a 
variety of problems makes their reform experiences diverse and interesting to 
examine from an academic perspective. 
" However, after the Price-Cap regulation was introduced in the UK, the FCC proposed in 1987 
that ROR regulation should be replaced by Price-Cap regulation, which technique was first 
adopted in the US long-distance services (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). 
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Latin America 
Latin America is the region with the most rapid and vigorous movement toward 
telecommunications industry reform. According to Wellenius (1994), many Latin 
American countries believe that reform would save them from economic 
difficulties. It is thus not surprising to see the majority of these countries put the 
privatisation of their SOTEs as the foremost task, while leaving the issues of 
competition and regulation a secondary priority. 
Chile was the first to start the telecommunications reform programme which was 
substantially completed by 1987; it was regarded as the most successful case in 
the region and because of this the Chilean approach has become the model for 
most countries there (Izaguirre, 1999). However, differences in political 
incentives and institutional arrangements among Latin American countries shaped 
the differences in the reform process, which as a result, produced different 
outcomes. For example, although the reform initiative among these countries 
generally revolved around the privatisation of SOTEs, there was a difference in 
each country's implementation. Privatisations in Argentina, Mexico, and 
Venezuela were done for financial reasons; therefore, they were very focused and 
rushed. These countries took less than two years for the whole privatisation 
process. With a different objective, privatisation in Chile was more gradual and 
indecisive, which consequently took more than ten years to complete (Wellenius 
& Stem, 1994). 
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Despite the rapidity in privatisation, the development of a regulatory capacity in 
these countries had become the common problem as it usually lagged far behind. 
It was found that, during that time, all stakeholders in the industries suffered from 
the lack of a competent regulatory regime as well as inefficient competition. 
Wellenius (1994) reveals that it took a decade before they were able to get the 
regulatory capabilities off the ground. 
After a long struggle, telecommunications reform in Latin America eventually 
produced positive outcomes. The economy in most countries gained considerably 
from privatisation, while all stakeholders also benefited. Operators are much 
better positioned for sustained development. Consumers are satisfied with the 
services and prices. The same drawback to the regulatory regime does still 
persist, but to a lesser degree (Wellenius). 
Asia 
As elsewhere, countries in Asia also realised the benefits of telecommunications 
reform. The differences in domestic constraints made the strategies and progress 
of reform among these countries differ markedly. As proposed by Fink et al. 
(2001), it is possible to find almost every combination and sequence of changes in 
telecommunications policy in this region. In any case, although the actions 
responding to the reform among the governments of these countries were diverse, 
it is possible to say that they are moving away from traditional public monopolies 
(Fink et al. ). 
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The attitude to the reform differed from one country to another. Some 
govenunents (e. g. that of Hong Kong or that of Singapore) truly supported the 
reform. They believed that efficiency in the telecommunications industry would 
lead to a positive outcome for their countries as a whole. As a result, these 
countries have even liberalised their telecommunications industry ahead of 
schedule 42 (Singh, 2000). On the other hand, Singh also finds that, though most 
other Asian governments wanted to increase efficiency and strengthen their 
economies, they were still reluctant to open the industry to free competition as 
well as to abandon their control over the industry. Presumably, it was this 
hesitation that overwhelmed the telecommunications reform programme of most 
Asian countries, which consequently led to the slow and uncertain progress. 
As regards the Southeast Asian region in particular, the reform experiences among 
these countries are relatively sparse. Only a few countries (e. g. Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand) have seriously commenced telecommunications refonn 
programmes, while some others still make the reform a lower priority since they 
are still struggling with restoring economies damaged by war (e. g. Cambodia, 
Laos, and Myanmar). Like most other reforming countries, Southeast Asian 
countries are striving for a better industry environment. However, with the 
dramatic differences in each country's backgrounds and constraints, the reform 
approaches (as well as the obstacles) among these countries cannot be the subject 
of meaningful generalisation (Singh). 
42 The Singaporean government decided to introduce its local and international telephony in April 
2000, which is two years ahead of schedule; while Hong Kong's government announced full 
liberalisation of its telecommunications industry in January 2002, one year ahead of the original 
schedule. 
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Important determinants of the reform outcome 
Despite the similarities in goals and the basic reform issues, the outcomes in 
different countries still differed greatly. Some countries succeeded, while others 
failed. The outcomes of the reform are not straightforward as the reform is 
actually a complex process. It is found that domestic conditions within the 
refon-ning country are an important factor in accounting for the different reform 
results from one country to another. As proposed by Thatcher (1999), national 
institutions provide a framework within which a country's policies are made. 
National institutions can affect a country's policy-making (and also economic 
perfon-nance) through their influence over interest, strategies, distribution of 
power among groups, state autonomy and the nature of the markets. It is however 
found that national institutions not only differed among states, but are also deeply 
rooted and resistant to change. It was these dissimilar institutional arrangements 
that lead to persistently different patterns of policy formation and economic 
outcomes from one place to another. Interestingly, even when reforms take place, 
"they bear the imprint of past institutional histories and follow unique national 
paths of development" (Thatcher, p. 2). In any case, there are several issues that 
tend to exert a direct influence on the outlook of the reform policy-making as well 
as its outcomes. 
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Dispersion of interests 
The major difficulty in making reform decisions or implementing reform policies 
is that the interested parties try to get involved to promote their own interests. 
Ideally, a desirable political system tries to minimise the harm and maximise the 
benefit from the political competition among involved parties. 
Olson (1982) proposes the harm of competition among interest groups that it 
introduces a significant bias into political markets by diverting resources from 
efficient allocation, which has the result that the accumulation of interest group 
coalitions will lead to productivity slowdowns, sluggish growth, and eventually, 
the decline of a nation. However, Becker (1983) challenges Olson's idea by 
claiming that competition between interest groups tends to correct market failure 
and minimise dead weight losses in the process of wealth redistribution. Becker 
explains that competition among interest groups contributes to the survival of 
policies that raise social output since the favourably affected groups tend to lobby 
more intensively for these policies than the less favourably affected groups lobby 
against them 43 . It is also 
found that the size of interest groups cannot indicate the 
level of influence on the policy making process of the group. The better 
organised and wealthier groups are usually found to be the winners in the political 
arena; unfortunately the interest of the winning group hardly enhances social 
welfare or public interest. 
" However, the claim that there is no policy that lowered social output would survive will be held 
only if all groups are equally large and skilful at producing political influence (Becker, 1983). 
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As for the telecommunications reform programme, the experiences in many 
places reveal that the dispersion of interest among different interest groups did not 
seem to increase social output as claimed by Becker. It appears that, "In the real 
world, competition among interest groups is imperfect. " (Newbery, 1999, p. 141). 
As a result, the dispersion of interests usually turned out to be a reforra hindrance. 
In this respect, some existing works (e. g. Niyomsilpa (2000) on the case of 
Thailand and Singh (2000) on the cases of Malaysia and India 44 ) describe as 
46pluralism" situations where various politically powerful interest groups are 
trying to be involved in the reform process either to protect their own interest or to 
search for more benefits. In such circumstance, Singh (2000) proposes that the 
outcome of the reform depends heavily on how fast and how well the government 
can balance the forces from different interest groups. Interestingly, experiences in 
many developing countries reveal that pluralism normally goes with messiness 
and delays in the reform programme, as either the interest groups are politically 
too strong or the governments are too weak. 
Regulatory reform 
The importance of effective regulatory reform becomes apparent both in the short 
term and long terms. As suggested by Prosser (1989), efficient competition needs 
time to develop, which in the meantime, regulation can merely be used as a stop 
gap to create a fair competition within the industry. As for the longer term when 
44 Singh (2000) reveals that the pressures from different interest groups such as foreign states, 
international organisations, telecommunications operators, urban users, trade unions, and 
politicians led India's telecommunications reform programme to be known as one of the most 
complex liberalisation programmes ever undertaken. 
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the market is already competitive, Schultz (1994) and Young (200 1) still argue 
that effective regulation is needed in order to deal with the industry standard, 
social issues, and so forth. Therefore, it becomes clear that effective regulatory 
refon-n is an important determiner of the reform outcome; not only is it used to 
create fair competition, but it is also crucial to promoting social welfare within the 
economy. 
An effective regulatory reform is difficult to create. There are some convincing 
arguments that regulation in the real world is not operated with the goals of 
efficiency and social welfare as originally intended. The first and foremost 
argument was Stigler's capture theory. Stigler (1971, p. 3) proposes, "As a rule, 
regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for 
its benefits. " In other words, the capture theory explains the situation where the 
regulator either lost, or never had, the independence to make professional 
decisions on their merits because of undue influence either from politicians, 
politically driven ministries, or the regulated monopolies (Melody, 1997). The 
advocates of the capture theory such as Peltzman (1976) and Posner (1971) (as 
cited in Armstrong et al., 1994) further propose that strong interest groups, usually 
the operators, may try to capture regulators by either lobbying or monopolising 
information or both, the so-called "regulatory capture"; consequently, regulators 
instead act in the interests of politically strong incumbents rather than those of 
consumers, or potential entrants to the industry. In this respect, Peacock et al. 
(1984) present a study on the industry environment once the regulators were 
captured. The result was the "predatory regulation model". The model explains 
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that politically powerful operators used the regulators to restrict entry and protect 
higher prices, which eventually led to efficiency losses in the industry and the 
economy as a whole. However, Hancher and Moran (1989) disagree with the 
instinctive belief that private influence over the regulatory process is illegitimate. 
They argue that the idea of "capture" betrays an assumption that there is a sphere 
of public regulatory authority which ought to be inviolate from private influence. 
Instead, they find that, in the advanced capitalist economies, the integration of 
private sector into the implementation of regulation is very often a precondition of 
its success. They consequently conclude that, unlike the case of the US45, "The 
critical question for the analyst of the European regulatory scene is not to assume 
"capture", but rather to understand the nature of this shared space. " (Hancher & 
Moran, p. 276). 
The study of regulatory reform cannot be complete without mentioning the 
concept of the "regulatory state". The concept was originally developed by 
Johnson (1982). By using the economic development experience of Japan during 
1925 to 1975 as a case study, he finds that Japan developed and attempted to 
implement three different government-business relationships, namely "self- 
control", "state-control", and "administrative guidance". It is found that the 
administrative guidance form is by far the most efficient. Johnson explains the 
chief advantage of this form that it leaves ownership and management in pnvate 
hands, while it affords the state a certain degree of goal-setting and influence over 
45Prosser (1989, p. 154) argues that "a central theme in accounts of regulation in the United States 
is that of the "capture" of regulators by the dominant industry. " 
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private decisionS46 . As regards the UK, the idea of a regulatory state became 
apparent during the late twentieth century, when there was a change in the 
relationship between the state and industry. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say 
that the idea seems to be a prerequisite for successful industry reforrn in any 
economy, as the state needs to change its mindset and adapt its roles to fit with 
real-world modernism. Moran (2002) and Osborne and Gaebler (1992) propose 
that the state has to withdraw from direct interventionism and to concentrate on 
the role of "steering" (policy decision) rather than the role of "rowing" (service 
delivery). In short, the regulatory state therefore involves a semi-detachment of 
the state from the economy whereby the state still plays a role in promotion of the 
public interest through a process of regulation 47 , while leaving the role of 
producer to the private sector (Bartle, Muller, Stunn & Wilks, 2002). 
Interestingly, although the concept of a regulatory state would seem to reduce the 
power of government within the industry, this is not necessarily the case in terms 
of a broader political perspective. Wolfe (1999) examines the British utilities 
regulations and finds that the state still has both direct and indirect influences on 
the industries. It is true that diminishing the state's role in production and 
administration would reduce its direct influence; paradoxically, the use of 
46 However, it appears that the "regulatory state" among European countries is becoming more 
complex because of the creation of a single market and the liberalisation of European utility 
sectors. The European regulatory state therefore has been only studied and developed extensively 
during the past decade (e. g. one of the most famous works is conducted by Majone, 1996). In any 
case, even though the European Community (EC) has steadily expanded its regulatory regime in 
the European utilities, it does not mean the end of national regulation. One has to keep in mind 
that the EC regime cannot be complete within itself; it has to allow some space for national 
variation and the real implementation action (Coen & Thatcher, 2001). 
47 Vickers and Yarrow (1988) describe the public interest regulation as the regulation that has 
purpose to enhance economic and social welfare via improved efficiency in resource allocation, 
and that has a regulatory agency that faithfully pursues the implied allocative objectives. 
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regulation appears to promote the state's indirect influence, which altogether 
could re-empower state control over industry. Thatcher (1998) also shares a 
similar point of view. He argues that the establishment of a new regulatory 
regime in the UK has not weakened the power of the state; instead "the 1980s and 
1990s have not seen "de-regulation" or a "rolling back of the state"; on the 
contrary, to the privatised suppliers, the DGs often represent the ever-present and 
over-powerful-state" (Thatcher, p. 140). All in all, it is important to keep in mind 
that even though the benefits of regulation are various (e. g. to promote efficiency 
and social welfare), it is also nevertheless associated with some risks, especially 
when the authority used the power inappropriately or dishonestly. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM PROGRAMME IN THAILAND 
According to both internal and external impetus, recent Thai governments have 
made the telecommunications reform programme a high priority since the late 
1990s. The scarcity and the low quality of telecommunications services along 
with the need to increase industry efficiency were the main internal forces, while 
the influences from international organisations as well as the global trend were 
considered as the external force to reform. There are several academic pieces of 
work that can help in visualising the country's need for telecommunications 
refon-n. 
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Crisis hypothesis 
Although the telecommunications reform programme in Thailand has been 
ongoing for more than two decades, the movement in favour of it intensified 
following the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The situation in Thailand is largely 
consistent with the "crisis hypothesis" (Williamson, 1994 and Rodrik, 1996). 
This hypothesis states that reforms usually emerge as a response to crisis since 
crisis alters the benefits and costs of different policy options, thus shocking 
countries out of traditional policy patterns. Wei, Christine and Xu (2003) further 
explain the hypothesis from the political standpoint that a crisis effectively 
increases the opportunity for reform because the maintenance of the status quo 
option during the crisis becomes too expensive. As for Thailand, Niyomsilpa 
(2000) proposes that the Asian economic crisis in 1997 sparked public debates 
about the linkage between politics and economics as well as the growing need to au 
speed up political and economic reform. Niyomsilpa concludes that, "the 
financial crisis in 1997 could be seen as another milestone in Thai political history 
as it was leading to far wider political economic and social reform than Thailand 
had seen up to date. " (p. 104). 
External help hypothesis 
Another academic perspective that helps an understanding of the reform initiative 
in the Thai telecommunications industry is the "external help hypothesis" or 
"foreign aid hypothesis". Williamson and Haggard (1994) propose that external 
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help can be very influential both in the form of intellectual help and of conditional 
foreign aid. The IMF financial bail-out package required Thailand to undertake 
major economic and bureaucratic reforms, which included reform of the 
telecommunications industry. Rodrik (1996) proposes an interesting argument 
that assistance from other countries does not guarantee the success of the reform. 
It can either foster or hinder the refonn; however, foreign aid in countries with 
good accountability should better foster policy reforms than in countries with poor 
accountability. In the regard, Weiss (1995) admits that though the Bretton Woods 
Institutions provide financial support and economic development 
recommendations, their help usually comes at a cost. Not only is interest charged, 
but the policy conditionality they required is also a severe restriction on the 
freedom of the recipient governments. As such, a Thai local expert, Ruchuphan 
(as cited in Dempsey, 2000) questions the sincerity of international lenders like 
the INV; he criticises the reform recommendations as being driven by creditors 
who care less about local economic well-being and more about having their loans 
repaid. 
Global trend 
In many cases, forces from powerful international organisations always 
effectively put pressure on policy establishment in developing countries (Weiss, 
1995). In the case of Thailand, apart ftom the rescue package of the IMF, the 
commitment with the WTO signed in 1997 to liberalise basic telecommunications 
services by the year 2006 also yielded substantial influence on the 
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telecommunications policies. Responding to the commitment, several important 
reform attempts were introduced. The first action was the ratification of the 
Telecommunications Master Plan (TMP) in 1997 to be used as a guideline for the 
overall reform programme. Further, two new telecommunications laws were 
enacted in 2000 and 2001 to terminate the state monopoly power and to establish 
a new independent regulatory body specifically for the industry. There was also 
an attempt to convert the BTO telecommunications concessions in order to create 
a fair competitive environment. Finally, the SOTEs were also pushed to be 
privatised to increase their efficiency and competitiveness. 
Interdependent environment 
Not only has the telecommunications reform programme in Thailand been directly 
pressured by commitments made to international organisations, but the reform 
programme of Thailand is also influenced by other factors. Thatcher (1999) 
argues that technological and economic development, supranational. regulation, 
international policy learning and market integration and competitive pressure are 
all contributed to the idea of institutional reform (or industry reform). In other 
words, these factors could guide different countries to the same development 
direction. In the case of Thailand, it is found that the advent of digital technology, 
the neo-liberal ideology, or even the benefits gained from the reformed industry in 
other countries appear to be the implicit reasons to strengthen to need of the 
telecommunications reform. 
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RVELEVANT LITERATURE, ON THAI TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
INDUSTRY 
Looking specifically to the literature on the Thai telecommunications reform 
programme, there are only a few studies existing. All of them have been 
conducted under different themes and focal points. Importantly, when 
considering the recent situation of the telecommunications industry, all of them 
appear to have one common important limitation. 
The most recent study is a PhD thesis in the area of Mass Communication, 
conducted by Keeratikrainon in 2002. This thesis provides a content analysis of 
the historical pattern of development in the policies governing the Thai 
telecommunications infrastructure during the period 1934 to 2000. In fact, the 
thesis put special emphasis on the two reform policies, which are the formulation 
of the 1997 TMP and the promulgation of the two new pieces of 
telecommunications legislation, which are the Act on Organisation Allocating 
Frequency Waves and Supervising Radio/Television Broadcasting and 
Telecommunications Business B. E. 2543 (2000) and the 2001 
Telecommunications Business Act 48 . Keeratikrainon (2002) proposes that the 
goverranent is reluctant to fully liberalise the industry; it has adopted a gradual 
and protectionist approach geared towards ensuring that governnient will still 
obtain significant economic benefit from the developing market by remaining an 
investor in the new market in both the short and long term. 
48 However, Keeratikrainon's analysis of the country's Telecommunications Business Act was 
based on the draft version. The final law was promulgated in 2001, which is apparently one year 
after the thesis' cut off point. 
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The second relevant piece of work was written by Niyomsilpa in 2000. The focus 
of the study is to explain the change of state-society relationships in Thailand 
during the 1980s - 1990s. Telecommunications is chosen as the case study as it is 
believed to represent the country in the larger picture. It is found that the 
telecommunications industry in Thailand has experienced political transformation 
from a bureaucratic polity towards a more pluralistic socio-political system in the 
later stages. By identifying bureaucrats with anti-refonn and societal groups with 
pro-reform forces, Thai telecommunications reform experiences during the last 
decade reveal that state-society relations have been moving gradually in the 
direction of an increase in the roles and influence of societal forces. That the pro- 
refonn coalition started to gain the upper hand over the anti-refonn in the refonn 
competition shows that the bureaucratic government is no longer the main player 
in national economic development as it was formerly. 
The third relevant piece of literature is a Doctor of Science thesis written by 
Prateapusanond in 2001. It is about the performance and economic expectations 
of the newly privatised telecommunications companies, which used a Thai 
telecommunications state owned monopoly, the TOT, as a case study. 
Prateapusanond's thesis tried to establish that privatisation affects perfonnance 
measures of newly privatised telecommunications companies. The thesis shows 
that privatisation works in Thailand and that privatising state-owned enterprises 
would greatly improve their profitability, operating efficiency, output, service 
delivery, and capital investment spending without lowering the employment level 
after privatisation. 
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In general, all the existing works provide a great deal of insightful information 
within their particular perspectives. The review of these works further shows that 
they have not covered all the interesting aspects regarding the Thai 
telecommunications reform programme. There still are some gaps to be filled in. 
For example, none of the existing studies has put the main focus on the country's 
three outstanding reform issues; none of them has tried to find how and to what 
extent the industry's institutional arrangements would have effect on the progress 
of the reform programme. In fact, as mentioned earlier, all the existing studies 
have one common limitation being that they were based on information prior to 
the year 2000. This made their observations less up-to-date, thus their 
conclusions may not apply at the present, especially considering the fact that there 
were so many important incidents that occurred after the year 2000. For example, 
there were at least two serious official attempts (in 2000 and 2001, respectively) 
to convert the BTO telecommunications concessions. The resistance to 
privatising SOTEs from labour unions has been dealt with. Two new 
telecommunications laws were promulgated in 2000 and 2001 respectively. The 
SOTEs' monopoly right was called back to the state in 2001. A new ministry (the 
Ministry of Infort-nation Communications and Technology: MICT) was 
established in 2002 specifically to take care of telecommunications related tasks 
(including the reform programme). The telecommunications regulator was 
established and started operations in 2004. Most importantly, the new industry's 
political environment, which was dramatically different from the previous 
regimes, was introduced in 2001. All in all, these country's new conditions 
should alter the industry institutional arrangements a great deal. Therefore a 
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detailed study of telecommunications reform of the country under the new settings 
should produce a whole different outlook and none of existing literature has 
previously touched on it. 
In summary, the wide range review of literature provided throughout the chapter 
basically surrounds the topic of telecommunications industry refonn. The chapter 
spells out the inevitability of telecommunications reform for a particular country. 
Both internal and external pressures appear more demanding in the modem 
environment. In order to implement an effective reform, it involves a number of 
complicated and sensitive issues. The privatisation of SOTEs, the introduction of 
free and fair competition, and the creation of an effective regulatory regime are all 
imperative, which therefore have to be carried out carefully and systematically. 
The local conditions (most notably the dispersion of interest among interested 
parties and the political envirom-nent) are nonnally found to be the key factors to 
the smoothness of the reform process and the success of the reform as a whole. 
Although it appears that reforraing an industry is strongly influenced by. domestic 
conditions, the real practice reveals that refonn experience of one country can be 
useful to others. The transfer of experience actually happens (e. g. when the UK 
carried out the regulatory reforra following the US or when the US began to apply 
the "Price-cap" regulation following the UK). Therefore, it is believed that the 
study of the Thai telecommunications reform process (as well as its obstacles) in 
relation to the different industry settings of different political eras will be more or 
less academically useful as it could be well situated within a broader paradigm of 
historical institutionalism. 
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CHAPTER 3 
POLITICAL ERAS AND 
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM PROGRAMME 
INTRODUCTION 
The telecommunications industry reform experience of Thailand during the last 
twenty years has encountered fairly dynamic political environments. It usually 
faced changes of government from time to time. In the broad picture, it is found 
that the reform has been carried out under three different political regimes 
(ranging from the bureaucratic, pluralistic, to the hegemonic). Each political 
regime produces a specific set of institutional arrangement for the industry, and 
therefore different consequences for the telecommunications refonn programme. 
It is found that neither the bureaucratic, nor the pluralistic polity, enhanced the 
reform programme; on the contrary, they caused delays and even hindered the 
entire reform programme. However, events took a different turn in 2001. The 
advent of the hegemonic political regime resulted in a major shift in domestic 
institutional arrangements at both national and industry levels. It is interesting to 
understand how and to what extent each political environment has an impact on 
the reform programme as well as to visualise whether the new political regime 
will be more favourable to the reform programme than the previous ones had 
been. 
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POLITICAL ERAS OF THE THAI TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
INDUSTRY 
From the beginning of the telecommunications reform attempt in the mid 1980s, 
the telecommunications reform programme of Thailand has been carried out under 
three political regimes, which are the bureaucratic, pluralistic, and finally 
hegemonic. With closer consideration, it is interesting to find that the politics 
within the telecommunications industry is directly reflected from the politics at 
the national level. Experiences show that the industry does not have much 
autonomy on it own; rather, it is very easy for it to be intervened or influenced by 
the wider politics. The fact that the industry is usually dominated by the state 
agencies, the fact that the industry does not have an independent regulatory body, 
and the fact that there is no real competition are all making the industry depend 
heavily on state activities. Any change within national politics tends to have 
consequences for politics within the industry (or vice versa). This would be the 
reason why Niyomsilpa (2000) decided to study the Thai telecommunications 
politics as a depiction of the national politics in general. 
As suggested by the characteristics of national politics, telecommunications 
political environments during the last twenty years are accordingly separated into 
three regimes (see Figure 3.1). Unsurprisingly, a historical institutionalist study 
of telecommunications reform programme during these periods reveals that each 
political regime usually embeds with its own set of industry institutional 
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arrangements. It is further found that the differences in these arrangements did 
lead to varying consequences for the reform process. 
Figure 3.1 
The eras of telecommunications politics in Thailand from the beginning of the reform attempts 
Bureaucratic 
(Between 1986 - 1992) 
Pluralistic 
(Between 1992 - 200 1) 
Hegemonic 
(Between 2001 
- the present) 
THE BUREAUCRATIC ERA 
At the time when Thailand implemented the first telecommunications reform 
attempt in the late 1980s, the telecommunications politics of the country was 
perceived to be a "bureaucratic polity" (Niyomsilpa, 2000 and Riggs, 1996). Both 
politics at the industry and national levels during that time were basically 
dominated by the military. In fact, Thailand had been run by the military since 
the country changed from absolute monarchy to democracy in 1932. Although 
the country did have civilian governments from time to time, those governments 
did not stay long as they were normally either terminated by the dissolution of 
parliament or overthrown by the military. 
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Focusing on the telecommunications industry, the key persons who exerted most 
influence on telecommunications activities, ranging from the PM to the Minister 
of Transport and Communications, usually came directly from the military (see 
Table 3.1 and 3.2). Moreover, once in position, they nonnally used national 
security as an excuse to assign people from the military as the Chainnen of the 
Boards of TOT and CAT. In fact, until recently, it was traditional that the 
Chairman of the Board of both SOTEs had to come from the military 
(Naksrinuan, personal interviews, December 7,2004). 
Table 3.1 
List of Thailand's PMs during 1948 to 1992 
Name Military/civilian Position held between 
1 Field Marshal Por Piboonsongkram Military Apr 1948 - Sep 1957 
2 Poj Sarasin Civilian Sep 1957 - Dec 1957 
3 Field Marshal Tanorm Kittikachom Military Jan 1958 - Feb 1959 
4 Field Marshal Salit Thanarat Military Feb 1959 - Dec 1963 
5 Field Tanoryn Kittikachom Military Dec 1963 - Oct 1973 
6 Sanya Tharninasak Civilian Oct 1973 - Feb 1975 
7 M. R. Sanea Pramote Civilian Feb 1975 - Mar 1975 
8 M. R. Kukrit Pramote Civilian Mar 1975 - Apr 1976 
9 M. R. Sanae Pramote Civilian Apr 1976 - Sep 1976 
10 Tanin Kraivichean Civilian Oct 1976 - Oct 1977 
II General Kreangsak Chamanan Military Nov 1977 - Mar 1980 
12 General Prem Tinsulanondha Military Mar 1980 - Apr 1988 
13 General Chartichai Choonhavan Civilian Aug 1988 - Feb 1991 
14 Anand Panyarachun. (Anand 1) Military Feb 1991 - Mar 1992 
15 General Suchinda Kraprayoon Military Apr 1992 - May 1992 
Source: The Royal Thai Govemment 
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Table 3.2 
List of Ministers of TransDort and Corninunications durim4 1955 to 1992 
Name Military/Civilian Position held between 
I Lieutenant General Banyat 
Thephussadin Na Ayutthaya 
Military Sep 1956 -Feb 1957 
2 Major General Pong Punnakan Military Jan 1958 - Feb 1959 
3 Lieutenant Pong Punnakan Military Feb 1959 - Mar 1971 
4 Air Chief Mashal Tavee Jullasap Military Mar 1971 -Nov 1971 
5 General Pong Punnakan Military Dec 1972 - Oct 1973 
6 Rear Admiral Chalee Santisalarn. Military Oct 1973 - May 1974 
7 Chao Na Sinlawan Civilian May 1974 - Feb 1975 
8 Surat Osathanukroh Civilian Feb 1975 - Mar 1975 
9 Major General Siri Siriyothin Military Mar 1975 - Apr 1976 
1 0 Tawich Krinpratum Civilian Apr 1976 - Sep 1976 
- - 11 Khunying Lursak Sombatsiri Military Oct 1976 - Oct 1977 
12 General Surakit Maiyalarb Military Nov 1977 - May 1979 
13 So om Boonyakup Civilian May 1979 - Feb 1980 
14 Admiral Amom Sirigaya Military Mar 1980 - Apr 1983 
15 Samak Sultomlavej Civilian May 1983 - May 1986 
16 Banham Silpa-archa Civilian Aug 1986 -Apr 1988 
17 Montri Pongpanit Civilian Aug 1988 - Dec 1990 
18 Samak Sultomlavej Civilian Dec 1990 -Feb 1991 
19 Nukul Prachoubmoh Military Mar 1991 - Mar 1992 
20 Colonel Vinai Sompong Civilian Apr 1992 - Sep 1995 
Source: The MOTC 
It is evident that the military was able to dominate the telecommunications 
industry in the executive branch. However, the military seemed able to dominate 
the industry in the operating branch as well. Although the laws provided both 
SOTEs with monopoly powers (both in the service provision and regulatory 
respects), the line ministers and the BODs appeared to be influential enough to 
overshadow the operations of SOTEs in real practice. In fact, the 
telecommunications academic Vongpanitlerd (personal interview, December 2, 
2004) adds that the Thai telecommunications industry under the military regime 
was considered a closed industry. Most activities within the industry (e. g. policy 
development, project investment or contract signing) had never been opened up to 
public scrutiny; only a few high ranking officials knew what was going on inside 
the industry. The contract for the telephone directory made in 1984 was a classic 
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example of the SOTE being dominated by bureaucratic polity. Via the BOD, the 
military was able to force the TOT to comply with its demands. The BOD used 
its power to overrule the decision already made by the TOT management and the 
selection committee, to help a foreign company to win the deal. The case became 
an issue when the TOT selection committee disqualified an American "big name" 
bidder, as it violated two important conditions of the Terms of Reference (TOR). 
The TOT Chairman of the Board, General Arthit Kamlang-ek (who was also the 
Army Commander), asked the committee to reconsider the selection; however, the 
committee insisted on its ruling. As a result, the BOD decided to overrule the 
committee's decision by annulling the whole bidding process and calling for a 
new one. Interestingly, this time, the BOD dropped the two TOR conditions that 
had previously disqualified that American company, which eventually made the 
company concerned the winner of the contract. 
The bureaucratic polity and the telecommunications reform programme 
The first telecommunications reform attempt evolved around the end of this era. 
Following the oil crisis and global economy downturn in the late 1970s, Thailand 
was hurt by the economic recession between 1981 and 1986. As a result, the 
Prem. Tinsulanondha govenunent came up with an idea to reform the economy to 
restore stability. As for the telecommunications industry, in 1985, the government 
proposed to separate telecommunications from postal services. This proposal was 
turned down due to severe opposition and the threat of a national strike from the 
labour unions with the backing of the anny (Niyomsilpa, 2000). The interference 
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from the military was even more obvious when there was an idea to revise the 
1934 Telegraph and Telephone Act, which was the source of monopoly rights of 
both SOTEs. The idea, in 1986, progressed to the stage where the cabinet 
submitted the reform bill to Parliament for approval. However, once again, the 
reform bill faced strenuous opposition from the army as well as the threat of a 
nation-wide strike from the labour unions. As a result, the cabinet reluctantly 
withdrew the bill to defuse the political crisis (Niyomsilpia). 
Following the retirement of PM Prem Tinsulanondha in 1988, Chartichai 
Choonhavan became the first-elected civilian PM of the country since 1976. 
Unlike Prem Tinsulanondha, PM Chartichai Choonhavan ran the country with a 
more advanced mindset. He agreed to refon-n the economy in order to support the 
economic boom during his time 49 . He brought a number of businessmen and 
technocrats into his cabinet; however, this increase was offset by the decrease in 
the quota of the military. The 65% of businessmen and technocrats in Chartichai 
Choonhavan's government, compared to the 47% in Prem Tinsulanondha's, was 
good evidence of this trend (Niyomsilpa). With regard to telecommunications 
refonn, PM Chartichai Choonhavan decided to increase the role of the private 
sector within the industry by allowing SOTEs to grant more BTO concessionS50 
More than 20 BTOs were granted during 1988 - 90. Moreover, he also proposed 
a bill to establish an independent regulator to separate the regulatory role from the 
49 After the economic recession of the mid- 19 80s, the Thai economy bounced back with a rapid 
recovery in the late 1980s. With double-digit growth in GDP for three consecutive years, the Thai 
economy had the highest growing figure globally, which led to an unprecedented economic boom 
during 1988 - 90. 50 The BTO scheme in the telecommunications industry was originally initiated in PM Prem 
Tinsulanondha's era. However, there was only one BTO concession granted in his time. 
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SOTEs (and from military intervention)51 . Nonetheless, due to the strong 
opposition from the labour unions with support from the military, the 
parliamentary vote on the bill was indefinitely postponed. In the big picture, the 
telecommunications politics under Chartichai Choonhavan's government was 
different from that under Prem Tinsulanondha. With the main focus on economic 
growth, PM Chartichai Choonhavan brought a number of technocrats into the 
administrative level and a number of private companies into the service provision 
level. However, doing so inevitably challenged the power of the military; the 
further PM Chartichai Choonhavan succeeded in bringing more participants in the 
political arena, the more the military felt that their power and honour were being 
reduced. As a result, the military, also known as "the Revolutionary Council", 
brought down PM Chartichai Choonhavan in February 1991, citing corruption as 
52 justification for ending his era . 
The Revolutionary Council appointed a renowned technocrat, Anand 
Panyarachun, as PM to reduce resistance from the public. The fact that PM 
Anand Panyarachun came to the position by military power gave him very limited 
independence. Telecommunications reform, as a result, was not much different 
from what it had been during the era of the military. The PM's technocratic 
background eventually started to emerge when he began to support a pro-reform 
coalition (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004); unfortunately, this was not satisfactory to 
" See the draft of the Communications Act, MOTC, dated 30 June 1989. 
5' Among the justifications of the military coup, the Revolution Council raised the 3 million 
countrywide fixed line BTO project as a sample case of corruption. The Revolution Council 
claimed that it had saved the government's revenue for approximately THB 1,000 billions (or 
around GBP 2,500 millions at that time) by abolishing the deal (Uthaisang, personal interview, 
November 18,2004). 
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the anny, thus costing PM Anand Panyarachun his post. Soon after PM Anand 
Panyarachun's exit, the military set up its own man as PM. General Suchinda 
Kraprayoon, who was the Deputy Chief of the Revolutionary Council, became the 
next PM of Thailand. The coming of PM Suchinda Kraprayoon appeared to be a 
wrong move, as it led to the end of the military era. Placing someone with such 
strong military ties as PM stirred up strong public feelings, which soon led to a 
mass uprising in ay 1992. Following the riot, PM Suchinda Kraprayoon himself 
was forced to step down, while the political power of the military was 
significantly decreased. In fact, it is found that the involvement of the military in 
politics, especially in telecommunications politics, has remained very calm and 
limited during the past decade. The fact that the military did not express any 
grievance when the positions of the Chairman of the Board of both TOT and CAT 
(which normally reserved for representatives from the military) were offered to 
the technocrats at a later time 53 , could be good evidence suggesting that the 
military realised its diminished status and the need for modesty 54 . 
To conclude, although the idea to reform the telecommunications industry was 
initiated in the bureaucratic era, the reforra hardly saw any progress. There were 
only a few parties (the military along with its subordinate allies - the labour 
unions) who had any appreciable influence on the telecommunications reform 
programme; however, they seemed to disagree with the reform and effectively 
53 The Chairman of the Board of CAT was changed from Air Chief Marshal Anan Kalintah to 
Chaovalit Tanachanan in June 1992, while the Chairman of the Board of TOT was changed from 
Air Chief Marshal Issarapong Nunepakdee to Rungroj Sriprasertsuk in July 1992. 
54 However, Samudavanija (as quoted by McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005) argues that the Thai 
military has never depoliticised, it only adjusted itself to the changes in socio-political conditions 
and maintained a low profile until conditions were right for a reassertion of influence. 
93 
blocked or delayed all the reform attempts. In fact, from time to time, the military 
was suspected of enjoying hidden benefits associated with its resistance to the 
reform of telecommunications, especially when considering that the military 
actually exercised its superior power to interfere with the operations of SOTEs on 
many occasions. In this era, the issues of privatisation and independent regulation 
seemed very sensitive and virtually untouchable due to nationalism and national 
security reasons. The grant of BTO concessions that appeared to be the only 
reform action in this era was also questionable, as to whether it was deliberately 
done for efficiency. Chevapruek (personal interview, December 8,2004) reveals 
that the military and labour unions did not see the BTO as a reform initiative; 
rather they allowed the BTO to take place because it gave the SOTEs the 
opportunity to enjoy free revenue-sharing without losing their monopoly and 
controlling power. 
THE PLURALISTIC ERA 
The collapse of military power in 1992 gave rise to the next era of 
telecommunications politics, the so called the "pluralistic era" (Niyomsilpa, 
2000). This term was used to characterise politics where there were various 
emerging parties (e. g. political parties, private operators, academics, etc) that had 
became more politically powerful, and started to take part in the 
telecommunications reform political arena 55 . The era 
lasted almost a decade 
" In this regard, Jordan, Halpin & Maloney (2004) propose to call any policy-relevant active party 
by the generic term of "pressure participant". They further argue that, within that general 
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(between 1992 and 2001) and covered most of the time after Thailand first began 
reforming its telecommunications industry. 
In this era, the opinions on the reform programme among interested parties 
seemed to diverge. Some agreed, while others did not. Some agreed in principle, 
but were still unsure about the implementation. Surely, the reform would lead to 
fundamental changes of the industry and certainly affect the status of many 
interested parties; it is unsurprising to see that each party strove to protect its 
particular interests or searched for better opportunities from the change in the 
industry. Inevitably, the reform programme became a political issue, where there 
were a number of parties (who were also politically strong) involved in most 
reform moves. 
Unlike the previous era where the most influential parties obviously disagreed 
with the reform, the pluralistic era was more complicated since there were usually 
tensions between interested parties as the reform progressed. Most of the time, 
the tensions were unable to be solved since the interested parties were all strong 
(or had support e. g. the case of a private operator and a political party or the case 
of labour unions and the academics). Interestingly, while other interested parties 
became politically stronger, it appeared that the governments in this era were 
usually weak and unstable. Most governments were politically vulnerable; they 
category, the unitary interest "policy participant" is distinct from the collective "interest or 
pressure group". Being a "policy participant" or "interest group" depends on the group's level of 
flexibility, decision-making process, autonomy, and so forth. Although such a proposal is 
worthwhile to note, it is still the subject of wide debate. Therefore, this thesis decided to apply the 
old term "interest group" for the reason, "the policy studies literature tends to accept as a 
pressure/interest group any organisation that is seen as being active in the policy process with the 
function or aim of influencing policy outcomes" (Jordan et al., p. 200). 
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easily became unstable if their reform policy caused dissatisfaction to other 
coalition political parties, or was strongly opposed by any politically influential 
parties such as the labour unions, academics, or NGOs. In other words, the 
govermuents were incapable of reconciling the tensions between the interested 
parties into a sound reform package, and it was this dispersal of interests that was 
the main cause in the delay (or the failure) of the reform programme during this 
era. 
The pluralistic polity and the telecommunications reform programme 
The fact that there were a number of parties involved in the telecommunications 
political space in this era, inevitably made the reform programme more 
complicated and confronted it with a number of difficulties. It is argued that the 
pluralist characteristic of the Thai telecommunications politics on many occasions 
was the key factor leading to the failures or delays of the reform (Niyomsilpa, 
2000 and Petrazzini, 1995). 
Although the governments, as a policy making unit, were supposed to fulfil an 
important role in facilitating the reform programme, it was found that they were 
more of a hindrance. All the governments in this era were politically weak and 
not well-insulated from any kind of intervention. A number of good reasons can 
be listed to explain how other parties could exercise their political power over the 
government's policy on telecommunications reform. 
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All the governments were made up of a coalition of many political parties. These 
coalition governments usually held only slightly more seats than the opposition 
parties. The core party as a result, was nonnally very polite to its coalition parties 
since the government would collapse if one of the coalition parties pulled out 56 
Although this kind of situation is not extraordinary among developing countries, 
upon closer consideration, it had a direct effect on the progress of the 
telecommunications reform of Thailand. Most political parties (either in the 
government or on the opposition side) were usually accused of having their own 
agenda on the telecommunications reform programme. This claim would seem to 
be true considering the nature of political parties where a large part of their 
income usually comes from private patronage (either legally or illegally). 
Teeralarp (personal interview, December 20,2004) explains that giving sponsors 
to political parties and sending proxies into politics were the common methods 
that private operators used to boost their business activities during the last few 
decades. In this respect, McCargo and Pathmanand assert some samples, 
"Broadly speaking, UCOM was aligned with the Democrat, TT&T with the 
Democrat and Chart Thai, and TA with New Aspiration" (2005, p. 29). This 
evidence suggested "patron-client" relations (in other words - the proxy system) 
between the private sector and the political parties in Thai society. The political 
parties tended to hold the duty of clients for the private operators who provided 
them with financial support. Thus, reform initiation that tended to worsen any 
patron's interests was likely to be blocked (or delayed) by its clients, which such 
56 The sample case was when Palang Dharma Party resigned from the coalition government in 
May 1995. PM Chuan Leekpai consequently was obliged to dissolve the parliament. In the 
subsequent General Election, Palang Dharma became the key broker in gathering the seven-party 
government coalition under the premiership of Banharn Silpa-archa. 
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veto was not very difficult to make considering the political vulnerability of the 
previous govenunents. All in all, the reform policy that seemed unable to allocate 
benefits to patrons across the board was unlikely to be launched or, even if it was, 
it was likely to fail. 
Table 3.3 
List of Thailand's PMs clurin 1992 to 2001 
Name Military/Civilian Position held between 
I Anand Pany arachun (Anand II) Civilian Jun 1992 - Sep 1992 
2 Chuan Leek pai (Chuan 1) Civilian Sept 1992 - May 1995 
3 Banham Sil pa-Archa Civilian Jul 1995 - Sep 1996 
4 General Chaovalit Yongjaiyuth Civilian Nov 1996 -Nov 1997 
5 Chuan Leek pai (Chuan II) Civilian Nov 1997 - Feb 2001 
Source: The Royal Thai Govenunent 
No matter how hard the govemments tried to please all powerful players to keep 
their support, political instability was still a dominant characteristic of this era. 
The country experienced frequent changes of PMs as well as governments; the 
five governments under four PMs within nine years time (shown in Table 3.3) is 
good evidence. Frequent changes of government inevitably affected the 
telecommunications reform programme. Changes of PM led to alterations in the 
reform strategies that eventually faltered from time to time. The most classic 
example of this case was the attempt to promulgate the TMP that contained 
detailed strategies to reform the telecommunications industry of Thailand. The 
TMP was drafted at the time of the Chuan Leekpai I government in 1995; 
however, along with the changes of government during the mid 1990s, the TMP 
had been called back for revision every time when there was a change of 
government. The TMP was finally approved in November 1997, which was the 
last month of PM Chaovalit Yongjaiyuth's era. Altogether, the political 
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instability contributed to Thailand taking almost three years, under three different 
governments, solely to put the TMP into action. Materials obtained from 
Pomsutee (personal interview, November 12,2004) explains the story, 
Frankly speaking, for most parts, it had to do with political issues; governments were insecure 
and consisted of many parties with main concentration on other issues rather than the refonn. 
In fact, at times, the governments were determined to reform or even began to implement 
some of the actions; however, those governments did not stay long enough to make concrete 
reform progress. The government often changed and another General Election came up. As a 
result, the previous goverm-nent's reform attempt was cancelled or put on hold. In short, I 
would say that the political environment in Thailand in the past did not at all encourage the 
reform. 
Apart from the interference from political parties and the private operators, the 
pluralistic character of telecommunications politics also included the involvement 
of other major parties like SOTE management, labour unions, academics, and 
NGOs. Most of these participants were new players, but became influential in the 
telecommunications political arena. Unsurprisingly, these participants had their 
own interests (although at times, some parties might have had common interests 
in certain aspects). They usually asserted their right to involvement in the 
government's reform proposals, either to retain or promote their interests. 
To cite an example, the SOTE labour union along with the SOTE management did 
not agree with most kinds of industry reform. According to a SOTE employee 
(Anonymous A), both management and labour union were willing to accept any 
measure that would increase their operating efficiency; however, they did not 
agree with the liberalisation as they did not want to lose the monopoly right or the 
controlling power over the industry. They opposed privatisation as they did not 
want to lose their job security and the privileges obtained from being a state 
enterprise Is official. They made several unlikely proposals to the government in 
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exchange for the privatisation (e. g. no lay-off policy and a huge amount of 
compensation), which was too much for the government to accept. They refused 
to accept the idea of the conversion of BTO concessions as they did not want to 
lose the income from revenue-sharing; however, under the first conversion 
framework (proposed by Thailand Development Research Institution: TDRI), the 
SOTEs were more willing to negotiate, as opposed to when they were at a 
seemingly disadvantaged position under the subsequent framework proposed by 
Chulalongkorn University Intellectual Property Institution (CUlpj)57 
With regard to the academics' or NGOs' perspective on telecommunications 
refonn, they tended to base their position on the interest of the public. The 
country's chronically weak economy that resulted from the Asian economic crisis 
in 1997, stressed the feelings of nationalism and the dangers of flawed 
liberalisation among these parties. They argued that this was not the right time for 
privatisation as the locals would not be the ultimate beneficiaries; on the contrary, 
they asserted that hurrying for privatisation rather became a sophisticated tool to 
sell off national assets for the benefit of some people who had power in their 
hands, or even foreign investors. According to Juruphan (personal interview, 
December 14,2004), the academics and NGOs also usually raised the issue of 
social welfare in their arguments; they claimed that experiences from many 
developing economies, which were fundamentally similar to Thailand (e. g. 
countries in Latin America) revealed that privatising the state enterprises and 
letting them operate commercially might lead to public hardship from cream- 
51 Please find the detailed discussion about concession conversion in Chapter 6. 
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skimming and the rise of prices. All in all, such involvement from the academics 
and NGOs appeared to get the attention of the governments because the constant 
criticisms from credible people on the reform policies impacted on and 
undennined the government's standing. 
The pluralistic character of policy-making was further intensified after the 
promulgation of the 1997 Constitution 58 . The economic crisis in 1997 alerted the 
public to the links between politics and economics and to the fact that they have 
directly related consequences for one another; in other words, bad politics 
amounted to bad economics (Niyomsilpa, 2000). This concern was clearly 
reflected in the content of the new Constitution, which was drafted and 
promulgated later in the same year. With full support from the public, the 
Constitution was intended as a strategic tool to reforin the country's politics by 
promoting public participation, good governance, and transparency within the 
political system, which was the reason that the 1997 Constitution is also called 
"the Constitution for the Thai people"59 . Not only was politics at the national 
level affected by the Constitution's intention, but telecommunications politics was 
also impacted accordingly. As an example, unlike before when the selection of 
the committee of an independent organisation (the telecommunications regulator 
being one of them) was simply appointed by the govenunent, the 1997 
Constitution now required the first round of selection to be done by a trustworthy 
58 The Constitution Drafting Committee was consisted of one hundred experts, all of them with 
very different backgrounds. Four fifths were representatives from each province of Thailand, in 
which they had to be elected within their province. The rest of the committee was comprised of 
experts from different relevant fields of proficiency. 
59 Yoonaidharma (personal interview, December 21,2004) further explains that, during the time of 
drafting the Constitution, the public whose morale had been destroyed by the economic crisis was 
strong enough to balance the opposition from politicians who tried to preserve their power. 
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Selection Committee 60 . Once selected, the Senate must make the 
final selection 
and ask for the Royal Assent. Another example in this regard is that the 1997 
Constitution demands the establishment of the Administrative Court. 
Consequently, this allows people to bring a law suit against either state agencies 
or state officials for misuse of power or omission of duties. Generally speaking, 
although the Constitution had good intentions to involve more participation, as 
will be described in Chapter 7, some of its consequences (especially in the context 
of telecommunications reform) paradoxically turned out to be a loophole in 
reforming telecommunications in practice. 
To summarise, unlike the bureaucratic era, this era experienced various attempts 
at reforming the industry. There were attempts at liberalising, re-regulating, and 
privatising the industry. Unfortunately, none of these attempts paid off, but faced 
problems and severe delays. As suggested by the name of the era, there were 
many emerging participants who became more powerful in the 
telecommunications political space. It was these participants (together with the 
key players in the previous era) that tried to take part in the reform programme. 
Most of the time, these parties had conflicting interests, which finally resulted in a 
block on policy and a delay in the reform programme as a whole. 
60 The composition of the Selection Committee is varied depending on the type of the independent 
organisation, but the law normally requires the Selection Committee to come. 
from different 
backgrounds, to promote fairness and transparency within the selection process, 
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THE HEGEMONIC ERA 
The pluralistic era ended when PM Chuan Leekpai left his post in 2001. The 
General Election at the beginning of 2001 paved the way for PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra and his TRT party. Such election was the first carried out under the 
principles of the new Constitution. Intended as a tool to refonn the country's 
politics, the 1997 Constitution had fully demonstrated its strong impacts on both 
overall politics as well as telecommunications politics. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the new Constitution brought more 
participants into the political arena; however, it is also the Constitution's intention 
to exclude those participants from further involvement, once the process of 
establishment is over. For instance, though the process to establish an 
independent organisation such as the NTC, was quite open for many parties to get 
involved in, once the establishment was complete, both the Constitution and its 
delegated laws obviously give the NTC its own power as well as a very high level 
of discretion. In fact, a regulator (Kusripituck, personal interview, November 24, 
2004), academics (Tangkitvanich, personal interview, December 28,2004 and 
Teeralarp, 2004), a SOTE manager (Naksrinuan, personal interview, December 7, 
2004), and a SOTE employee (Chareonwan, personal interview, December 14, 
2004), all unanimously agree that the law equipped the NTC with a wide range of 
responsibilities and a high level of discretion 
61 
. The same principle also applied 
to the formation of the government in 2001 and 2005. The General Elections 
61 However, Teeralarp (2004) argues that the law did not provide an adequate check and balance 
mechanism, which could cause a serious problem in the future. Please see 
Teeralarp (2004) for 
more detailed criticisms on the NTC's discretion. 
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were closely watched and governed by the newly established, but very powerful, 
independent organisation, namely the Office of Election Commission of Thailand 
(ECT)62 . However, after the election was over and the government had been 
formed, the Constitution was designed to provide the government with a 
favourable working envirom-nent in order to ease the work load and make it 
progress more smoothly and effectively. 
The landslide victory of Thaksin Shinawatra and his TRT party in the 2001 
General Election made the administration the most stable and powerful 
government ever in the history of Thailand 63 . The Constitution's intention to 
produce a strong PM and stable government seemed to be working. 
Consequently, the strong new PM and government has moved the country to a 
brand new political era - the hegemonic era - which differs greatly from both 
previous eras. 
The new political environment inevitably affected the telecommunications refonn 
progr I amme. The telecommunications reform programme under the new strong 
government and well-insulated politics appeared to be very interesting, especially 
considering the fact that many ministers in the cabinet, including the PM himself, 
may have special interests in the telecommunications industry (see Table 3.4). 
Table 3.4 further shows that, except for UCOM and SAMART, all other major 
62 The ECT is another offspring of the new Constitution. Stated in Section 140 of the 1997 
Constitution, two out of five of the ECT's duties clearly state the involvement of public 
participation within the election process. 
63 In the 2001 General Election, TRT won 248 seats from the 500 in the Lower House. However, 
at the time of writing the chapter, the TRT and PM Thaksin Shinawatra had just emerged 
victorious, with higher winnings on the 2005 General Election. The TRT won 377 seats, which 
made the TRT and PM Thaksin Shinawatra even stronger and better insulated from any influences 
than before. 
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telecommunications operators have joined the first Thaksin Shinawatra cabinet. 
However, at this point, it is also interesting to analyse from where and how the 
political power of PM Thaksin Shinawatra's govemment emerges. 
Table 3.4 
Selected individuals in PM Thaksin's cabinet who have strong background in telecommunications 
Name Position in cabinet 
Telecommunications related Current relationship background 
Thaksin Prime Minister - The founder, former - Wife, elder 
Shinnawatra chairman, and the major stock brother-in-law, and 
holder of three children are the 
I. SHIN Corporation PIc. major stockholders 
2. Advance Info Service of these companies. 
Plc. (AIS) 
3. SHIN Satellite Plc. 
4. ITV Plc. (') 
5. SHIN International Co. 
Ltd. 
6. Other subsidiaries 
2 Adisai Former - The founder, former - Wife and son are 
Potaramic Minister of chairman, and the major stock holding a lot of 
Commerce holder of stocks of these 
Minister of 1. Thai Telephone and companies. 
Education Telecommunications 
Plc. (TT&T) 
2. Jasmine International 
3. Acumen Co. Ltd. 
3 Pracha Former Deputy - The former CEO and the - Wife and children 
Maleenond Minster of maj . or stock holder of the BEC are holding a lot of 
Transports and World Plc. (2) stock of the 
Communication company. 
- Deputy 
Minister of 
Interior 
4 Wattana - Minister of - Son-in-law of Thanin - n/a 
Muengsuk Commerce Cheirawanon, the CEO of CP 
group, which owns 
1. Telecom Asia Plc. 
(TA) 
2. TA Orange 
Note: (1) ITV is the newly established free channel; it is currently considered as the most 
popular news channel in Thailand. 
(2) BEC World runs channel 3, which is one of the country's most popular free channels. 
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The coming of PM Thaksin Shinawatra and the "Thai Rak Thai" Party 
(TRT) 
Thaksin Shinawatra established the TRT Party in July 1999. Right from the start, 
TRT sought to define itself as a technocratic party, a party led by a successful 
entrepreneur who wanted to bring the same levels of professionalism to politics as 
he had brought to his private sector activities. Thaksin Shinawatra was 
surrounded by an impressive group of advisors and associates. His slogan "Think 
new, Act new" resonated with a reformist emphasis on the need for considerable 
changes in ideas and ways of working. He and his party overwhelmingly won the 
General Election in January 2001 with the 248 out of 500 seats in the Lower 
House (see Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5 
The official result of the General Election in 2001 
Party Constituency basis Party's list basis Total 
I Thai Rak Thai 200 48 248 
2 Democrat 97 31 128 
3 Chart Thai 35 6 41 
4 New Aspiration 28 8 36 
5 National Development 22 7 29 
6 Liberal Democratic 14 - 14 
7 Rassadom 2 2 
8 Tin Thai 1 1 
9 Social Action I I 
Grand total_ 400 100 500 
Source: The ECT 
The root of his political success had to be attributed to two important factors. 
Firstly, once the TRT was established, Thaksin Shinawatra wisely sought out the 
names of the members of the parliament (MPs) from other political parties with a 
winning potential in the next election, and subsequently invited them to join his 
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party. As a result of this astute move, Phongpaichit and Baker (2004) estimate 
that Thaksin Shinawatra managed to gather more than 200 potential candidates for 
the 2001 election 64 . Secondly, Thaksin Shinawatra differentiated his propaganda 
from the old-fashioned political parties by stressing the populist policies, also 
known as "Thaksinomics", and applied modem marketing techniques in the 
voting campaign 65 . Thaksinomics was invented under the principal of injecting 
money to the people at the grass-root levels to revive rural economies and 
stimulate domestic demand. Selected important policies were the 3-year farmers' 
debt suspension and revitalisation programme, the one million Baht 
(approximately GBP 14,250) village and community fund, the bank for the poor, 
the 30 Baht (approximately GBP 0.43) health scheme, the One Tambon (village) 
One Product Project (OTOP), and so forth 66 . These policies were very successful 
in convincing grass-root people to vote for TRT as they clearly saw the benefits 
67 
that they were to achieve . 
After all, with the highest number of MPs in the Lower House of Parliament, 
Thaksin Shinawatra became the 23 rd pM of Thailand and TRT became the core 
government party in February 2001; the year was considered the beginning of a 
new political era for Thailand. 
64 Thaksin Shinawatra was widely criticised ethically for this strategy when it appeared that he 
capitalised on his financial advantage by gathering those potential candidates from other parties. 
65 PM Thaksin commented on his populist policies as "Our critics condemned our policy and 
called it, in contempt, a populist policy. I must confess I was bemused. A populist policy so 
called because it must be a policy so liked by the people. The people like it because they find it 
beneficial. So, if they like the policy and benefit from it, what's wrong? " (Shinawatra, 2003). 
66 More details for each policy can be found at the TRT's web site (www. thairakthai. or. th). 
67 At a later time, "Thaksinomics" became an economic model for various countries 
in the region 
(e. g. the Philippines, Indonesia, or even China). For example, the President of the 
Philippines, 
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, once said "When Thaksin first talked about this programme for rural 
recovery, everybody made fun of him; but one year later, other countries were also replicating 
it, 
including the Philippines. " (as quoted in Perrin, 2003). 
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The well-insulated government under PM Thaksin Shinawatra 
Whereas previous Thai governments had been characterised by unstable coalition 
politics and the lack of clear policy direction, this government was quite different. 
The government of PM Thaksin Shinawatra was well known for being insulated 
from both internal and external pressures. The strong insulation was a result of 
several factors, such as the factions that were committed to him and his party's 
policies, and the factions acquired by the PM's own utilisation of political 
advantage. 
The insulation of the government could be seen from the incorporation of the TRT 
itself The party was formed with the support of a number of local giant corporate 
groups in various industries (e. g. telecommunications, banking, real estate, and 
entertainment media). As shown in Figure 3.2, the TRT can be perceived as a 
coalition of giant private entrepreneurs, who wanted to gain access to national 
politics. On closer consideration, PM Thaksin Shinawatra successfully created 
this network by pooling economic powerful players in the country to be his allies. 
This being so further suggested that his premiership and his government were 
even stronger and better insulated. It was these companies that patronised other 
political parties in the country. Therefore, the fact that these patrons became part 
of the TRT network meant PM Thaksin Shinawatra has effectively weakened 
other political parties as well as reduced the possibility of conflicts with the joint 
forces of other giant private corporations and their political proxies. 
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Figure 3.2 
Samples of private companies that supported the formation of the TRT Party 
Banking 
- Bangkok Bank 
- Thai Military Bank 
Real Estate 
- M. Thai Estate 
- Sivikorn Group 
Petrochemical/Steel 
- Thai Petrochemical 
Industry 
- Thai Submit 
- Thai Nox 
TRT 
Entertainment Media 
- ITV 
- BEC World 
- Grammy Entertainment 
- GMM Media 
- EGV 
- RS Promotion 
Telecommunications 
- Shin Corporation 
- Chareon Pokaphan 
(Telecom Asia) 
- Jasmine (TT&T) 
-M Link Asia 
Source: McCargo and Pathmanand (2005) 
In national politics, the TRT was also very strong and well insulated from 
pressures from other political parties. Even though it won 248 out of 500 seats in 
the Lower House in 2001 General Election, PM Thaksin Shinawatra still wanted 
more seats to consolidate the majority. Soon after the official announcement of 
the results by the ECT, TRT merged with the Liberal Democratic Party and 
acquired 14 additional seats. Doing so turned TRT into a single-party government 
for the first time in the history of Thailand. The following act by PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra, was to invite another two political parties - the New Aspiration Party 
and the Chart Thai Party - to join his goverment, which gave his goverment a 
total of 339 seats 68 ; thus it undoubtedly became the strongest ever government in 
68 The Democrat Party (the opposition party) suspected that Thaksin Shinawatra required his 
government to have more than 300 seats to enable him to exploit Section 185 of the 1997 
Constitution, which states that the opposition party needs more than two-fifths of all MPs (or 200 
seats) in the Lower House to submit a motion for a general debate for the purpose of passing a vote 
of no-confidence in PM. 
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the history of Thailand. At a later time, the TRT party expanded even more when 
it acquired the New Aspiration Party and the National Development Party, 
acquiring 65 more MPs, which gave the TRT alone 327 seats in the Lower House 
(see Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6 
The political parties merged with the TRT Par 
Political parties Merged date Amount of MPs Total TRT's MPs 
Thai Rak Thai 248 248 
Liberal Democratic 6 Sep 2001 14 262 
New Aspiration 28 Mar 2002 36 298 
National Development 21 Sep 2004 29 327 
Source: The ECT 
Apart from insulation from the private sector and the political parties, the 
government under the TRT also obtained popularity among the majority of Thai 
people. The widely accepted PM with his eye-catching policies further created a 
strong insulation for the government and PM Thaksin Shinawatra himself 
Yoonaidharma (personal interview, December 21,2004) explains PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra's policies as follows, 
It is an entirely new idea to focus on the lower levels of people, rather than the middle or high 
levels. These new political policies have killed all other old-fashioned political parties. The 
traditional policies were mostly focused on the middle and high levels of people, and hoped 
that the benefits of the policy, after having served the high and middle levels, would 
eventually spill to the poor. These old political policies will probably never again gain 
popularity. 
For the first time in the history of Thai politics, the govenu-nent of PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra could administer the country for the whole four-year term. The PM's 
popularity as well as the unity within the government seemed to be the foremost 
reason for such an achievement. In fact, he was completely confident of his 
popularity, his TRT, and his govenunent. As quoted in McCargo and 
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Pathmanand (2005, p. 84), he once told Thai expatriates in Los Angeles that 
"Thailand was moving towards a two party system: but whereas in the US where 
power alternated between two parties, in Thailand, TRT would retain a monopoly 
of power, opposed by a permanently isolated Democrat Party. " Indeed, on many 
occasions, he declared that his TRT would remain in power for at least twenty 
more years, even in the absence of himself ("TRT set for 20 years, " 2003). In the 
General Election in 2005, the strength of PM Thaksin Shinawatra and TRT 
remained high (or even higher) when he almost accomplished his announcement 
of having more than 400 (out of 500) MPs and becoming the single party 
government. He retained his post as PM, while TRT won even more seats (377 
seats) in the Lower House compared to 248 seats in the last General Election (see 
Table 3.7) 
Table 3.7 
The official results of the General Election in 2005 
Party Constituency basis Party's list basis Total 
I Thai Rak Thai 310 67 377 
2 Democrat 70 26 96 
3 Chart Thai IS 7 25 
4 M hachon 2 - 2 
Grand total 400 100 500 
Source: The Secretariat of the House of Representatives 
In conclusion, politics under PM Thaksin Shinawatra differed from the previous 
eras. The ability to create and exploit his popularity and to utilise the networks of 
the government seemed to work well. In this era, the government was able to 
work with only minimal interference from other political players. Up to the time 
of writing, although the PM and government have faced some criticisms on their 
management practices, the PM still got support from the majority of the people 
III 
and the unity within the government still remained high. It is arguably true that 
this cannot guarantee the permanence of either TRT or the PM himself. However, 
the fact that, during the last four years alone, there have been so many important 
political changes at both national and industry levels should be sufficient to stress 
the importance of the era. 
The hegemonic era - the return of the beginning? 
The new election conditions (e. g. the use of the party's list system or the one MP 
per one electorate area) as prescribed in the 1997 Constitution, gave the bigger 
and stronger political parties increased opportunities for winning more MPs. This 
also meant a more stable government. In this aspect, Tangkitvanich (personal 
interview, December 28,2004) comments: 
It becomes a consensus at the present that the new Constitution enables big political parties, 
like TRT, to win the General Election. Once it becomes government, the Constitution still 
gives further chances for it to dominate or manipulate the politics of the country in the way it 
deems; while, on the other hand, the Constitution leaves the opposition political parties to face 
many difficulties to scrutinise the administration of the strong government. Therefore, it 
totally depends on the individuals in power, whether they will exploit the Constitution as well 
as the rule of law. 
Although, under the new Constitution, the PM is supposed to be stronger than in 
the past 69 , the power of PM 
Thaksin Shinawatra at the moment seems to exceed 
the expectations of the Constitution. Thaksin Shinawatra pledged to run Thailand 
according to business principles with himself as a CEO. In fact, it is no 
exaggeration to say that the CEO regime (which suggests a very powerful leader) 
69 Sirisamphan (2003) states that the Constitution Drafting Committee intended to strengthen the 
stability of the PM by promoting the "Strong Prime Minister" system (like that of Malaysia and 
Singapore) in order to enhance the continuously smooth work of the PM. 
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has some similarities to the period when the military dominated the country's 
politics. In this respect, a high-level manager of the SOTE (Anonymous A) 
strengthens the claim, "Thai politics does not look like a party system anymore; 
everything is centralised around only one person. The entire cabinet has become 
puppets that workjust to serve one person". This opinion is also consistent with 
another from a renowned academic (Anonymous B), "The current government 
possesses absolute power. They wisely and sophisticatedly manage the budget, or 
set the policies. They effectively utilise state power to strengthen themselves and 
weaken their opposition. " 
However, no matter how strong the PM and his government are, they are still not 
to be compared to the military era, as there are several main differences between 
these two eras. First of all, the military usually possessed political power by 
overthrowing the previous government. An order from the Revolutionary Council 
was considered as law and there were absolutely no checks or balances on the 
power of the militarist govenunent. Compared to this era, PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra and TRT party came into power lawfully and legitimately. They won 
the election and gained power by a majority. Secondly, while the power of the 
militarist government was pooled at the Revolutionary Council; the power of PM 
Thaksin Shinawatra's government is centralised in only one person. For example, 
he himself is practically the only one who finalises any reshuffle in most of the 
important positions, either among political or government officials. A highly 
ranked government official (Anonymous Q discloses, 
The government is comparable to a company, which has PM Thaksin as CEO, and the whole 
cabinet is rather like the company's employees. The CEO is able to fire or move any 
113 
employee as he sees appropriate. Therefore, it is unsurprising that, during his first four-year 
term, there were nine cabinet reshuffles, which makes for the country's highest record. 
It is hard to believe that the reshuffles were carried out for the purpose of 
efficiency since each reshuffle led to the cessation or discontinuation of work in 
the affected ministries. In fact, the promotion, transfer, or demotion of high-level 
government officials in the era of PM Thaksin Shinawatra have raised public 
suspicion on many occasions and led to recollections of the cronyism system. 
Most inheritors of new power positions usually have close relationships with the 
PM (Sirisamphan, 2003). Therefore, it seems that he politicised everything 
around him. Selected samples on the appointment of some high-level officials 
shown in Appendix B could hint that he tried to expand his political network to 
encompass almost every field of the society. 
The hegemonic polity and telecommunications politics 
The picture of national politics is inevitably reflected in the politics within the 
telecommunications business. When considering the names of persons who 
govern the country (see Table 3.4), it can be presumed that telecommunication 
politics might be even more heavily afflicted by a change in the political 
environment. All of the individuals in Table 3.4 resigned from their businesses 
and devoted themselves entirely to the political arena, which is the reason why the 
era is named "telecom tycoons turned politicians" (Tangkitvanich, personal 
interview, December 28,2004). 
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On closer consideration, such a phenomenon further implies another characteristic 
of the current era namely that the old proxy political system has now come to an 
end (at least in this era). Telecommunications entrepreneurs are no longer 
working from the shadows; they come out directly into politics to set their own 
agendas. It costs IeSS70 and the result is guaranteed. The telecommunications 
entrepreneurs may have realised that they cannot fully rely on their proxies 
because they may also be hand in glove with someone else at the same time, thus 
causing a conflict of interest. Besides, telecommunications entrepreneurs may 
also realise that they are unable to let these proxies, who are usually old-fashioned 
professional politicians, to run the economy any longer. Their stakes are very 
high; it is too risky allowing the old-fashioned proxies to handle the dynamically 
changing economy in today's era of globalisation. 
It is not an exaggeration to say that the new political regime changed the 
telecommunications politics quite dramatically. It affected industry institutional 
arrangements at large. In fact, it appeared that the previous two main institutional 
problems of the reform (the involvement from interested parties and the weak and 
instable government) were effectively dealt with and become no longer obstacles 
to the refonn. 
All in all, as the reform programme in Thailand is still in process, it cannot be said 
for sure, at this point, what ultimate results this era will produce. However, with 
the information gathered during the first four years of this era, it becomes feasible 
70 According to Teeralarp (personal interview, December 20,2004), the patronage system in the 
telecommunications means the feeding of the whole system, not only politicians, but also 
government officials and SOTEs' management. 
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to draw some tentative conclusions. Firstly, the hegemonic character of the 
government in power was able to push the reform towards making impressive 
progress. In contrast with the military era, this government agreed and had a clear 
intention to push forward the refonn programme. Unlike during the pluralistic 
era, PM Thaksin Shinawatra's govenunent effectively dealt with the political 
tension involved in the refonn; the government was strong and effectively 
insulated itself from political interference. Taking an optimistic view, the fact that 
the government consisted of a number of former telecommunications tycoons 
might arguably be advantageous to the reform programme in some ways. They 
should have a lot of relevant experience, and know exactly what the problems of 
the reform were. If so, their being in charge of the issue meant a better 
opportunity for problem solving, given that they exercised their power properly 
and legitimately. However, on the flip side, a powerful government with strong 
links to the telecommunications sector inevitably gives cause for some concerns. 
It is questionable whether these persons would be able to discard their own 
interests and promote those of the public. However, without any clear evidence, it 
would not be fair to draw any final conclusions at this time. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, since the telecommunications reform programme began in the late 
1980s, telecommunications politics in Thailand have passed through at least three 
different eras. Each era has its own characteristics and institutional arrangements, 
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which as a result produced different consequences for the reform programme. 
The problems in the bureaucratic era were found to be that the persons with 
nu absolute power did not agree with most reform activities. In fact, it was found on 
many occasions that the military also allied itself with another strong party - the 
labour unions - to obstruct the reform programme. While national security was 
usually raised as an excuse for keeping telecommunications as a closed industry, a 
number of people suspected that the reform was avoided to further retain a 
controlling power over the industry as well as over the SOTEs. Most reform 
attempts were stymied either by direct order from the military or by opposition 
from the labour unions. As a result, little progress occurred in this era. In the 
subsequent era, institutional arrangements within the industry had changed 
significantly. The role of the military significantly decreased while that of more 
democratic elements blossomed. Various groups in society increased in strength. 
Several of those who had an interest in telecommunications (e. g. private 
operators, academics, or NGOs) had entered the telecommunications political 
arena to either protect self-interest or search for more benefits. Therefore, apart 
from the lack of a formal regulatory institution, it was also found that the greater 
number of participants (especially the ones with political power) in the reform 
programme under the weak and unstable governments of the time appeared to be 
the main problem of the reform in this era. Tensions, arising from conflicting 
interests, over the reform activity were usually found to be irreconcilable; it was 
these unsettled issues that resulted in a major delay of the entire reform 
programme. Finally, the General Election in 2001 led the country towards a new 
political era, the so-called hegemonic polity. Once again, the change of political 
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regime provided telecommunications industry with a substantial institutional 
change. In this era, the government and PM remain ever powerful, as their 
stability and insulation are at a very high level. It is apparent that the reform 
under the strong policy and centralised style of administration could drive the 
reform to make a lot of progress. Even though the reform was not completed at 
the time of writing, the immediate consequences of the new telecommunications 
politics for the reform programme are still interesting to consider. 
The current chapter already introduced the political environments in Thailand and 
also brought forward the analysis of the reform Programme in relation to the 
different political environments. However, the following chapters are going to 
deal with the more general background to the telecommunications industry of 
Thailand as well as the refonn issues that kept hindering the reform for a long 
time. An understanding of this material is necessary for the further and deeper 
analysis of the Thai telecommunications reform experience under the historical 
institutionalist framework. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM PROGRAMME 
IN THAILAND 
INTRODUCTION 
The telecommunications industry in Thailand is embedded in a long history. The 
services in the early days were only available for military or official sectors. As 
time passed, the benefits of telecommunications services became apparent in that 
it was no longer considered appropriate that they should be kept and used only 
within state functions. Instead, business use, personal use, as well as use relating 
to social affairs would also gain a lot of benefit from these services. At the 
present time, access to efficient and sufficient telecommunications services 
throughout the country has become a key factor in the development of the 
economy and promotion of social welfare. However, the previous development of 
the Thai telecommunications seems neither able to effectively support the 
economic activities nor to thoroughly enhance the social welfare. The idea to 
reform the telecommunications industry in Thailand evolved from both internal 
demands as well as external forces. Although governments during the last two 
decades professed the intention of reforming the telecommunications industry, the 
process was very difficult to implement in practice. Every reform attempt was 
usually marred by a variety of complex issues, either structurally or politically. It 
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was these difficulties that caused the reform programme in Thailand to falter with 
unsatisfactory progress being made. 
BACKGROUND TO THE THAI TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
The history of the industry began around 1867 under the reign of His Majesty 
King Rama IV. Initially, the Post and Telegraph Department (PTD), established 
in 1898, was the sole organisation that received consent from the King to provide 
all kinds of telecommunications services within the kingdom. Later, with the 
increasing demand for telecommunications services, the financial and staffing 
constraints of the PTD started to cause problems for the capability of service 
provision. The PTD therefore hived off its telecommunications-related 
responsibilities to two newly established SOTEs in 1954 and 1977, respectively. 
The separation of the PTD's responsibilities reduced the size and authority of the 
PTD dramatically. The remaining authorities were basically left to oversee the 
industry on the whole as well as to act as the representative of the country in the 
international affairs of telecommunications and post, while the tasks relating to 
service provision were directed to the responsibility of the SOTEs (the PTD, 
1990). 
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Thailand's state owned telecommunications enterprises (SOTEs) 
As mentioned earlier, most telecommunications services in Thailand were initially 
operated and used within the military or government before becoming part of the 
public domain. Therefore, unlike some other countries where telecommunications 
services were first provided by private operators, such services in Thailand were 
started, operated, and monopolised by state agencies from the beginning. In fact, 
the state monopoly right was clearly spelt out in the very first Thai 
telecommunications law, the Telegraph and Telephone Act B. E. 2477 (1934), 
whereby Section 5 required the PTD to be solely responsible for all the 
telecommunications activities within the Kingdom of Thailand 71 . 
The PTD gave Thailand and its citizens various kinds of telecommunications 
services, such as telegraphy, telephony, and radio broadcasting. Though the PTD 
had limited resources, it was able to deal with its tasks satisfactorily. In fact, the 
period 1938 - 1966 was praised as the "golden age" of the Thai 
telecommunications industry (the PTD, 1990, p. 157) since the industry grew 
ra-pidly both in tenns of variety and availability of services. However, the r' 
increasingly dynamic industry environment soon revealed that the old structure 
was not efficient enough to deal with such rapid changes. There are generally two 
main reasons to explain the PTD's lack of competence. Firstly, as a government 
agency operating under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications (MOTC), the PTD had to rely on government rules and 
" Section 5 of the 1934 Telephone and Telegraph Act states "The Government shall 
have the 
monopoly to establish, maintain, and work telegraphic and telephonic services within 
the Kingdom 
of Thailand. Such monopoly shall be reserved to the Post and 
Telegraph Department. " 
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regulations restricted by the Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSQ, 
which caused the PTD to have limited flexibility to manage its tasks. Each move 
had to pass through a long decision chain hierarchically before being put into 
action, which usually caused a lengthy delay. Secondly, the demand for 
telecommunications services (especially the telephone) grew so fast that the PTD 
was not able to serve those demands adequately. In fact, the PTD faced major 
problems due to the limited annual budget allocated from the government as well 
as the number of qualified officers; it did not have enough resources to finance 
network expansion, to install new equipment and to operate the services. As a 
result, these turned out to be important reasons that caused the Thai 
telecommunications industry to grow more slowly than it should have done. 
To overcome these impediments, the TOT was established in 1954 to take over all 
telephony-related tasks (e. g. the network and services) from the PTD, while the 
CAT was established later in 1977 to take over the postal service 72 . Both TOT 
and CAT became the SOTEs under the jurisdiction of the MOTC and their main 
objectives were to operate and improve the services for which they were 
responsible for the benefit of the state and of Thai citizenS73. 
Since then, the TOT and CAT have dominated the Thai telecommunications 
industry both in the roles of service provider and regulator. As the service 
72 However, concurrent with the emergence of other new telecommunications services (e. g. telex, 
data communication, international television transmission, etc. ) during the late 1970s, the 
government decided to provide the exclusive operating rights over these services to the CAT. 
73 For the duty of SOTEs, please see details in Section 6 of the Telephone Organisation of 
Thailand Act B. E. 2497 (or the 1954 TOT Act) and in Section 7 of the Communications Authority 
of Thailand Act B. E. 2519 (or the 1976 CAT Act). 
122 
provider, the PTD's monopoly right to operate the telecommunications services 
and to own telecommunications assets was transferred to SOTEs at the time of the 
spin-off. On the other hand, the laws to establish TOT and CAT clearly 
mentioned the regulatory authority of both SOTEs (e. g. the role to monitor the 
service quality, the role to look after the public service, or the role to control the 
price of serviceS)74 . Therefore, 
it appeared that the SOTEs held multiple roles in 
the industry at the same time, which, on many occasions, it was found that the 
SOTEs were unable to handle all these roles effectively. The fact that the SOTEs 
were regulators while also being service providers usually led to conflicts in 
practice. The confusion in roles ended when the government promulgated the 
Telecommunications Business Act in 2001. The new law terminated the 
monopoly rights and recalled regulatory power from both SOTEs back to the 
state. Both TOT and CAT, since then, have become merely service providers 
without any special privileges. 
THE UNIQUE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OF THE THAI 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
It is interesting to note that the Thai telecommunications industry has several 
domestic arrangements that differ from telecommunications industries elsewhere 
in the world. Due to the country's specific constraints, unique industry 
arrangements gradually formed along with the development of the industry. 
74 Please see details in Section 31 of the 1954 TOT Act and Section 29 of the 1977 CAT Act 
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According to Keeratikrainon (2002), the fact that Thailand was never colonised by 
a Western country allowed the development of the Thai telecommunications 
industry to be less influenced by foreign patterns (presumably with the exception 
of telecommunications equipment) and thus maintain its own unique settings. The 
main unique arrangements of the industry can be categorised into three main 
areas. 
Legal 
The Telegraph and Telephone Act B. E. 2477 (1934) was the first 
telecommunications law in Thailand. Section 5 clearly outlined state monopoly 
rights within the telecommunications industry. At the beginning, national security 
was the main justification of the monopolisation; the PTD was therefore assigned 
to be the sole legitimate monopolist of the Thai telecommunications industry at 
the time. 
Later, although the TOT and CAT were established to improve the service 
provision, the idea of protecting a state monopoly still remained unchanged. The 
monopolistic rights both to operate and to own telecommunications assets were 
accordingly transferred to the newly established SOTEs. All kinds of services 
were virtually monopolised by these SOTEs. The TOT monopolised the 
telephony and other closely telephone-related business within the country, while 
the CAT monopolised the postal service, telecommunications, and other closely 
connected businesses. As for some other services that did not fit within the remit 
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of either TOT and CAT (satellite, for instance), they were to be operated directly 
by either the PTD or the MOTC. 
The "Build-Transfer-Operatell concession scheme (BTO) 
Although SOTEs were established with the main intention of alleviating scarcity 
as well as improving the quality of telecommunications services, the result was 
not quite as expected. Being a SOTE, wholly owned by the state, TOT and CAT 
operate under the same strict and complex rules and regulations as other 
government agencies; these rules sometimes appear to undermine the efficiency of 
the enterprises in practice. The fact that the Thai consumers had only poor and 
insufficient telecommunications services under the SOTE service provision 
suggested the need to bring in the private sector to alleviate the problem. 
The level of scarcity of telecommunications services (also known as the 
"telecommunications crisis") reached a critical point around the end of 1980s and 
the beginning of 1990s when the Thai economy was at its peak. The double digit 
growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (shown in Table 4.1) and the 
impressive increase in the per capita income during 1987 - 199175 were 
suggesting a greater need to support infrastructures, and the telecommunications 
system appeared to be one of the most important fundamental facilities. Both 
businesses and individuals needed good and reliable telecommunications to 
support and extend their activities. However, the limited capacities of the SOTEs 
75 The per capital income of Thai people has increased from THB 2 1,000 (around GBP 3 00) in 
1987 to THB 41,000 (around GBP 586) in 1991 (the NESDB, 2004). 
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were unable to match the growth in demand, either in terms of quantity or quality. 
Statistics from the ITU on the waiting list and waiting time of Thailand in 1991 
revealed the severity of the crisis; the ITU reported that there were more than one 
million people on the waiting list and they had to wait up to eight years before 
they were eligible for one telephone line (the ITU, 2004a). 
Table 4.1 
Averalze annual GDP Rrowth 
Year Average GDP growth 
1961- 1966 8.1 
1967- 1971 7.8 
1972- 1976 7.0 
1977- 1981 7.4 
1982-1986 4.4 
1987-1991 10.5 
1992- 1996 8.2 
1997-2001 4.9 
Source: The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) 
Clearly, the two state-run agencies could not effectively respond to the demand 
for telecommunications services within the country. In fact, this problem was also 
encountered in many other countries and the most common choice that was 
widely adopted was to allow the private sector to participate in the industry. 
Global examples indicate that opening the industry to private participation does 
effectively alleviate the scarcity and improve the quality of services in most 
implementing countries (Wallsten, 2001). Unfortunately, this "best practice" 
could not just simply be applied to the case of Thailand due to the country's legal 
limitations. Direct private participation was impractical because private entities 
were not allowed to own any telecommunications assets or to provide any 
telecommunications services. Although the governments realised the scale of the 
problem and wanted to correct this restriction, the political instability during the 
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1980s was not amenable to amending the existing legislation. As the issue was 
very politically sensitive, the coalition governments were not strong enough to 
resist the opposition from involved parties. Besides, the governments did not 
survive long enough to pass the whole process of amendment. Finally, in 1986, 
the government of PM Prem Tinsulanondha came up with an alternative solution 
that made private participation possible without breaking the context of the law. 
This "practical" solution was known as a new type of telecommunications 
concession scheme, the so-called "Build-Transfer-Operate" (BTO). 
The BTO was a scheme that allowed a private company that won a bid to provide 
telecommunications services to the public under the monopolistic right of the 
SOTEs. The BTO's key feature was that the bid-winner (the concessionaire) had 
to be responsible for all the expenses that were associated with the building of the 
network. Once finished, the ownership of these assets had to be transferred to the 
SOTEs in order to conform to the law. In return, the concessionaire received the 
right to exclusive use of those transferred assets and had the right to operate 
within the industry until the end of the concession period. Moreover, the BTO 
usually came with revenue-sharing (a certain percentage from the total revenue) or 
minimum guarantee (a fixed amount of money) features. In fact, it was these 
features that were used as the main criteria to grant the concession; the awarded 
concessionaire was the one willing to pay for the network construction and the 
one who proposed the highest revenue-sharing to the SOTE. 
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Since the first BTO was granted in 1986 76 , it was widely used and has shown its 
helpfulness in alleviating the scarcity of the services. The service quality and 
accessibility were also improved under private operations, especially in the 
services where concessions had been granted to more than one concessionaire 
(e. g. the pager). As pointed out by Chevapruek (personal interview, December 8, 
2004), BTO became an important strategy in developing the Thai 
telecommunications industry, which altogether there are 26 BTO contracts that 
have been granted since its introduction (shown in Appendix Q. However, the 
concept of the BTO was also widely challenged. The point of criticism was that 
granting concessions and allowing private firms to participate in the industry was 
obviously against the real intention of the law. However, the governments during 
that time decided to continue granting more BTOs, as it was the most "practical 
solution" under the specific constraints of the country. 
Structure of the telecommunications industry 
The present appearance of the Thai telecommunications industry has been formed 
gradually over a long period. The country's constraints and industry environment 
created a specific set of institutional structures. Firstly, the 1934 Telephone and 
Telegraph Act mandated the MOTC to be the sole body that had the right to 
regulate the telecommunications industry. Nonetheless, the MOTC's regulatory 
duties, in practice, were spread to the PTD, TOT, and CAT depending on the 
authonties prescribed in the law that established that particular agency 
(as shown 
76 The first BTO concession was granted by CAT to a private pager operator, namely the 
Pacific 
Telesis Co. Ltd. 
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in Figure 4.1). Transferring the regulatory duty to the PTD seemed reasonable, as 
the PTD is a governmental body and does not operate any commercial activity, 
while transferring the regulatory power to the TOT and CAT was another story, as 
they were also service providers on the other side. This was another bizarre 
feature of the Thai telecommunications industry where the SOTEs took both the 
roles of regulator and operator. This characteristic became even more 
complicated afterwards, when the regulatory role of TOT and CAT became more 
active after the allowance of the BTO concessions. The SOTEs happened to have 
a duty to control and regulate their concessionaires, to be exact, to keep them in 
line with the designated policies as well as to protect the consumer benefits. 
Figure 4.1 
The structure of telecommunications industry of Thailand (before 2001) 
Ministry of Transport 
and Communications 
(MOTC) 
Telephone 
Organisation of 
Thailand (TOT) 
Post and Telegraph 
Department 
(PTD) 
Communications 
Authority of 
Thailand (CAT) 
*Basic telephone operator 
eConcession to 2 fixed-line 
concessionaires (TA and TT&T) 
*Concession to major mobile operator - 
the AIS 
,, Other concessions in pagers, card 
phone, pay phone, etc. 
-Regulator in radio wave and 
frequency allocation. 
aInternational telecommunications 
operator (e. g. international long- 
distance, ISDN, fibre optic, and 
satellite network 
eConcessions to mobile operator - the 
DTAC 
"Other concessions for pagers and 
Internet. 
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Secondly, both SOTEs were established by their own lawS77 ; each law clearly 
provided the duties that each organisation was responsible for. During the early 
days of telecommunications development, it seemed that the laws were robust 
enough to distinguish the types of service to be provided by a particular 
organisation. However, at a later time, the advent of new technologies and 
services (e. g. data and mobile communication or other value-added services) 
blurred the previous borderline of authority between these SOTEs since both the 
1954 TOT Act and the 1977 CAT Act, in Section 9(2) and 10(2) respectively, 
provided an opportunity for each organisation to enter the same new services. 
Consequently, these SOTEs became direct competitors in some services (e. g. 
Internet and international telephone). Also on several occasions, they even 
granted concessions on the same services (e. g. mobile phone, pager, and VSAT 
(very small aperture terminal)). Although it was good to have more than one 
operator providing a certain service, it led to waste from double investment and 
difference in conditions between the concessions that were granted by different 
agencies 
78 
. 
77 The TOT was established by the Telephone Organisation of Thailand Act B. E. 2497 (1954), 
while the CAT was established by the Communications Authority of Thailand Act B. E. 2519 
(1976). 
78 Concessions on pager (granted by TOT, CAT, and PTD) and mobile phone (granted by TOT 
and CAT) are good examples of the unequal concession conditions, which were set 
by different 
concession granters. The details about the unequal conditions among concessions will 
be further 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Figure 4.2 
The agencies that have influence on the Thai telecommunications industry 
The cabinet, 
NESDB, 
MOF, 
Administrative level MOTC, PTD 
-------------------- 
j 
-------------------- 
TOT 
Concessionaires 
Overatin level 
The SOTEs under the MOTC's 
CAT administration 
Concessionaires 
Thirdly, there were various govermuental bodies that exerted influence on the 
telecommunications industry of Thailand. Apart from the normal practice that the 
responsible ministry, which was the MOTC in this case, had a duty to take care of 
the overall policy as well as to set the direction of development, the Thai 
telecommunications industry also had several other governmental agencies that 
played important roles in telecommunications activities (shown in Figure 4.2). 
The first agency was the PTD. The PTD involved itself directly as it was 
responsible for frequency management and allocation; besides, it had the duty to 
study, analyse, and make comments and suggestions on the country's 
telecommunications plan; it also had to act as a government representative in 
international post and telecommunications affairs. The second agency that also 
played a crucial role in telecommunications was the National Economic and 
Social Development Board (NESDB). As a central planning authority of the 
country, its roles were to approve the SOTEs' annual investment budget and to 
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study and approve the feasibility of the high-value investment project proposed by 
SOTEs. The next agency was the MOF. The MOF was involved with SOTEs in 
several aspects, such as in selecting the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the 
Board of Director (BOD), in appraising the SOTEs' operating efficiency and 
approving the amount of bonus to SOTEs' employees and management, and in 
fixing the maximum loan levels for each SOTE. In addition, the cabinet was also 
involved with the telecommunications industry. It was the authority that made the 
final decision on most of the strategic telecommunications initiatives as well as on 
every telecommunications mega-projects. Lastly, the final influential body was 
the SOTEs themselves. With the monopoly right in hand, the TOT and CAT had 
superior power over their concessionaires. Most strategic activities, such as 
network upgrading or new service launching, had to be agreed by the SOTE 
before being put into action. All in all, it is found that the complex structure of 
the Thai telecommunications industry possessed both pros and cons. The positive 
aspect was the balance of power. The involvement from various agencies tended 
to make the decisions more accurate and prudent. On the other hand, it led to a 
very lengthy process, while disagreement (if any) among these agencies also 
possibly led to further delay. Importantly, it is also worth noting that more 
involvement from governmental agencies means a greater possibility of being 
influenced by outside forces. 
In summary, it is not an exaggeration to say that the Thai telecommunications 
industry has its own unique arrangements in many respects. Many of those are 
structurally unfavourable to the full-scale refonn programme. The competition is 
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limited, as it is confined by the SOTE monopolisation. Liberalisation is 
impractical, as it is restricted by the laws and BTO concession. The regulation is 
complex and inefficient, as it has too many pertinent agencies involving in the 
decision-making. 
THE NEED FOR REFORM 
The more developed Thailand's economy becomes, the more significant the role 
of telecommunications becomes to the country. The growth of the economy 
needs good supporting infrastructures. According to the OECD (1998, p. 7), "it is 
clear that the telecoms industry provides the backbone supporting a wide range of 
growing service industries, and has the potential to create many new service 
activities". Not only in the economic sense, but a reliable and adequate 
telecommunications service is also crucial for the social agenda. It can reduce the 
social gap between people of different classes and create equal opportunities for 
people throughout the country. Therefore, it is quite clear that an efficient and 
adequate telecommunications infrastructure is vital for Thailand in order to 
promote economic growth and competitiveness on the international level as well 
as to improve domestic social welfare. In fact, Thailand's need for reform can be 
indicated by several pieces of evidence. 
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Inefficiencies of the industry 
Some statistical data can provide a picture of the severity of the 
telecommunications crisis during the late 1980s until the mid 1990s. It was found 
that Thailand had one of the poorest telecom service records in the Southeast 
Asia, where, like most other countries, the inefficiency of the state-run providers 
was the main cause of the deficiency (Petrazzini, 1995). 
The statistics on basic telephone service before 1993 79 depict a severe shortage. 
In 1987, the penetration rate of the fixed line service for the whole country was 
only 1.67 lines per 100 inhabitants, while the ratio within the Bangkok area was as 
high as 10.96, and the same ratio for the rural area was as low as 0.59. However, 
the numbers were slightly improved in 1993 when the penetration rate in Bangkok 
and the rural areas rose to 25.38 and 1.52 lines per 100 inhabitants, respectively, 
which increased the average telephone penetration rate of the country to 3.80 lines 
per 100 inhabitants 80 (see Table 4.2). 
79 1993 is the year that the first fixed line concessionaire, the Telecom Asia Plc. (TA), began its 
operations. 
'0 As for mobile phones, the number of registered numbers was very low during that period of 
time, which is therefore considered irrelevant in this case. 
134 
Table 4.2 
Basic televhone Denetration rate (ver 100 inhabitants) during 1987 to 1993 
Y 
Number rented Thai population 
Penetration rate 
(per 100 inhabitants) 
ear 
Bangkok Rural Total Bangkok Rural Total Bangkok Rural Total 
1987 
. .. 
614,707 
.. ................... III....... . 
286,915 
. ................................ I ....... 
901,622 
........ .... .......... I .................... 
5,609,352 
........................................... 
48,263,820 
.......................................... 
53,873,172 
.... ....... ........ .... .... . . .. 
10.96 
.. . . 
0.59 
. . . 
1.67 
..................... ... .. 
1988 
. . 
686,151 
... . . .. 
319,721 
. ....... ................... . . ......... 
1,005,872 
.......... . . ..... . . . 
5,716,779 
. . 
49,244,138 
. . I .. . . . ... 
54,960,917 
......... .. ... . I .. 
12.00 
........... I. . . ......... 
0.65 
............................. 
1.83 
I-, ................. 
1989 
... ............ I., I . . . 
792,203 
. . . . 
365,811 
. .......... ..... .. .... . . 
. -- . . . . ...... I. 
1,158,014 
...... .. .... . .. 
. .. ............. III . 
5,832,843 
......................................... 
50,055,550 
................... I. I. -I ................. 
55,888,393 
.... ................ ................ 
13.58 
..... ............ ... 
0.73 
-I.. .................... ... . 
2.07 
........ . ................... 
1990 
. . .... 
.--....................... 
900,941 
........... I .............................. 
I . - . . .. . 
423,581 
. . . .. ................. 
1,324,522 
................ I .... ............ 
I .................. I .............. 
5,546,937 
I ......................... ....... ... 
..................... ................ .... 
50,756,336 
...... I. ....... . . ... 
.............. ............................ 
56,303,273 
. . . . . 
...... I ............... ........... I ........ 
16.24 
.. -................... 
0.83 
. 
................ - 11 ............. 
2.35 
. . . . . . ........... ......... . . 
1991 1,044,295 
.. ..... . ... ............ I .......... I 
508,865 
........................... ..... 
1,553,160 
.............. I ......................... . 
. . 
5,602,591 
.... ..... .... 
..... .-I . .. . 
51,358,439 
. .... . . ... . . -. - . ............... 
56,961,030 
...................... 
18.64 
I-, ................ .. ....... 
0.99 
- ......... .. .. . . ..... ...... 
2.73 
.............................. 
1992 
... . . . 
1,159,227 
. .. . . ... ............ 
630,802 
....... .................................. 
. 
1,790,029 
.. ... ... ... ........ ......... .... 
. ... I .. .... I.., I ...... 
5,562,141 
.... . . . . . 
..... II.. I ................. 
52,226,824 
.......................................... 
57,788,965 
.................. .... ......... 
20.84 
......... 
1.21 
. . . . 
............... 
3.10 
. . . . ............................ 
1993 
I ... . ... . . I 
1,414,242 
. 
801,623 
. . . II . I 
2,215,865 
. . .. 1 11 ....... .. I.... ............. 
5,572,712 
...... -I....................... 
52,763,360 
......................................... 
58,336,072 
......... I ............................ 
25.38 
...... ............. ........... . . ... 
1.52 
. . ..... ........ .... ..... 
3.80 
Sources: The TOT Corporation Plc., The College of Population Studies, Chulalongkorn University 
The inefficiency of the industry can also be illustrated by the statistics on the 
average waiting time. The ITU reported that telecommunications consumers in 
Thailand had to wait for a very long time before being served. In 1991, it was 
estimated that waiting time for installation was as long as 8.6 years, while there 
were more than 1.3 million customers in the waiting list (the ITU, 2004b). In 
1994, the number of waiting lists in Thailand had further increased to 1.6 million 
customers; but the average wait was reduced to an average of 4 years. Although 
the average wait was cut by half in 1994 from the 1991 figure, it was still 
unacceptable and out of line with other countries in the same region (shown in 
Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3 
Average waiting time in 1991 and 1994 
Thm 
: ý, Io 
0 8.6ý -- --- -- ------ 9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
10.3 
5.5 
Thailand Indonesia Pliflippines Milaysia Sinppore 
131991 
Source: The ITU 
M 1994 
The inefficiency of the industry was also statistically noticeable from the local 
perspective (shown in Table 4.3). There was a huge gap between the 
telecommunications services provided to the people in Bangkok and the rural 
areas. For example, the fixed line concentration rate (per 100 inhabitants) of 
people in the Bangkok area was more than 15 times higher than that of people in 
the rural areas during the period 1987 to 1993. In fact, the proportion used to be 
as high as 18.43 times in 1987 before it gradually decreased to the level of 16.70 
times in 1993. The situation was not better for public phones. Statistics in 1987 
showed that there was less than 1 public phone per 10,000 people in the rural 
areas, while there were 26 lines per 10,000 people in the Bangkok area, which 
was equivalent to more than 21 times the difference. Fortunately, the disparity 
became steadily narrower in the subsequent years, when it was reduced to a 
difference of 11.13 times in 1993. 
Countries 
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Table 4.3 
The differences of basic telecommunications services between Bangkok and rural areas during 
1987 and 1993 
Year 
Fixed line Concentration Rate 
(per 100 inhabitants) 
Difference 
(BKK vs 
rural) 
Public Phone 
Concentration Rate 
(per 100 inhabitants) 
Difference 
(BKK vs 
ral) 
Bangkok Rural areas Total 
(times) Bangkok Rural areas 
ru 
(times) 
Metropolis Metropolis 
1987 
-1-. 1. ý .......... 
10.96 
... --.......................... 
0.59 
................................................ 
1.67 
........................ I .......... - ..... 
18.43 
.......... I ................ 
0.26 
................. ... ................. 
0.01 
... I ............... ............... 
21.76 
1988 
............................ 
12.00 
....................... I ........................ 
0.65 
....... 
1.83 
....... ...................... 
18.49 
............................................. I ........... 
0.25 
....................... I ......................... 
0.01 
................................. 
20.18 
........................... - ................... 1989 
I ................. I .... 
13.58 
.......... ................................. 
0.73 
................................................ 
2.07 
............................. I ................... 
18.58 
......... - .................. I .......... 
0.25 
................ 1 -. 1 - ................ I .. 
0.01 
............... -I............... I ..... 
18.27 
................... - .......................... 1990 
......................... 
16.24 
................................................ 
0.83 
........... I ............ ......... 
2.35 
.......................... I ................. I .... 
19.46 
........... ........................................ 
0.26 
......... I ....................................... 
0.02 
....................... .................. .... .. 
17.56 
...................................... 1991 
I ................ 
18.64 
......... I ............................... 
0.99 
... .................. II........ 
2.73 
............ ............... ........... I ......... 
18.81 
.................. II............................. 
0.29 
................................................. 
0.02 
....................... I ......................... 
15.22 
..... ........... IIIII 1992 
............ I .................. 
20.84 
................................................. 
1.21 
................. IIII 
3.10 
ý ................ -. 1. .................... 
17.26 
.. I., ................... I ................................. 
0.32 
....................................... ......... 
0.03 
................................................. 
12.85 
.............. ............. ............................. 1993 25.38 1.52 3.80 16.70 0.36 0.03 11.13 
Source: the TOT Corporation Plc. 
Moreover, in addition to the terms of service availability, the inefficiency of the 
industry was also clearly exposed in terms of service fees. The monopoly 
structure, ineffective competition, and poor regulation were the main reasons for 
the inappropriate pricing structure, which, from the efficiency standpoint, was 
unacceptable since it led to a deadweight loss for the country as a whole. For 
example, the huge cross-subsidisation between the local and long-distance calls 
effectively distorted the real cost of service and reduced the operators' incentives 
to increase efficiency. The comparisons of important telecommunications 
services in Thailand and in other comparable countries provided in the Table 4.4 
and 4.5 are examples that demonstrate the necessity of the reform programme 
within the Thai telecommunications industry. 
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Table 4.4 
The comparisons of domestic long-distance calls 
Unit: THB Der minute 
Di t k Thailand 
Malaysia The Philippines 
s ance ( ms) TOT Telekorn Malaysia PLDT 
< 50 3 1.35 
51-100 6 
3 39 
101-150 9 . 
151-200 9 2.59 
201 -350 12 9 67 
351 -500 15 . 
> 500 18 
Source: The'I'DRI 
Table 4.5 
The comparisons of international long-distance calls 
Unit: THB ner minute 
Thailand Malaysia The Singapore Hong Kong 
D ti ti 
Philippines 
es na ons 
CAT Telekom PLDT Singtel HKIC Malaysia 
UK 30 22.6 14.0 27.4 
USA 22 22 6 9 3 14 6 
. 17 15 . . 
Japan 30 33.9 . 21.4 32.3 
Australia 22 22.6 14.3 25.1 
Source: The TDRI 
Note: Exchange rates: 1 Malaysian Ringgit = 11.28 Baht, I Philippine Peso = 0.862 Baht, 
Singapore Dollar = 23.77 Baht, and 1 Hong Kong Dollar = 5.49 Baht 
As for mobile phones, the size of its segment during 1987 - 1993 was relatively 
small compared to that of the fixed line; however, it showed strong potential 
growth. The proportion of mobile phones to fixed lines had grown dramatically 
from around 1% in 1987 to almost 18% in 1993 (shown in Table 4.6). Although 
the advent of the mobile service seemed to be able to alleviate the severity of the 
crisis (both in terms of the insufficiency and the limited service area of fixed line), 
however, before 1993, the mobile phone penetration was low and could not make 
the crisis any better. The monopoly environment hindered the growth of service 
by distorting the price of handsets as well as service tariffs. Up to the early 2000s, 
such distortions still existed; the cost of service and the price of handsets in 
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Thailand are still significantly higher than other comparable countries in the 
region (see the price comparison in Appendix D). 
Table 4.6 
The size of mobile nhone and fixed line se2ments durm2 1987 to 1993 
Year Fixed line 
Public 
Phone 
Total Basic 
Telephone 
Mobile phone 
operated by 
TOT 
Mobile Phone 
operated by 
CAT 
Total Mobile 
Phone 
Proportion 
Mobile/Basic 
1987 
........... 
901,622 
.... ......................................... .... 
20,144 
.................... ... .............. 
921,766 
....... . ..................... ...................... 
4,413 
..................... ............ III... 
n/a 
....... I ........... I ............... 
4,413 
..... I .......................... 
0.48% 
I. . - . . . . 1988 
- ............ .... 
1,005,872 
............... ... ... ..................... 
20,668 
I ........... 
1,026,540 
..... I ......................................... . 
10,612 
...................................................... 
6,972 
..... - ................... I. .......... ................ 
17,584 
.., .................. I ................... 
I I -II. -I-111- ........... - ... .. .. .... 1.71% 
............ III..., 1989 
.................... .... . 
1,158,014 
...... I-I.......................... 
21,360 
.......... I .......... .................. 
1,179,374 
...... I ............... ............................... 
20,936 
........................................... 
14,171 
.... I ................................ I ................. 
35,107 
................ I ................................. I .. 
2.98% 
....................... ... ..... ......... ... . 1990 
............... . ... 
1,324,522 
.......... ....................... . ................ 
22,307 
.............. I ............ I ................. 
1,346,829 
............................................. - ...... 
31,981 
.......... ......... 
31,242 
... ...... ....... ... ............ ........... 
63,223 
.. 1.11.1.1 ........ ................................... 
. . I . 4.69% 
................................. I 1991 
................. .... 
1,553,160 
..... I .......................... I ................... 
26,093 
1. ............... I ............... 
1,579,253 
.................. ... I ........................ 
79,198 
.................................................... I .. 
50,044 
....... . .............................................. 
. 129,242 
...................................................... 
8.18% 
......................................................... 1992 
....... I ............... ..... 
1,790,029 
.......... .............. .......................... 
30,999 
............... I ...................... I ...... 
1,821,028 
........ I .......... ........... I., .......... II. 
142,422 
....................... . 
95,538 
......... I ............... -. 1 .................. 
237,960 
-. 1 ........... II............... I ........ 
13.07% 
......... -- ................. II . . 1993 2,215,865 36,730 2,252,595 254,837 143,277 398,114 17.67% 
Source: The TOT Corporation Plc. and the CAT Telecom Plc. 
In summary, the statistical data before 1993 provides a clear picture that the Thai 
telecommunications industry was in need of reform, either looking from the 
economic or the social standpoint. In economic terms, an efficient and adequate 
telecommunications infrastructure is a key factor that enhances economic growth 
(Wellenius & Stem, 1994). The question of deeper telecommunications reform 
(apart from only the introduction of the BTO) was further addressed when the 7th 
NESDP (National Economic and Social Development Plan), which was used 
between 1992 and 1996, called for making Thailand a telecommunications hub 
within Southeast Asia. Compared to other countries in the region, even though 
Thailand's figures on basic telephone penetration, mobile phones, and waiting 
time in the years 1991 and 1994 were slightly better than those of Indonesia and 
the Philippines, these numbers were significantly worse than those of Malaysia 
and Singapore (see Table 4.7). Consequently, an immediate action towards 
reform had to be launched and implemented in order to achieve the national goal. 
139 
Focusing on a social perspective, the accessibility differential between people in 
the capital and in the rural areas was very high. The basic telephone concentration 
rates in the Bangkok and in the rural areas were obvious indicators. Like 
electricity and irrigation, telecommunications currently appeared to be another 
basic infrastructure for everyone; in fact, it is very important in promoting 
equality and unity within society, especially in the aspects of social, economic, 
custom, and politics (Tatchayapong, Korarnuntakul & Wanichakorn, 2003). The 
difference in accessibility between different groups within society can widen the 
gaps between them and may lead to social problem afterwards (the so-called 
"digital divide 
Table 4.7 
Com-Darisons of selected teleconu-nunications indicators in 1991 and 1994 
Country 
Category Year The 
Indonesia Phili i Thailand Malaysia 
Singapore 
pp nes 
Basic telephone 1991 
......................... II...... 
0.7 
............ .... .............. I ...................... 
1.0 
....................................... 
2.7 
....................................................... 
9.9 
I ............ I ................. 
39.9 
................ - (per 100 inhabitants) 1994 1.3 1.7 4.7 14.7 47.3 
Mobile phone 1991 
........... ............ ...... 
0.01 
. ........ .. -, '' **'*' -- ........ 
0.05 
... *...... .................. .......... . ...... 
0.37 
...... . ...... . 
0.39 2.96 
(per 100 inhabitants) 1994 0.04 0.30 1.10 2.93 8.36 
Average waiting time 1991 
............................ ....... 
2.6 
.............................. .................. 
>10 
....................................................... 
8.6 
- .................................................... 
0.9 
. .......................................... 
0 
.................. I ......................... (yrs) 1994 0.3 5.5 4.0 0.3 0 
Source: The ITU 
The Telecommunications Master Plan (TMP) 
Responding to the 7 th NESDP that wanted Thailand to become the 
telecommunications hub in the Southeast Asian region, the MOTC accordingly 
81 The "digital divide" is a social/political issue referring to the socio-economic gap between the 
people or communities that have access to telecommunications and related services (e. g. 
telephones, computers, and Internet access) and those who do not (the ITU, 2005). 
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transformed the national goal into a real action plan by launching the TMP in 
1997. 
According to Kusripituck (personal interview, November 24,2004), the TMP was 
written under the expectation of changing the industry from a state monopoly to a 
liberalised one with a number of operators who are licensed and regulated by a 
newly established independent regulator. In fact, the TMP also incorporated the 
2006 liberalisation commitment into the plan, which is why the TMP set the year 
1999 as the deadline to liberalise the industry for all local operators, as the plan 
intended to prepare the local operators for the arrival of real competition in 2006. 
Although it is found that the real refonn actions taken later were not quite in 
harmony with the plan, the TMP was considered the first concrete comprehensive 
plan to reform the telecommunications industry in Thailand. 
Country's new legislations 
Responding to the wave of economic reforrn that hit Thailand around the end of 
1990s, the Thai governments had promulgated several new legislations that 
directly impacted the telecommunications industry as well as its reform 
programme. 
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The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B. E. 2540 (199 7) 
The declaration of the 1997 Constitution made a number of impacts on the 
telecommunications industry. There are at least three sections, which are 40,87, 
and 335(2), that have reference to the telecommunications industry. 
Section 4082 states that the communication frequencies are a national resource and 
belong to the people of Thailand; the management of these valuable frequencies 
therefore should no longer be carried out by the SOTEs who are going to privatise 
in the near future. Besides, the frequencies must be used to serve the public 
interest and public benefit rather than to maximise the SOTEs' income. Thus, 
permission to use a frequency on the basis of the highest revenue-sharing bidder 
appeared to no longer correspond to the intention of the new Constitution because 
this extra operating cost is usually transferred to the consumers in some way or 
other (Peacock et al., 1984). Section 40 also stresses another key feature of the 
refonn, which is to establish an industry independent regulatory body. However, 
the detailed establishment process as well as the specific duties of the regulator 
are not specified in the Constitution, but will be spelt out later in the 
implementing laws. 
82 Section 40: Transmission frequencies for radio or television broadcasting and radio 
telecommunications are national communication resources for public interest. There shall be an 
independent regulatory body having the duty to distribute the frequencies under paragraph one and 
supervise radio or television broadcasting and telecommunications businesses as provided 
by law. 
In carrying out the Act under paragraph two, regard shall be had to utmost public 
benefit at 
national and local levels in education, culture, State security, and other public 
interests including 
fair and free competition. 
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Section 87 83 principally talks about a fair and free market, which also includes the 
a 'k bolition of the state monopoly as well as the liberalisation of the industry. It 
further mentions that the state should not compete with the private sector in areas 
where private concerns can run effectively. This emphasises the need for 
corporatisation and privatisation of the SOTEs, while, on the other hand, the 
monopoly right should be brought back to the state. 
Finally, Section 335(2) 84 further extends the gist of Section 40 by mentioning the 
enactment of the implementing laws, which primarily refers to the law to establish 
an industry regulator, In addition, Section 335(2) makes another important point, 
as it honours all the existing concessions. All the BTO contracts will be valid and 
remain intact until the end of contracts. Unless both BTO partners agree to 
terminate or convert their concessions, the concessionaire still maintains the 
exclusive right to use the networks and to operate within the industry under the 
right of the SOTE until the end of the concession period. 
In a nutshell, the 1997 Constitution mandates the telecommunications industry to 
be open for free and fair competition, an independent regulatory body has to be 
83 Section 87: The state shall encourage a free economic system through market forces, ensure and 
supervise fair competition, protect consumers, and prevent direct and indirect monopolies, repeal 
and refrain from enacting laws and regulations controlling businesses which do not correspond 
with economic necessity, and shall not engage in an enterprise in competition with the private 
sector unless it is necessary for the purpose of maintaining the security of the State, preserving the 
common interest, or providing public utilities. 
84 Section 335(2): The provisions of Section 40 shall not apply until the law implementing such 
provisions has been enacted, which shall not be later than three years as from the date of the 
promulgation of this Constitution; provided that such law shall not affect any licence, concession, 
or contract valid on the date such law comes into force until the expiration of such licence, 
concession, or contract. 
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established, and the SOTEs have to be transformed into operating companies 
without any privileges. 
The Act on Organisation Allocating Frequency Waves and Supervising 
Radio/Television Broadcasting and Telecommunications Business B. E. 2543 
(2000) 
Resulting from Sections 40 and 335(2) of the 1997 Constitution, the govenunent 
promulgated one of the two implementing laws, which was aimed at establishing 
the independent telecommunications regulatory body. 
The cabinet., in February 2000, approved the Act on Organisation Allocating 
Frequency Waves and Supervising Radio/Television Broadcasting and 
Telecommunications Business B. E. 2543 (2000), hereinafter "the 2000 Spectrum 
Act". It is interesting to find that the govermuent decided to regulate 
telecommunications and broadcasting separately, as the law requires these two 
industries to have their own regulator 85 . The telecommunications regulator will 
be called the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), while the 
broadcasting regulator is to be called the National Television and Sound 
Broadcasting Commission (NTSBC). 
85 However, the law still requires some tasks to be done by a "joint commission" such as the task 
to manage the use of the national frequency wavelengths (please see details in Section 62 of the 
2000 Spectrum Act). In fact, that telecommunications and broadcasting are being regulated 
separately is surprising considering the fact that modem technology is dissolving the boundaries 
between the two industries. This is perhaps suggesting an innate conservativism in Thailand, 
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The 2000 Spectrum Act revealed a key implication that the government had 
shown a clear intention to discharge its control over the industry and to transfer 
the control power to the newly established agency that is more skilled, 
independent, impartial, and professional. However, although the law to establish 
the regulators is already in effect, the new regulatory regime still cannot fully 
function unless another law, namely the "Telecommunications Business Act", 
which provides the details on the framework of doing telecommunications 
business within the country, has been enacted. Therefore, the 2000 Spectrum Act 
is more or less the first step in the country's regulatory reform. 
The Act on Telecommunications Business B. E. 2544 (2001) 
A year after the promulgation of the 2000 Spectrum Act, the second implementing 
law of Section 40 and 335(2) of the 1997 Constitution was also in effect. The 
Telecommunications Business Act B. E. 2544 (2001) was approved by the cabinet 
in November. 
The law is used as the ground framework for the operation of the regulator; for 
instance, the law mentions the types of license, the payment of the license fee, 
network interconnection, the standard of telecommunications networks and 
equipment, the rights of service operators and consumers, and so forth. One of 
the most important features of this law is that it officially terminated the state 
monopoly right that was embedded in the SOTEs. Section 3 of the 2001 
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Telecommunications Business law repealed the 1934 Telegraph and Telephone 
Act, which was the basis of telecommunications monopoly. 
It is interesting to note that although Thailand was in the middle of a fast- 
changing and highly competitive environment, the introduction of the 2001 
Telecommunications Business law was the first time in the last six decades that 
the original regulatory authority on telecommunications (and also broadcasting) 
had been touched since it was mentioned in the country's first 
telecommunications legislation in 1934. Therefore, the introduction of the 2001 
law can be seen as a significant step forward towards reform, since it loosened the 
legal deadlock, which was one of the major reform problems. 
The external forces 
Reform pressures from outside the country also appeared to be important forces 
driving economic reform in Thailand. The country's crisis combined with the 
conditionality required by international organisations for being part of the global 
society stressed clearly the need for economic refon-n. As such, these external 
forces appeared to be an effective force that pressured the Thai governments to 
seriously reform the economy. 
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The 1997 Asian Economic Crisis and the IMF bail-outpackage 
The major economic crash in Thailand and other Asian countries in 1997 was 
another turning point in the Thai telecommunications industry. According to 
Prachuabmoh (1998), the attempt to defend the "Baht" against international 
speculators was the main reason for the depletion of the country's foreign reserves 
and for the country being driven almost to bankruptcY86 (see Table 4.8). The 
govenu-nent, under PM Chaovalit Yongjaiyuth, decided to float the Baht on July 
21 1997 and signed an agreement for IMF financial assistance for USD 16.7 
billion on August 14,1997. As a result, the government had to conform to the 
rescue package demanded by the IMF, such as tighter fiscal and monetary 
policies. 
Table 4.8 
End quarter net official foreign reserves 
Unit: Billion USD 
Year Quarter Net Official Reserves Current Account 
Q2 
..................................... I ............. I.., 
2.9 
.................................................. - ....... ..... . -3,128 .......... . .... I ... ....... -. 11. ................ -- - .................. . 1997 Q3 
. 
1.8 
........................................................................................................ ......................... ........ -694 ............... .. ........ . .............................................. ........ Q4 ... -. - .. . . 1.9 . I . .... -................. ....................... .......... ................................ 2,890 
Q1 
...................... I ....................... ........ 
2.8 
................................................................ ................................ . ................................ 
4,201 
................................ ............ I ...................................................................................... .............. Q 2 5 4 2,8 I 0 
1998 ... ..... ............ - . .................. ............ . .... .......... ................ ..... - - ..... ...... ...................... ............... ........ ............................ ....... . -- - ........... .. Q3 
.......................... 
6.8 
.... ............................................... ........... . ............................................ . 
3,411 
...... I .................... ............. ................... I .......... I ............ ........ ..................................... Q4 11.7 3,861 
1999 Q1 14.1 3,463 
Source: The Bank of Thailand 
Note: Drawing from the IMF package started in September 1997 
Focusing on the telecommunications industry, the privatisation of the SOTEs was 
clearly stated as a medium-term strategy in the summary of important measures 
86 Before 1997, Thailand used a "basket of currencies" to determine the value of the Baht. 
However, in practice, the Bank of Thailand normally tried to keep the value of the Baht around 
THB 25 to USD 1. 
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attached to every Letter of Intent (LOI) Thailand made with the IMF 87 . In fact, 
even though the IMF did not ask for it, the privatisation of TOT and CAT still 
seemed inevitable. The SOTEs were allocated insufficient budget for new 
investment. While self-raising debt was difficult (due to the constraint on the 
country's public debt 88), the only option left was to therefore raise funds by 
selling stocks of the organisations. 
To conclude, the 1997 Asian financial crisis as well as the conditionality imposed 
by the IMF effectively forced Thailand to make a very important move in its 
telecommunications industry 89 . The incidents enlightened both the government 
and the SOTEs that privatisation was an inevitable option for the recipient 
country. 
The Commitment with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the General 
Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) 
As a member of the WTO and a GATS participant, Thailand had to commit to 
promoting freer and fairer trade in services. Each participant country had to make 
individual commitments stating which of its service sectors it is willing to open to 
international competition, and how open those markets are. 
87 Such conditionality was severely criticised by various social and business groups (e. g. NGOs, 
labour unions, and academics) that it was a "fire-sale" tactic to benefit foreign investors rather than 
the locals (Krugman, 1998). 
88 This was similar to the UK's experience when the idea to borrow directly ftom the private 
capital market (via the so-called "Busby bonds") to alleviate the BT's underinvestment on network 
modernisation did not get off the ground due to the difficulty of 
distinguishing such borrowings 
from public sector borrowings (Armstrong et al., 1994). 
89 The "crisis hypothesis" and "external help hypothesis" can well explain the situation of Thailand 
in this respect. Please see more details in Chapter 2. 
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As for telecommunications related issues, the GATS agreement in February 1997, 
which committed 69 governments and accounted for 90% of the world 
telecommunications market in 1997, required the participant countries to open 
their telecommunications to free competition by January 1,1998. Nonetheless, 
Thailand (together with other 25 countries) won an exemption since it was not 
ready for full liberalisation in time. However, these countries had to make an 
obligation to liberalise their telecommunications by a later date. As for Thailand, 
it had already liberalised the value added service (VAS)90 to intemational 
competition since January 1995, while it committed to liberalising basic 
telecommunications services (i. e. fixed line, telex, telegraph, and facsimile) by 
January 2006. The types of service and level of liberalisation that Thailand had 
committed to the WTO are shown in Table 4.9. 
All in all, the commitment to the WTO under the GATS frameworks is therefore 
another significant impetus to the reform, as it provided concrete deadlines for 
liberalisation, which truly put pressure on the govenunent to prepare the industry 
for very intense competition in the near future. 
'0 VAS includes (1) data base access service, (2) online information and/or data processing 
services, (3) telecommunication equipment sales services, (4) telecommunications consulting 
services, (5) videotext, (6) teleconference, and (7) domestic leased circuits. 
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Table 4.9 
The le. vf-. Iq nf fihernlkntinn nrnpramme due to the WTO conunitment 
Types of service Indonesia Malaysia 
The 
Philippines 
Thailand 
APEC 
Average 
World 
Average 
Voice Telephony 1 5 2 2 4 4 
_Mobile. 
Telephony 3 5 2 0 4 4 
Teletype 1 0 2 2 4 4 
Telegraph 1 0 2 2 4 3 
Facsimile 0 5 2 2 4 4 
Pager 3 5 0 0 4 3 
Packet Switched Data 
Transmission 
2 5 2 2 5 4 
Circuit Switched Data 
Transmission 
1 5 2 2 5 4 
Private Leased Circuit 0 5 0 0 4 4 
Mobile Data Service 0 0 0 0 3 3 
Personal Communication 
Service 
3 0 0 0 2 3 
Source: The TDRI 
Note: Score "0" means monopolisation, while score "8" means full liberalisation 
In summary, there were a number of factors that directed Thailand to implement 
telecommunications refon-n. In the past, inefficiency within the industry, together 
with service scarcity used to be the main reason. The introduction of the BTO to 
allow the private sector to participate in the service provision seemed to be able to 
temporarily alleviate the crisis. However, as time went by, the credence of the 
benefit gained from the reform together with the pressure from the outside became 
very influential in calling for telecommunications reform in terms of both depth 
(and width) and the speed of the reform. 
CONCLUSION 
Consistent with the nationalisation concept, the early telecommunications industry 
in Thailand was dominated by the state with the intention of providing quality 
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services throughout the country, while national security was still a major priority. 
All kinds of telecommunications related tasks, as a result, were solely done by the 
state and the SOTEs. However, the analysis of events revealed that the state-led 
telecommunications development in Thailand was encumbered with a number of 
inefficiencies. Telecommunications services at that time were simply inadequate 
and inefficient in responding to local demand. A series of statistical data provided 
throughout the chapter can be sound illustrations of the difficulties. The levels of 
economic development and social welfare consequently tended to be hurt by the 
telecommunication limitations. At the same time, the pressure from outside (e. g. 
the neo-liberalism wave and international commitments) was another important 
factor that demanded a major revolution within the industry. All things 
considered, the local demand along with the pressure from outside made the 
telecommunications reform programme in Thailand inevitable. 
Although the Thai telecommunications reform programme began from the late 
1980s and there were so many incidents emphasising and accelerating the reform 
programme all along the way (e. g. the new Constitution, the 1997 financial crisis, 
the commitment to WTO, and so on), it is interesting to note that all these 
incidents were not powerful enough to drive the reform programme to a 
satisfactory outcome. In fact, the effects of these stimuli were drowned out by a 
number of deeply embedded unfavourable conditions within the industry. In the 
next several chapters, the three basic reform issues (which are the privatisation of 
the SOTEs, the conversion of the BTOs, and the establishment of the industry 
regulator) will be separately discussed and analysed in detail to identify the 
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reasons that have hindered (or still continue to hinder) the completing of each 
issue, and therefore the telecommunications reform programme as a whole. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE PRIVATISATION OF THE 
STATE OWNED TELECOMMUNICATIONS ENTERPRISES 
INTRODUCTION 
The fact that most telecommunications services were brought into Thailand for 
use within state functions was the reason that the state was the sole operator of all 
the service provisions. However, when the telecommunications services became 
widely available to the public, all the services were still monopolised by the state, 
but now with the intention of providing services throughout the country at 
reasonable prices, while still being able to preserve national security. With the 
monopoly right, the TOT and CAT simply dominate the industry. The high 
demand on telecommunications services from both individual and business users 
drove both SOTEs to grow quickly and strongly. Compared with all other SOEs, 
the TOT and CAT are usually ranked very high both in terms of size and financial 
perfonnance. However, the question that usually arises is whether the assets and 
the profits made by SOTEs are really gained as a result of their own competency; 
the answer, unfortunately, seems to be that their accomplishments were actually 
derived from their monopolistic power and the protected industry. Although the 
monopolised industry structure may have been sensible in the past, new influential 
factors such as advances in technology, the rapid growth in service demand, as 
well as the liberalisation wave, made the old structure no longer convincing and in 
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need of change. It was difficult for the SOTEs to survive in conditions where 
their monopolistic rights were taken back by the state, especially when they 
remained inefficient and unwilling to respond to change. 
PROBLEMS OF SOTES AND STATE-RUN SERVICES 
Experiences of dissatisfaction over state-owned and state-run services from many 
places around the world have strengthened the substance of the govenunent 
failure theory. Similar to places elsewhere, the operation of SOTEs in Thailand is 
also considered not very efficient. The fact that the country ran into a 
telecommunications crisis around the end of 1980s was good evidence of their 
inefficiencies. Careful consideration shows that there are several factors that lead 
to inefficiencies in the Thai SOTEs. 
The first factor is the problems deriving internally from the SOTEs themselves. 
The large size and the rigid organisation structure made the SOTEs inflexible. 
Both TOT and CAT have divided their structure into so many divisions and 
subdivisions. The steep organisation structure and long communication flow 
among units often cause a slow workflow. Neither do the rules that the 
govenunent applies to the SOTEs enhance efficiency. By being a state enterprise, 
SOTE has to be under the rules that are also used by all other government 
agencies, which can be very trivial and conservative. A high-level management 
official of a SOTE (Chevapruek, personal interview, December 8,2004) discloses, 
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Carrying on the business under the state owned structure makes it hard to compete against the 
privately-owned structure. There are so many inferiorities embedded in the nature of the 
SOTE; for example, the SOTE cannot expand their services to cope with the demand as it has 
only limited investment budget; the SOTE's business project cannot be kept secret as it has to 
submit the proposal for feasibility study and approval; the SOTE is unable to respond quickly 
to the changes within the market as any action has to successively pass the lengthy decision 
process. 
Apart from problems within the operation, human resources stand out as another 
major impediment for Thai SOTEs. The study of TDRI in 1994 as well as a 
comment from the SOTE's labour union (lambumrung, personal interview, 
December 21,2004) both reveal that high-level management with a good vision 
and business mind is a scarce resource within Thai SOTEs. In this aspect, the 
State Enterprise Policy Office (SEPO) reported that the lack of a proper 
motivation mechanism 91 and the lack of a sense of ownership among employees 
and managements also contribute to the human resource problem (Juruphan, 
personal interview, December 14,2004). It is also found that though SOTEs had 
nil Abundant employees in hand, they were not able to effectively utilise their people. 
Table 5.1 provides evidence of the inefficiency of the SOTEs (the TOT in this 
case); it gives an idea why the SOTE is unlikely to be able to compete with 
private operators. For a comparable level of service provided, the SOTE required 
a lot more resources than did the private operators. For example, in the year 2000, 
TOT used 24,483 employees to provide 2.88 million fixed line numbers around 
the country, while the concessionaires (combined TA's and TT&T's) used only 
8,545 employees to provide approximately the same number of lines as TOT. 
9' The poor working performance does not actually have effects on the SOTE employees and 
management. With "no lay-off 'policy, both TOT and CAT provide their employees with a high 
level of job security. Besides, the monopoly right also generated the SOTEs a huge amount of 
profit every year, which eventually led to a substantial level of bonus (in practice, it is found that 
both SOTEs apply the fixed bonus policy during the last decade (Chareonwan, personal interview, 
December 14,2004)). 
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Moreover, when looking at the ratio of amount of numbers rented to the employee 
employed, it is found that, in 1998, one employee of TOT was able to serve 98 
numbers, while one employee of a private company was able to serve 306 
numbers. Although TOT tried to improve its efficiency until the ratio increased to 
157 numbers in 2003, however, it is still not to be compared to the private 
companies, which also rose to 373 numbers per employee in the same year. 
Table 5.1 
The comparison of employees used to provide service between the TOT and its concessionaires 
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 
TOT 21,597 21,858 22,842 24,483 25,355 26,017 
Number of 
Private 
Operators 8,465 8,579 8,790 8,545 8,102 8,092 
Employees TT&T 3,124 3,160 3,251 3,240 3,304 3,392 
TA 5,349 5,419 5,539 5,305 4,798 4,700 
TOT rural 1,854,227 1,785,473 1,647,170 1,437,212 1,248,740 1,099,623 
TOT Bangkok 1,542,231 1,543,262 1,474,421 1,439,382 1,438,933 1,459,549 
Number of Total TOT 3,396,458 3,328,735 3,121,591 2,876,594 2,687,673 2,559,172 
numbers rented TT&T 1,187,181 1,196,299 1,184,126 1,178,856 1,135,424 1,167,675 
TA 1,971,135 1,974,808 1,736,774 1,535,634 1,381,539 1,310,702 
Total Private 
Operators 3,158,316 3,171,107 2,920,900 2,714,490 2,516,963 2,478,377 
Numbers rented for TOT 157.27 152.29 136.66 117.49 106.00 98.37 
each employee 
employed 
Private 
Operators 373.10 369.64 332.30 317.67 310.66 306.27 
Source: The TOT Corporation Plc., the TT&T Plc., the TA Plc., and the Bualuang Securities Plc. 
Secondly, the SOTE normally faces the problem of operational freedom. The 
SOTE's operation is notoriously vulnerable to outside intervention. The fact that 
the SOTEs are currently wholly owned by the state and are under the 
responsibility of the line ministry 92 suggests that the operations of both SOTEs do 
not have as much freedom as they should. For example, the law specifies that the 
cabinet should make the final decision on a number of important issues such as 
92 In the past, the TOT and CAT were under the jurisdiction of the MOTC. However, when 
Thailand underwent a major bureaucratic reform in 2003, the MICT was established. Since then, 
both SOTEs had been transferred to the jurisdiction of the new Ministry. 
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the approval of the high-value investment plan, the appointment of the BOD 93 and 
the high-level management 94 . In 
fact, real incidents that show the SOTEs' 
vulnerability to political interference can be seen all along. According to 
Uthaisang (personal interview, November 18,2004), it almost becomes a tradition 
among the large SOEs, including the SOTEs, that there will be a major reshuffle 
within the BOD every time there is a change of minister, where, most of the time, 
the members of the new BOD are intimates of the government party or the 
minister himself 
Finally, the unclear objectives of the SOTEs sometimes cause confusion regarding 
the roles they play. Thai SOTEs do not clearly know whether they are socially- 
oriented or commercially-oriented organisations. They play both roles up to this 
date. In fact, the ambiguous objectives of the SOTEs can be traced back to the 
beginning when Section 6 of the 1954 TOT Act and Section 7 of the 1976 CAT 
Act prescribed both organisations to operate for the benefit of both the state and 
the public. However, in practice, maximising the state benefit may not be 
consistent with maximising public benefit. Focusing on the public welfare 
perspective, state telecommunications organisations should have duty to provide 
equal accessibility to all people at reasonable prices regardless of where they live; 
such a role is so described under the concept of "Public Service Obligation" 
(PSO). Obviously, providing PSO to promote social welfare (e. g. providing 
9' See details in Section 27 and 40 of the 1954 TOT Act and Section 24 and 39 of the 1976 CAT 
Act. 
94 As a result of the Act on the Qualifications of Board of Director and Officers of State Owned 
Enterprise B. E. 2543 (2000), the selection of the top-level position of SOE has to be done by the 
MOF, which is the owner of SOEs. The applicants can be either SOE employees or professionals 
from outside. However, the selected applicant also needs approval from the cabinet before taking 
the position. 
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public telephones in the remote areas) burdens the SOTEs with heavy losses in 
financial terms, which therefore hurts the performance of the SOTEs as well as 
the benefit of the state. Although it can be argued that the PSO problem is easily 
solved by specific government subsidies, the PSO subsidisation from the 
government has never happened in Thailand. Instead, Pornsutee (personal 
interview, November 12,2004) reveals that the PSO's source of funds seems to 
come from cross-subsidisation from some other monopolised services such as 
long distance calls. On the other hand, the state also expects some benefits of its 
own. The fact that the state, via the MOF, usually asks for a huge amount of 
treasury remittance from the SOTEs every year is a strong reason to force the 
SOTEs to maximise their incomes and profits. The statistics of the SOTEs's 
remittance to profit ratio during 1998 to 2002 (shown in Table 5.2) reveal an 
interesting finding in that both SOTEs remitted a very high percentage of their 
profits to the state coffers. Especially in the case of TOT, it appeared that the 
TOT had remitted more money to the state than profit received. In this kind of 
circumstance, it is obvious that not only were the SOTEs unable to expand their 
investment, but it also hurt the SOTEs' financial status in the long run. With 
these incompatible objectives, the SOTEs should have tried their best to optimise 
both objectives; however, the real practice appeared to demonstrate that both TOT 
and CAT put priority on the maximisation of revenue rather than social benefit. 
Several pieces of evidence can be produced to justify this claim. Firstly, the 
SOTEs try to maximise profit because part of the profit will be put into the 
employee fund to promote employees' welfare; secondly, the MOF, via the SEPO, 
uses the annual profit and level of annual remittance as the key indices to evaluate 
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state owned enterprise's performance as well as to determine the level of bonus 
pay for SOTE's employees and management. 
Table 5.2 
SOTEs' renuttance to profit ratios during 1998 to 2002 
Unit: GBP 
TOT CAT 
Year 
Profit Remittance Ratio Profit Remittance Ratio 
1998 194,702,837 233,67 1,429 120.01% 105,274,730 74,571,429 70.84% 
1999 27,677,210 169,828,571 613.60% 52,968,763 50,000,000 94.40% 
2000 75,777,628 31,068,714 41.00% 81,539,646 40,564,286 49.75% 
2001 189,013,553 43,196,571 22.85% 102,133,931 74,681,857 73.12% 
2002 292,704,723 119,096,714 40.69% 81,294,029 65,631,286 80.73% 
Average 167.63% Average 73.77% 
Source: The SEPO, MOF 
Note: Exchange rate at GBP I: THB 70 
In summary, all observations on the problems of the state run organisations and 
services above should be convincing enough to conclude that Thai 
telecommunications under the domination of SOTEs really did face problems. 
These problems had to be addressed without delay in order to improve the 
industry and make it in-sync with the changes of the current era. 
THE NEED FOR PRIVATISATION 
The idea to privatise the SOE in Thailand can be traced back to the beginning of 
the 1960s; however, it had never been put up for serious implementation. Until 
the mid 1990s, there were only a few small, poorly-operated, and inefficient SOEs 
(e. g. the Paper Mill Organisation, the Preserved Food Organisation, and the Off- 
shore Mining Organisation) that had been privatised and sold to private 
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companies. Although the idea of privatisation within Western countries started to 
become widespread during the 1980s and 1990s, such thoughts did not affect the 
Thai economy much at that time. It appeared that the high growth of the Thai 
economy during those periods kept the governments from paying much attention 
to privatisation. Dempsey (2000, p. 380) explains, 
Because Thailand's GDP was growing faster than any country in the world between 1985 and 
1995, the need to reform the SOEs seemed less pressing. Ministers and directors of state 
enterprises were willing to turn a blind eye to the inefficiencies of the SOEs as long as the 
country as a whole kept booming. The incentive for reform was simply lacking during these 
years. 
However, more recently, the need for privatisation has become more apparent in 
many economies around the world. Thailand is one of the countries where 
privatisation finally appeared vital in order to catch up with the fast changing 
environment. Focusing on the telecommunications industry, many factors, 
internally and externally, unanimously suggested that the government had to start 
considering and implementing the privatisation programme seriously. 
The first reason that forced the governments to seriously implement the 
privatisation programme was the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution. Section 
87 clearly states the promotion of a free and fair market; it also mentions that the 
state should not compete with the private sector in doing business except where it 
is necessary to do so. As for telecommunications, there was no further reason that 
the state should remain the service operator since the claims on either national 
secunty or the natural monopoly were already weakened due to advances in 
technology (Newbery, 1999 and Wallsten, 1999). In fact, it was also obvious that 
the Thai private telecommunications companies could do the job very efficiently. 
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Therefore, to comply with the Constitution and to enhance economic efficiency, 
the TOT and CAT had to be privatised and become only ordinary operators 
without any special privileges. 
The second impetus to serious privatisation also took place in 1997 when 
Thailand accepted the financial bail-out package from the U\4F. The package 
insisted that the government must bring the SOEs into fiscal balance and prepare a 
comprehensive privatisation programme. As a result, the government's 
commitment to privatising the SOEs was seen in every LOI. Besides, the 
economic recession that dragged on into subsequent years also pressured Thailand 
to privatise its SOEs in another way (Dempsey, 2000). The economic 
deterioration made the government desperately in need of money to spend on 
other pressing expenditures such as reducing debts, balancing the budget, 
improving social services, and so forth. The privatisation of SOEs seemed an 
easy and sensible option. Although privatisation in theory covers a wide range of 
measures (e. g. leasing, contracting out, joint ventures), privatisation in the outlook 
of the Thai government basically meant the divestiture option (Juruphan, personal 
interview, December 14,2004). The primary purposes of privatisation were to 
raise money for the state coffers as well as to reduce the state's financial burden. 
In fact, the intention to privatise SOEs (including TOT and CAT) in search of 
money can be clearly seen when the cabinet made a resolution on May 19,1998 
that 50% of privatisation proceeds must be used to replenish a special fund that 
was established to bail out the country from the damage incurred during the 
financial crisis. However, because the country was in a financially vulnerable 
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situation, the selected SOEs to be privatised had to be lucrative enough to draw 
attention from investors, which is why TOT and CAT were picked and put in the 
MOF's fast track privatisation schedule. 
Another reason for privatisation was the need to increase the efficiency of the 
telecommunications industry and the SOTEs themselves. As mentioned earlier, 
there were many factors that made the industry under SOTEs' domination not 
very efficient. Additionally, the inefficiencies embedded within the SOTEs 
tended to make them unable to compete effectively with other private local and 
international competitors; especially when they no longer had monopoly rights or 
special privileges. These SOTEs therefore needed to be changed; and 
privatisation seemed to be the soundest alternative in such circumstances. In fact, 
according to information obtained from the fieldwork, the privatisation of SOTEs 
with the purpose of increasing efficiency is unanimously agreed upon among most 
local industry gurus in different fields such as politicians (Suebwonglee, personal 
interview, November 25,2004), SOTE management (Chevapruek, personal 
interview) December 81 2004 and Naksrinuan, personal interview, December 7, 
2004), government officials (Juruphan, personal interview, December 14,2004 
and Pornsutee, personal interview, November 12,2004), academics (Teeralarp, 
personal interview, December 20,2004 and Vongpanitlerd, personal interview, 
December 2,2004), and even SOTE labour union (Chareonwan, personal 
interview, December 14,2004 and lambumrung, personal interview, December 
213 2004). A number of advantages are potentially obtained from privatisation. 
For instance, the tight government rules applied to SOTEs will be lifted off, 
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private business practice will be brought in; independence and transparency 
within the organisations will be improved (especially once the SOTEs are listed 
on the stock market and conform to the stock exchange regulations). 
In the case of Thailand, the benefits of privatisation have begun to be seen even 
though the SOTEs have not yet divested. Firstly, the pressure of being a private 
company that focuses on performance is prone to force employees (and even 
management) to change their working style to a more efficient manner. As 
disclosed by the president of TOT labour union, Chareonwan (personal interview, 
December 14,2004), 
It is found that the plan to privatise TOT made TOT employees more enthusiastic about their 
careers. It appeared that a number of employees strove for further education and attended 
more training sessions in order to improve their qualifications and advance their career paths. 
Secondly, the "Thailand Post Company Limited" (a company that spun-off from 
the CAT) stands as another good example of the significant improvement in 
operating performance. Although there was no plan to list it on the stock market, 
the company's performance considerably improved simply by bringing in private 
business practices and performance-based operation; a number of new services 
(e. g. the "Pay-at-Post" service 95) were introduced to customers, which generated a 
high amount of income and helped the company to overcome heavy losses 
(Chareonwan). Moreover, a high-level govemment official at the MOF further 
reveals another benefit in that privatisation can create a sense of ownership among 
the employees and management (Juruphan, personal interview, December 14, 
95 "Pay-at-Post" is a service that allows people to pay their bills (e. g. electricity, water, landline 
phone, mobile phone, insurance, credit card, and etc. ) at the post office, which there will be a small 
amount of premium charged for this service. 
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2004). Based on her experience, one of the major drawbacks of the SOE is that 
t ere is no real owner. Employees, management, or even the public, do not have a 
sense of belonging to the SOE, which did not inspire them to do their best for the 
good of their organisation. Therefore, incorporating the "Employee Stock Option 
Plan" (ESOp)96 with the privatisation of TOT and CAT provides a good 
opportunity to improve the perfon-nance and efficiency of the organisations, as the 
improvement in the organisations' performance would be reflected in the price of 
the SOTEs' stock. 
Last but not least, the privatisation of SOTEs also showed government intentions 
as regards the telecommunications reform. That the government agreed to pull 
out its stake from the SOTEs means it no longer has motivation for further 
industry protection. As SOTEs become private companies, the government 
cannot simply ask for remittances as before; on the contrary, the only ways the 
government can draw money from privatised SOTEs are from stock dividends and 
annual income taxes, which means the government is no longer reluctant to open 
the industry to free competition 97 . Instead, 
it now becomes another party that 
expects to gain benefits from the refon-ned and more efficient industry (Juruphan). 
By doing so, the clear direction from the government has become a good stimulus 
to increase the confidence of investors, either local or foreign, and facilitates real 
and fair competition. 
96 The ESOP is a scheme that gives the SOTE employee the right to buy a certain amount of the 
SOTE stocks at a special price. 
97 Keeratikrainon (2002) argues that Thai governments in the past actually did not want to privatise 
the SOTEs, as they still enjoyed drawing money from both TOT and CAT. 
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In summary, during the 1990s, there were many important incidents that 
suggested the Thai telecommunications industry towards the same policy. The 
economic breakdown, the commitment to international organisations, and the 
apparent inefficiency within the SOTEs all suggested that the privatisation of the 
SOTEs was a sensible option to alleviate these problems. Privatisation raises 
money for the state; it reduces the state budgetary burden; it corresponds with the 
country's commitment to international organisations; it supports a more open and 
highly competitive environment; it releases the SOTEs from tight and lengthy 
government rules; it improves the efficiency and flexibility of the SOTEs; and, 
most importantly, it is expected to restore economic vitality to the country. 
THE PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT PRIVATISATION 
Attempts to privatise SOTEs have been seriously undertaken by the two recent 
governments. The Chuan Leekpai II government was the one that began 
undertaking the privatisation programme seriously, which was inherited by the 
subsequent government of PM Thaksin Shinawatra. To make privatisation 
happen, recent governments attempted several important manoeuvres. The first 
action was the unveiling of the Master Plan for State Enterprise Sector Refonn in 
September 1998 (hereinafter "the 1998 State Enterprise Master Plan"). Resulting 
from the 1998 State Enterprise Master Plan, a specific committee, namely "the 
State Owned Enterprise Policy Committee (SEPC)", was established to take 
responsibility for most privatisation-related tasks, ranging from choosing the 
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SOEs to be privatised to supervising and facilitating the entire privatisation 
process. The second action taken by the Thai government was the enactment of 
the Corporatisation of State Enterprise Act B. E. 2542 (1999), the so-called " 1999 
Corporatisation Act". The objective of the act was to facilitate the transformation 
of the SOE from state ownership to a company 98 . Besides, the 1999 
Corporatisation Act has another important implication, as it mandates the 
establishment of another important agency, namely the State Owned Enterprise 
Capital Policy Committee (SECPC), which has the duty to facilitate and deal with 
the whole corporatisation process of any SOE. 
Although the governments have undertaken many measures to facilitate the 
privatisation programme, privatisation in real practice was not as easy as initially 
thought. The urgent need for money and the inexperience of privatisation caused 
the MOF to only roughly estimate the country's economic conditions as well as to 
be too optimistic about the readiness of the SOEs themselves. As the secretariat 
to both SEPC and SECPC and the owner of all SOEs, the MOF picked the 18 
most lucrative SOEs and put them into the initial fast-track privatisation schedule 
(Table 5.3), which meant all of them had to be privatised and listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) between 2001 and 2003. However, by the end of the 
98 However, the 1999 Corporatisation Act is not versatile enough to privatise the SOE in one step. 
All it can do is convert the SOE's initial capital (the equity that the state gave to each SOE at the 
establishment) into a number of shares, depending on the value of each SOE. Therefore, the 
privatisation of the SOE (e. g. the divestiture) has to be done as the next step under the guidance of 
the SECPC and the MOF. 
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plan, there were only five SOEs that actually publicly traded their stocks on the 
SET99 (shown in Table 5.4). 
Table 5.3 
i tie mup's initiat privatisation schedule during the period 2001 to 2003 
State Owned Enter rises ýV vx /ýV v/ý I 1z U U. ) p Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 I Q2 I Q3 I Q4 Q1 Q2 I Q3 Q4 
I Internet Thailand Co. Ltd. 
....... .... . 2 
......... .... 
..... I..... ... ................................................................. I ......................................... ............................................... . Thai Airways International Co. Ltd. 
....... I ......................................................................... 
...... ..... ....... 
3 .-........................ .................................................... Petroleum Authority of Thailand ............. ............ ................. ................. ... .............. ................. 
........ 4 ...... ... ............................................................. I-- ................... ....................... ....................................... Krung Thai Bank ............. ....... ......... .............. .. .... ....... I .... ...... .......... ................. .... - .......... ........... ..... ...... I .......... ........ 
5 Sri Nakorn Bank 
......... ..... 6 ......... ................ II................................ I .......................... ...................................... .............................. Slam City Bank ........ ....... ......... ............. ........ .................. .......... ......... ........... 
......... .... 7 I .................................. . ... II.......................................... .................................... .................................... Telephone Organisation of Thailand ....... ..... ................. ................ ... - ........... .... .................. .................. ................. ........ ........ - 
......... .... 8 ......................................... . ............. - ................. -. 1- ................. - ................................................................ Communication Authority of Thailand 
........................................................................................................ .. 
................. - ................ ... - ............ - ...... ......... ........ .................. ... ............. 
9 . ........................................................... Thailand Tobacco Monopoly ............. ........ ... ................. ........ I ......... ..... ....... ...... .. ............. ........... ................. ... 
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14 
........... I. 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
....... ... ....................................................................... I ........................................................ . 15 
...... ....... 
.... ...... I ...................... Metropolitan Electricity Authority 
............. . .................... .......................... . ......................................................................... .... . 
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. . .I.......................... Provincial Electricity Authority 
............ I ........................................................ I ....................................... ... . 
................. ................. - ........ . .... .................. .I............ . .. .................. .................. . ................. ................. ........ -- . ............ 
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Table 5.4 
i ne ust oi iast-tTaCK ý)ULS inat nave Deen privatiseci anci iisieci on ine ý, L i Derween zuu i ana zuu. 5 
Name of SOE Year of divestiture Percent of divestiture 
1. Internet Thailand November 2001 51% 
2. Petroleum Authority of Thailand December 2001 30% 
3. Krung Thai Bank October 2003 31% 
4. Slam City Bank* November 2003 17.5% 
5. Thai Airways International November 2003 30% 
Source: The SEPO, MOF 
Note: * Siam City Bank and Sri Nakorn Bank have been merged before divestiture. 
Focusing on the SOTEs, both TOT and CAT were also included in the initial 
schedule. The schedule required the TOT and CAT to be privatised and listed on 
the stock market by the second and third quarter of 2002, respectively. However, 
99 However, there are several SOEs that are not on the fast-track list, but they have been listed on 
the SET during 2001 to 2003. For example, Bank Thai divested 51% of its stocks in September 
2002. 
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under the real circumstances, the schedules of both TOT and CAT were violated 
and indefinitely stalled. By the beginning of 2005, the most that both SOTEs had 
achieved was that they had been incorporated as companies; the TOT was 
corporatised in July 2002 and had its name changed to "the TOT Corporation 
Public Company Limited" (TOT Corp Plc. ). Likewise, in August 2003, the CAT 
was also corporatised and separated into two different companies, which presently 
are (1) "the CAT Telecom Public Company Limited" (CAT Telecom Plc. ) and (2) 
"the Thailand Post Company Limitedloo. " 
THE FAILURES OF THE ATTEMPTS 
Upon closer consideration, the failure of the previous SOTE privatisation attempts 
can be attributed to several main factors. 
The structural reasons 
Since the late 1990s, governments have consistently put a lot of effort into 
privatisation. Although it is found that both TOT and CAT were healthy enough 
for privatisation, the industry envirom-nent at that time was not kind enough to 
make privatisation happen. 
100 The CAT has to be separated into two companies because the postal service is considered part 
of the PSO. The THB 3 delivery fee (approximately 
GBP 0.04) around the country is obviously 
unprofitable and needs a subsidy. Therefore, the 
Thailand Post Company will be kept as a SOE, 
while the CAT Telecom Plc. will be listed in the stock market 
in the appropriate time. 
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It is found that the industry contained too many uncertainties to produce a 
successful privatisation; to be precise, the industry lacked adequate structural 
arrangements. The absence of an industry regulator was the biggest hindrance. 
The vagueness of the future industry outlook remains a very influential factor in 
putting off privatisation, as investors need to know every relevant factor in order 
to evaluate the appropriate price, and decide whether or not it is worth buying the 
SOTEs' stocks. Also following from the absence of clear regulatory regime, the 
leftover BTO concession was another big obstacle to successful privatisation. The 
continuation or termination of these concessions would make a big difference to 
the operating performance of both SOTEs. In this regard, Vongpanitlerd 
(personal interview, December 2,2004) affirms that, at least, the government 
must be clear on whether or not it is going to convert the BTO concessions. 
Unfortunately, even though the government realises the importance of such 
distinctness, it does not have any right to force the BTO partners either to convert 
or not to convert their contract as all the existing concessions have their validity 
recognised by the 1997 Constitution. With these ambiguities, it is almost 
impossible to sell the stocks of SOTEs. In short, the uncertainties on the 
industry's future environment (e. g. the absence of regulator, the unclear regulatory 
regime and the unresolved BTO concessions) effectively undermined the 
privatisation since the risk from those uncertainties was too high for the 
government to recklessly push ahead the programme, while it was also too risky 
for investors to invest in the privatised SOTEs that had no clear direction. 
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The political reasons 
Apart from structural unreadiness, politically related reasons also played an 
important role in putting off the privatisation programme. 
Indecisive policy 
The indecisive policy over the privatisation of TOT and CAT was one of the 
reasons that obstructed the privatisation. The first official clue of privatisation 
appeared in the 1997 TMP, which had been well prepared and agreed upon by 
most involved parties, including the labour unions (Kusripituck, personal 
interview, November 24,2004). However, according to Uthaisang (personal 
interview, November 18,2004), the TMP was simply overruled by the 
promulgation of the 1997 Constitution, which is also a relevant context for the 
telecommunications reform. Although the TMP and the Constitution did not 
ultimately contradict one another, the Constitution does not strongly stress the 
privatisation of the SOTEs like the TMP (Kusripituck, personal interview, 
November 24,2004). The Constitution rather puts more focus on the 
establishment of an industry regulator as well as the enactment of new 
telecommunications laws, which made privatisation relatively a secondary priority 
of the reforin. 
The situation with the privatisation became even more complicated after the Thai 
economy was severely hit by the economic crisis in 1997. The aim of 
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privatisation had begun to veer away from the primary one, which was to increase 
the efficiency of the SOTEs; privatisation became more or less a device of the 
political apparatus. As described by Tangkitvanich (personal interview, 
December 28,2004), privatisation in the era of PM Chuan Leekpai 11 (between 
1997 and 2001) was under pressure to conform to IN4F conditionality and to repay 
the country's debt, while PM Thaksin Shinawatra (between 2001 - the present) 
promoted privatisation mainly to stimulate the capital market and the country's 
economy. 
Moreover, the fact that the privatisation model determined by the govemments 
has never been constant led to confusion among the working teams, as well as to 
difficulties in implementation (Juruphan, personal interview, December 14,2004 
and Pornsutee, personal interview, November 12,2004). For example, at the 
beginning, the TMP prescribes that there would be a newly established 
telecommunications holding company, which has both TOT and CAT as its 
subsidiaries; and these three companies can be separately brought to the stock 
market at an appropriate time. But, later, the govemment came up with several 
new alternatives of privatisation. For instance, it proposed the establishment of a 
"Super-Holding Company"101, which was going to be the holding company of all 
the privatised SOEs (not only the SOTEs); subsequently, the Super-Holding 
Company model was replaced by another idea, which was to separately privatise 
the TOT and CAT; and most recently, the model was changed once again when 
the government considered a merger of TOT and CAT into one comprehensive 
101 The government of Thailand imported this idea from the very successful "Temasek Holdings" 
of Singapore (Juruphan, personal interview, December 14,2004). 
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organisation before listing it on the stock market. Apparently, each alternative 
had its own pros and cons, supporters and opponents, which made it a difficult 
choice for the government as well as for other involved parties. Consequently, it 
eventually led to the stumble of the privatisation programme. 
Instability of the government 
The instability of the governments also caused problems for the SOTE 
privatisation plan from the start. Until recently, the nature of the Thai government 
was that of a coalition govenunent. Each political party did not greatly differ in 
terms of the number of seats held in parliament; the coalition government side 
usually had only a few more seats than the coalition opposition. Every Thai 
government in the past was not quite stable; in fact, all of them were politically 
vulnerable (Uthaisang, personal interview, November 18,2004). History suggests 
that political instability led to the frequent changing of the governments and the 
PMs, which inevitably affected the SOTEs' privatisation programme. The 
announcement of the TMP in 1997 is one good example. The TMP passed 
through three revisions from three different governments. The governments did 
not survive long enough from the drafting stage to the announcement stage. Each 
time there was a change of government, the draft of the TMP was drawn back and 
revised (Keeratikrainon, 2002 and Niyomsilpa, 2000). Moreover, resulting from 
the politically vulnerable nature of the governments, policies or actions that might 
cause dissatisfaction to other politically powerful parties (e. g. other coalition 
political parties, the labour unions, the military, the NGOs, and the public in 
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general) were usually turned down. A good example arose in the era of PM 
Chartichai Choonhawan when the government proposed the intention to privatise 
the SOTEs. Unfortunately, the government was not strong enough to withstand 
the resistance from the powerful labour unions 102 , which, as a result, indefinitely 
stalled the idea. All in all, it would not be an overstatement to conclude that 
governments in the past were politically weak and appeared interested in keeping 
themselves in position for as long as possible, rather than being seriously 
interested in implementing risky privatisations. 
Involvementfrom interested parties 
The diverse perspectives among the parties who were involved in the privatisation 
actually caused difficulties in the privatisation of SOTEs. According to Juruphan 
(personal interview, December 14,2004), she claims that SOTE employees, 
academics, NGOs, and the political groups were the parties that had high levels of 
involvement. It is interesting to find that each party has its own convincing 
reasons for participating in the privatisation. From the employees' perspective, it 
is very understandable that they would have an active role, as the privatisation 
directly affects them. The presidents of the labour unions of both TOT and CAT 
(Chareonwan, personal interview, December 14,2004 and lamburnrung, personal 
interview, December 21,2004) disclose that the employees resist privatisation 
because they are afraid of change. They fear losing job security and the benefits 
received from being a state employee, which are usually better than those of the 
'0' According to Niyomsilpa (2000), it is believed that the labour unions were backed by the 
military, which also receives many benefits from the SOTEs, and 
indeed the government of PM 
Chartichai Choonhawan was subsequently overthrown by the military. 
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private companies. They are also afraid that privatisation would lead to an 
increase in layoffs and a decrease in benefits, as the experiences in many other 
places reveal such results. The high-level management of TOT (Naksrinuan, 
personal interview, December 7,2004) reveals another insight that the 
govenunent stressed only the privatisation's potential benefits for the country and 
the consumer. But, the employees had never been informed about their own 
benefits, they only knew that they were becoming more exposed to harder work 
and being faced with less security in their jobs. Perspectives from academics are 
also interesting to note. As quoted in Pouaree (1997), Ungpakom, a local 
renowned political academic, opposed the government's privatisation programme 
by asserting that the SOE existed not to make profit, but to promote social welfare 
or for national security reasons. Moreover, some academics were also concerned 
about the issue of national sovereignty, as selling the SOEs' stock to international 
investors also means creating opportunities for foreigners to have more influence 
on the Thai economy. As for the political groups, opposition from some senators 
was also prominent. As cited in Nontharit (1998), Senator Kumanvisai appealed 
to PM Chuan Leekpai to slow down the privatisation programme since Thai 
investors, compared to foreign investors, were not financially strong enough to 
invest in the majority of the SOTEs' stock. Especially, when considering all the 
privatisation series (the 18 fast-track schedule) launched by the MOF, it was very 
unlikely that the "just-recovered" Thai economy would be able to absorb all the 
expected proceeds from the pnvatisation of 18 huge SOEs during the three-year 
period. In addition, Senator Ruchuphan (as quoted in Theparat, 1999) also 
attacked the privatisation programme on the grounds that the main objective had 
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diverged from the original intentions, as the privatisation in Thailand turned out to 
be driven primarily by the general policy of the IMF and foreign creditors, who 
seemed to be more concerned with getting their loans repaid rather than the well- 
being of the recipient country. All in all, it was found that the privatisation 
involved not only the SOTE employees and management, but it also called for 
involvement from other political actors (e. g. the NGOs, senators, or the 
academics). 
CONCLUSION 
What this chapter reveals is that privatisation of SOTEs was and still is an 
important issue in the telecommunications reform programme of Thailand. In 
fact, both internal and external forces were directing Thailand into improving the 
efficiency of the SOTEs and towards promoting free and fair competition via 
privatisation. Nonetheless, all the previous attempts failed for two main reasons. 
The first reason was the unreadiness of the associated structural arrangements 
within the country, such as the absence of a regulator and the existence of the 
BTO concessions. These ambiguities were technically unfavourable to the 
privatisation; they created a high level of risk that disincentivised investors, as 
well as worked against the prospect of a successful privatisation. More 
importantly, another culprit was the political dynamics created by different 
interested parties. Each party has its personal preferences and interests in the 
privatisation. For example, the government tried to privatise SOTEs to increase 
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the efficiency of the economy, to reduce financial burdens, and to meet national 
commitments; the labour unions resisted the privatisation to protect their 
privileges and benefits; the academics, along with the NGOs, opposed the 
programme since they doubted whether all Thai citizens would be the ultimate 
beneficiaries. The inconsistency of interests among these parties inevitably 
affected the progress of the privatisation programme. Each party strove to retain 
or even promote its interest by exercising its power, directly or indirectly and 
openly or secretly, while the govemments were not strong enough to resist all 
these involvements. In short, the case of Thailand reveals that, without a 
supportive institutional arrangement, a strong commitment and a clear policy from 
the government, and also coordination from the involved parties (especially the 
ones who are politically powerful), the privatisation of the SOTEs seems to be 
difficult to accomplish. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE CONCESSION CONVERSION 
INTRODUCTION 
The conversion of the BTO concessions is the second hindrance to reforming the 
Thai telecommunications industry. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the BTO 
concession scheme was created and appeared to be the only way to bring in 
private participation to the industry. The introduction of BTO in 1986 was 
actually the first concrete reform attempt of Thai telecommunications. At the 
beginning, the benefits of the BTO were quite obvious to both the SOTEs and the 
consumers; it effectively resolved the telecommunications shortage crisis and 
strengthened the SOTEs' financial status. The BTO, as a result, has been widely 
used within the Thai telecommunications business since then. However, the BTO 
ended up causing a lot of problems at a later stage when the country considered 
refort-ning the industry on a larger scale. Initially, it seemed fair that the BTO 
partners exchanged part of the revenue (or the "revenue-sharing") in return for the 
exclusive right to operate in the industry. However the BTO started to appear 
doubtful when the idea to open the industry for free and fair competition became 
apparent. This was especially so when the SOTEs no longer held monopoly 
rights. Many attempts have been made recently to terminate these concessions in 
order to separate SOTEs and their concessionaires to free them and allow them to 
177 
compete with one another. Unfortunately, all the attempts failed, and it seems that 
both structural and political reasons were at the root of the problem. 
BENEFITS OF THE "BTO" FOR THE THAI TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
INDUSTRY 
Responding to the telecommunications crisis during the end of the 1980s, the 
BTO concession was introduced as the most practical answer to most of the 
industry's problems. In fact, the benefits of the BTO were widely perceived right 
after its introduction in the 1986. 
The first benefit of the BTO was that it was the only way to bring in private 
participation without violating the country's telecommunications laws. The 
establishment law of both SOTEs allowed them to grant concessions to the private 
sector in the services that were under their responsibilities 103 . Therefore, as long 
as the SOTEs still held the monopoly right and the telecommunications assets 
were still owned by them, there was no legal violation. Besides, the state was also 
n, k able to retain power of control over the industry; it could exercise the power either 
directly over the SOTEs or indirectly (via SOTEs) over the private 
concessionaires. The classic example was that the state used its power to control 
the price of services or to force the operator to provide a universal service 
obligation without offering any subsidies. 
103 Please find details in Section 9(6) of the 1954 TOT Act and Section 10(6) of the 1977 CAT 
Act. 
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Figure 6.1 
The amount of the fixed line subscribers in Bangkok and rural areas during 1990 to 2003 
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Source: The TOT Corporation Plc. 
Whereas the services provided by only SOTEs were obviously insufficient to 
meet the increasing demand, the BTO scheme allowed private companies to 
participate in providing some important services to the consumers, which as a 
result, was able to alleviate the service scarcity. The growth of fixed line and 
mobile phone services can be seen as good evidence of the benefits of the BTO. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the improvement of the supply of fixed line service in both 
Bangkok and rural areas during the period 1990 - 2003, while Table 6.1 shows 
the annual growth rate of fixed line supply during the same period. 
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Table 6.1 
Annuil , mm, nt, ]in, - in Bnn(ykok and rural areas durm 1990 to 2003 
Number rented 
- A rea Provider 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
TOT 
. 1-1-11. - 
900,941 
1. ............... ... 
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... -. 1 ................. 
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....... I ............. .... 
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... I I-- I.. 
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.................. ... 
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" ........................ 
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- .............. I. - 
1,438,933 
...................... 
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................... ...... 
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........... 
1,543,262 1,542,23 1 
TA - - - 30,973 241,169 615,770 933,191 1,246,147 1,3 10,702 1,381,539 1,535,634 1,736,774 1,974,808 1,971,135 
Bangkok Total in 900,941 1,044,295 1,159,227 1,414,242 1,752,689 2,146,806 2,462,164 2,748,763 2,770,251 2,820,472 2,975,0 16 3,211,195 3,518,070 3,513,366 
Baný. kok 
. ..... ... ......... ......... ............ - .... ......... ..................... .... ..... .... ...... .... Annual 
growth 15.91% 11.01% 22.00% 23.93% 22.49% 14.69% 11.64% 0.78% 1.81% 5.48% 7.94% 9.56% -0.13% 
rate I I 
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I ................. 
11647,170 
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.... I- 
TT&T - - 69,209 386,233 778,489 1,081,033 1,167,675 1,135,424 1,178,856 1,184,126 1,196,2991 1,197,181 
Rural Total in 423,581 508,865 630,802 801,623 999,150 1,335,191 1,737,994 2,077,921 2,267,298 2,384,164 2,616,068 2,831,296 2,981,772 3,041,408 
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growth 20.13% 23.96% 27.08% 24.64% 33.63% 30.17% 19.56% 9.11% 5.15% 9.73% 8.23% 5.31% 2.00% 
rate 
Source: The TOT Corporation Plc. 
The statistics of the growth rate of fixed line service both in Bangkok and rural 
areas provide the same evidence that the availability of service increased 
significantly after the presence of private concessionaires. For example, the 
growth of fixed line service in Bangkok has increased twofold from 11.0 1% in 
1992 to 22.00% in 1993 right after the introduction of the TA service. The amval 
of TT&T also produced similar consequences when the growth rate of the rural 
areas jumped from 24.64% to 33.63% within a year subsequent to the TT&T 
introduction. Further, the growth rates in both Bangkok and the rural areas 
remained extraordinary for several years subsequent before the growth started to 
slow down. Nevertheless, it continued to grow until recently. Vimolvanich 
(personal interview, December 19,2004) explains this effect in terms of the fact 
that the private operators had excess capacity allowing them to work more quickly 
and effectively than the TOT, which made the waiting list decline significantly 
during the several years of the TA and TT&T's operations. With the decrease of 
the waiting list, the growth rate of the fixed line service accordingly dropped to a 
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normal one afterward. Apart from the decline in the waiting list, the substitution 
and the growth in the mobile phone service was also another factor that slowed 
down the growth of the fixed line service. 
Unlike the fixed line, the comparison of the mobile phone service before and after 
the BTO could not be clearly elucidated because both TOT and CAT were unable 
to make their mobile phone business flourish from the beginning. In fact, mobile 
services, under the provision of TOT and CAT, appeared to be an unsuccessful 
service both in terms of the amount of subscribers and the profitability. The story 
was different once the service began to be operated by the concessionaires (the 
AIS and the DTAQ 104; the amount of subscribers, the quality of service, and the 
service availability improved significantly (see Table 6.2). Although it can be 
argued that the impressive growth in the mobile phone industry may derive from 
factors like the change in technology and the reduction in the price of the handset 
and service fees,, the evidence of inefficient and overly conservative 
characteristics of the Thai SOTEs should be convincing enough to demonstrate 
that the admission of private companies to take care of the development and the 
provision of the mobile service was the right decision by the state' 05 . Otherwise, 
104 As of 2004, there are three major mobile concessionaires, which are (1) the Advance Info 
Service Plc. (AIS), the TOT concessionaire which provides the analogue NMT 900 MHz and the 
digital 900 MHz system, (2) the Total Access Communications Plc. (DTAC), the CAT 
concessionaire which provides the analogue AMPS 800 MHz and the digital 1800 MHz system, 
and (3) the TA Orange Plc. (TAO), another CAT concessionaire which provides the digital 1800 
MHz system. 
105 To strengthen the claim, Chevapruek (personal interview, December 8,2004) admits that CAT 
(and probably TOT as well) is incapable of running a business that is not its core service. CAT 
had no service mind and lacked marketing skills. He raises the case of "pagers", which was one of 
the most businesslike decisions of the CAT as an example. The CAT saw the potential of the 
service and kept the service provision for itself. After five years of operation, CAT had huge 
losses and thus decided to give out the service provision to the private concessionaires. 
Interestingly, the pager service in the hands of private concessionaires (e. g. the PACLINK, 
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the Thai mobile phone industry might not have flourished into what it is at 
present. The statistics show that, in 2001, the number of active mobile subscribers 
in Thailand was approximately equal to the amount of fixed line subscribers at 
around seven million lines before the mobile subscribers impressively soared to 
16 million in the following year while the fixed line only slightly increased (less 
than one million lines) in the same period (the ITU, 2004c). 
Table 6.2 
The growth of mobile phones in Thailand during 1995 to 2003 
Unit: 1,000 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Mobile 1,297 1,844 2 203 1 977 2 337 3 056 7 550 16 117 24 864 
subscribers , , , , , , , 
Source: The ITU 
Besides, the BTO also helped in introducing newer telecommunications services 
to the consumers. The conservative nature of the government, the NESDB, and 
the SOTEs themselves, on many occasions, obstructed the development of the 
industry. The SOTEs were not brave enough to initiate a new service, which was 
usually associated with risks, while the cabinet as well as NESDB were always 
reluctant to approve an investment project that entailed such a very large amount 
of investment. The granting of the BTO therefore became a decent alternative for 
the government to transfer the business risk to willing private operators, while still 
being able to retain control and the chance to draw revenues from the private 
company. The introduction of the VSAT service to the Thai telecommunications 
PHONELINK, and WorldPage) had made a huge customer base and large profits for many years 
before the service was gradually superceded by the introduction of the mobile phone service. 
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market was good evidence in this respect 106 . According to Chevapruek (personal 
interview, December 8,2004), the cabinet rejected the project, as it needed high 
investment, while the success was not guaranteed. However, a number of private 
operators saw the opportunity and were willing to bear the risks. Later there were 
six VSAT BTO concessions granted to the private sector and most of them turned 
out to be successful. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONCESSIONS TO THE SOTES 
Apart from the fact that the concessions have alleviated scarcity and improved the 
quality and variety of telecommunications services in Thailand, the concessions 
also gave Thai SOTEs a strong position, especially in terms of network coverage 
and revenue streams. The conditions of the revenue-sharing and the assets 
transfer included in the BTO scheme enhanced the SOTEs' vigorous and steady 
growth, both in terms of size and income. 
106 In fact, the introduction of other teleconununications services (e. g. Trunk Mobile or Optical 
Fibre Network) also originated in the similar fashion to the VSAT. 
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Figure 6.2 
The size and the revenue of TOT and CAT during 1996 to 2002 
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As shown in Figure 6.2, between 1996 and 2002, TOT's total assets increased 
from GBP 2,920 million to GBP 4,058 million, or around 40%. The grant of 
concessions both to the fixed line (TT&T and TA) and mobile (AIS) operators 
was the main reason behind this growth. The assets transferred from TOT's 
concessionaires were attributed to the significant proportion of the total assets of 
TOT. The fact that TOT invested only a small amount of capital to expand its 
own network after granting concessions has significantly diluted the proportion of 
assets built up by TOT compared to the assets built up and transferred from its 
concessionaires. The numbers provided in Table 6.3 are good evidence of this. In 
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1996, the total transferred assets accounted for 41 % of the total assets of TOT; 
while the proportion increased to the level of 76.5% in 2002. Furthermore, the 
revenue-sharing streams received from concessionaires occupied a larger 
proportion of the total revenue each year. In 1996, revenue-sharing accounted for 
approximately 20% of TOT's total revenue, while it increased to almost 32% in 
the year 2002. Interestingly, there were some years (e. g. 1999 and 2000) when 
the amount of revenue-sharing exceeded the amount of net profit, which 
obviously showed how important a role revenue-sharing played in TOT's profit. 
Table 6.3 
The percentage of transferred assets to total assets of TOT and CAT between 1996 and 2000 
TOT 
(Unit: GBP millions) 
Year Transferred 
asset 
Total asset 
Transferred asset 
to total asset 
1996 1,202.39 2,919.79 41.2% 
1997 1,594.55 3,573.16 44.6% 
1998 1,566.18 3,624.65 43.2% 
1999 2,520.41 3,589.79 70.2% 
2000 2,799.87 3,712.85 75.4% 
2001 2,751.81 3,900.05 70.6% 
2002 3,074.93 4,018.25 76.5% 
Source: The TOT Corporation Plc. 
CAT 
(Unit: GBP Millions) 
Year Transferred 
asset 
Total asset 
Transferred asset 
to total asset 
1996 147.14 651.94 22.6% 
1997 336.04 918.24 36.6% 
1998 335.65 929.34 36.1% 
1999 383.86 1,054.65 36.4% 
2000 493.47 1,202.41 41.0% 
2001 609.03 1,365.19 44.6% 
2002 598.36 1,364.82 43.8% 
Source: The CAT Telecom Plc. 
The percentage of revenue-sharing to total revenue of TOT and CAT between 1996 and 2000 
TOT 
(Unit: GBP millions) 
Year Revenue- 
sharing 
Total revenue 
Revenue-sharing 
to total revenue 
1996 119.02 597.59 19.9% 
1997 177.20 673.97 26.3% 
1998 133.72 751.71 17.8% 
1999 133.42 676.60 19.7% 
2000 151.57 703.40 21.5% 
2001 182.88 1 776.52 23.6% 
2002 281.35 
1 
885.97 31.8% 
Source: The TOT Corporation Plc. 
CAT 
(Unit: GBP nullions) 
Year Revenue- 
sharing 
Total revenue 
Revenue-sharing 
To total revenue 
1996 13.04 383.94 3.4% 
1997 25.15 430.09 5.8% 
1998 26.00 459.34 5.7% 
1999 36.19 430.25 8.4% 
2000 30.62 419.68 7.3% 
2001 40.41 434.20 9.3% 
52.69 441.27 11.9% 
Source: The CAT Telecom Plc. 
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As for CAT, it also experienced a dramatic growth in size since 1996 (see Figure 
6.2). It more than doubled from GBP 652 million in 1996, to around GBP 1,365 
million in 2002. Similarly to TOT, Table 6.3 shows that the transferred assets 
also significantly contributed to the impressive growth of CAT's total assets. It 
accounted for 22.6% of total assets in 1996 before it rose to almost 44% in 2002. 
However, the picture is a little different from that of TOT when looking at this 
from the revenue aspect. CAT's annual revenues do not greatly fluctuate, ranging 
from GBP 350 - 450 million, between 1996 and 2002. The amount of revenue- 
sharing each year was not a critical portion of CAT's total revenue; in fact, the 
revenue-sharing received from concessionaires accounted for only 3% of CAT's 
total revenue in 1996, before being raised to around 11 % in 2002. This is derived 
from the fact that CAT has only one strong concessionaire - DTAC - whose 
business is going well and is able to transfer a lot of assets while paying a 
substantial amount of revenue-sharing every year' 07 . In fact, the main income of 
CAT basically comes from its monopoly of data communications (e. g. long 
distance calls or international live broadcasting). Therefore, between the two 
SOTEs, CAT is much more financially independent from concessions than TOT. 
Even so, with the closer consideration, concessions are also important in keeping 
the Thai telecommunications market running smoothly since there is no clear 
indication whether the inexperienced state agencies like TOT and CAT will be 
able to utilise all the concession assets and continue operating those services 
efficiently and effectively, as was done before by the private operators 
(Vongpanitlerd, personal interview, December 2,2004). 
"' Except for DTAC, other CAT concessions are in sunset businesses, such as the pager and the 
VSAT. 
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Interestingly, another important fringe benefit of BTO concessions can be seen 
from the macroeconomic standpoint. The BTO has created several strong Thai 
multinational corporations (MNCs). Apart from the two SOTEs, there are five 
other major private conglomerates that dominate the telecommunications service 
provision: the Shinawatra group (SHIN: the major shareholder of AIS), the 
Jasmine group (the major shareholder of TT&T), the United Communication 
Services group (UCOM: the major shareholder of DTAQ, the Charoen Pokphand 
group (CP: the major shareholder of TA and TA Orange), and the SAMART 
group (the major shareholder of the SAMART telecom). The entrance to the 
telecommunications business and exploitation of the BTO conditions allowed 
these former family-based companies to grow impressively at both local and 
regional levels. For example, according to Ure (1995), Shinawatra has contracts 
for installing telephone lines and wireless local loops in Phnom Penh, fixed wire, 
mobile and broadcast concessions in Laos; CP, via TA, had some contracts in 
China, Vietnam, and Cambodia; UCOM has sub-contracted network construction 
from other companies, e. g. for CP in Cambodia; SAMART operates the largest 
cellular network in Cambodia. Economically, the growth of these companies at 
the regional level also benefits the economy as well as the competitiveness of the 
country as a whole. Appendix E shows the more detailed business lines of these 
major conglomerates in other countries. 
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THE BOOMERANG EFFECT OF THE "BTO" 
Although the previous section has illustrated the benefits of BTO to the industry 
as well as the country, the BTO also embodied some critical drawbacks that 
waited to be revealed at a later time. In fact, it became one of the major 
hindrances that was very difficult to resolve, especially when the country wanted 
to reform telecommunications on a larger scale. 
The first problem of the BTO resulted from the process of selecting the 
concession winner. The government used the amount of return that the state was 
to receive, such as the percentage of the revenue-sharing or the annual minimum 
guarantee, as the primary criteria. The bidder who met all requirements and 
proposed the highest benefit sharing to the SOTE was simply the winner of the 
concession. Sometimes, the need to win the concession forced the bidders to 
propose a very high offer to the state; and unsurprisingly this action later caused 
them financial difficulty'08. In addition, as the private concessionaires have to 
bear vast financial burdens, it is quite certain that these service providers would 
try to pass on these extra costs to the consumers (Stigler, 1971 and Peacock et al., 
1984). They tended to exploit the exclusive operating right to maximise their 
income to cover the revenue-sharing element as well as the operating 
expenditures. The "cream-skimming" phenomenon and all kinds of exploitations 
108 The case of TT&T, who won the 2.1 million fixed lines concession in the rural areas 
concession, provides a good explanation of the claim. The fact that TT&T proposed to share 
43.5% of its revenue with TOT in order to win the bid in the first place led the company into the 
financial difficulty on many occasions. It is always found that the incomes generated were not 
enough to pay for the revenue-sharing (the SET, 2005). 
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can consequently be found in the Thai telecommunications market; and it became 
an obvious manifestation of the drawbacks of BTO. 
Secondly, as the exclusive right to operate in the business is included as part of 
the BTO conditions, this means that the state has provided the concessionaires 
with an anti-competitive arrangement and enabled them to be a monopoly (or 
oligopoly in some cases e. g. pagers, VSATs, or mobile phones), in that particular 
service (Tangkitvanich, personal interview, December 28,2004). It is interesting 
to find that, once the SOTEs granted a concession, they either did not get into that 
particular service (if the service had never existed before, such as was the case 
with VSAT) or ceased their expansion (if the service was already provided by 
SOTEs, such as fixed line, mobile phone, and pager), as they and their 
concessionaires became business partners and enjoyed the same amount of 
revenue. Focusing on fixed line business, which was its core business, TOT 
agreed to cease its network expansion, except for unprofitable public service 
purposes, after granting the concessions to TA and TT&T. Table 6.4 reveals that 
the growth of TOT's subscribers dropped dramatically after it granted concessions 
to the private operators. The statistics in the Bangkok area reveal that TOT's 
subscriber growth rate fell sharply from double-digits to almost no growth after 
TA started its operation. The numbers in the rural areas however, may not show a 
significant decrease since TOT still had obligations to expand PSO services to 
remote and unprofitable areas. 
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Table 6.4 
The growth of TOT and nrivate concessionaires' fixed line subscribers between 1990 and 2003 
Number rented Area Providers 
1990 1991 1 1992 1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1 2003 
TOT 
.................................. 
900,941 
..................... 
1,044,295 
....... I .................. 
1,159,227 
... .. I....... . .......... 
1,383,269 
.......................... 
1,511,520 
............. I ............ 
1,531,036 
............. . ........... 
1,528,973 
....... . ............... .. 
1,502,616 
...... ............. ..... 
1,459,549 
....... . ................. 
1,438,933 
.......................... 
1,439,382 
.............. . 
1,474,421 
....... - ................ 
1,543,262 
................ II..... 
1,542,231 
... . ..................... Growth 15.9% 11.0% 19.3% 9.3% 1.3% -0.1% -1.7% -2.9% -1.4% 0.0% 2.4% 4.7% -0.1% 
rate 
TA 0 0 0 30,973 241,169 615,770 933,191 1,246,147 1 3 4 73 77 1 , 1 , 9 74 ,8 0 8 1,971,135 Bangkok ................................. ............ . ...... ......................... .......................... .......................... ...................... ... .......................... .......................... ............. . ...... -- ........ ........................ ý . . . . .. . . ý. , Growth 
I 
678.6% 155.3% 51.5% 33.5% 5.2% 5.4% 11.2% 13.1% 13.7% -0.2% 
rate 
Total in 00 941 1 044 295 1 159 227 1 414 242 752 689 1 2 146 806 2 462 16 2 748 763 770 5 820 72 975 016 195 3 211 3 518 O7C 3 513 366 , , , , , , , , , , , , , 4 , , 2, ,2 1 2, ,4 2, , , , , , , , Ba 
TOT 
I ................... 
423,581 
................. 
508,865 
....................... I .. 
630,802 
.......................... 
801,623 
.1........................ 
929,941 
........................... 
948,958 
.......................... 
959,505 
I .................. 
996,888 
................... I ...... 
1,099,623 
.... I ..................... 
1,248,740 
. ... .............. I ....... 
1,437,212 
............ I ............. 
1,647,170 
.... - ....... 
1,785,473 
.......................... 
1,854,227 
............ I ........... 
Growth 20.1% 24.0% 27.1% 16.0% 2.0% 1.1% 3.9% 10.3% 13.6% 15.1% 14.6% 8.4% 3.9% 
rate 
TT&T 0 0 0 0 69,209 386,233 778,489 1,081,033 1,167,675 1,135,424 1,178,856 1,184,! ýý ý , !! ý , ý! 
ý ! ! ! ý. 1 81 
Rural ............... ........ * ............ .I.............. .......... .......................... ..................... .......................... ........ . ............. ... ......................... .... ..... ....... .... .. ...... .......... .*... ...... ...... * ................ * .. ......... . . . . . 
ý. 
. ... . . 
Growl I 458.1% 
I 
101.6% 38.9% 80"'10 
I 
. 2 8' 3.8% 0.4% 1.0% 0.8% rate 
Total in 423,581 508,865 630,802 
I 
801,623 999,150 1,335,191 1,737,994 2,077,921 2,267,298 2,384,164 2,616,068 2,831,29 981,77 041,408 
rural I 
Source: The TOT Corporation Plc. 
However, the SOTE may not realise that merely maintaining its old customers 
while the private concessionaires grow rapidly in terms of finances and customer 
base, indicates that the SOTE is becoming relatively smaller and weaker (as 
shown in Figure 6.3). The case of mobile telephones is even clearer evidence of 
this. Although both TOT and CAT started to provide the mobile phone business 
in 1987, they could not exploit their first mover advantage to become the market 
leaders (Naksrinuan, personal interview, December 7,2004). On the contrary, 
after TOT and CAT granted mobile concessions to AIS and DTAC, they ceased 
their development of the mobile business and enjoyed increasing income from 
revenue-sharing. As a result, as of 2002, both TOT and CAT still only have 
outdated analogue technology, with an insignificant number of combined 
subscribers (less than 50,000 numbers). On the other hand, the concessionaires 
exploited the latest digital technology and have more than 17 million lines in hand 
(Sookmongkol, personal interview, November 20,2004). Therefore, it is not an 
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exaggeration to conclude that the BTO enabled the private operators to become 
more powerful in the Thai telecommunications industry. The combined 
subscribers of TA and TT&T became larger than those of TOT in the fixed line 
market, while the mobile business is completely dominated by the private 
concessionaires such as AIS and DTAC. In addition, the longer the private 
concessionaires can keep exploiting the BTO's drawbacks (e. g. the limited 
comPetition from either the new entrants or the SOTEs), the harder it is to create a 
level playing field within the industry, as the incumbents have huge advantages, in 
terms of customer base and brand recognition, over the privatised SOTEs and the 
newcomers who are about to enter the industry after liberalisation in 2006. 
Figure 6.3 
The comparison of the fixed line market share in Bangkok and the rural areas 
Proportion of the fixed line market share in BKK 
Percent 
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Proportion of the fixed line market in the rural areas 
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iono/. 
lo% 
FEI P 
Source: The TOT Corporation Plc. 
Year 
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The next drawback of the BTO was that many state agencies (i. e. TOT, CAT, 
PTD, and the MOTC) are eligible to grant the telecommunications concessions. 
Unfortunately, the country did not have any standards to set the concession 
conditions; it all depended on the time they negotiated the contracts as well as the 
negotiation power of each private company. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the 
conditions specified in the concessions that were granted by different agencies 
would differ from one another. In fact, the differences still persist even between 
the concessions that were granted by the same agency, but at a different time. 
This was because the private companies were so keen to win a concession; they 
accepted virtually any of the conditions proposed by the SOTE and, at the same 
time, they also offered very convincing benefit sharing schemes to SOTE. The 
fixed line concessions can be good examples in this regard. Both TA and TT&T 
received concessions from the TOT, but their conditions differed markedly. TA 
was required to share 16 - 18% of its revenue in exchange for 25 years and 2.6 
million lines in the Bangkok metropolitan area 109 , while TT&T had to share 43.5 
- 44.5% of its revenue for 25 years and 1.5 million lines in the rural areas"O. The 
difference in the percentage of revenue-sharing was the key disparity in this case. 
However, a more extreme example can be seen in the mobile phone sector. 
DTAC and TA Orange (TAO), the 27-year concessionaires of CAT, have to share 
12 - 30% of their revenue with CAT' 
11 and another additional THB 200 per 
month per line access charge with TOT network, as TOT is the sole owner of the 
'09 TA agreed to share 16% of its revenue on the first two million lines, while the rest of the 
subscribers would be shared at 18%. 
110 TT&T agreed to share 43.5% of its revenue on the first one million lines, while the percent of 
sharing increased to 44.5% for the rest of its subscribers. 
111 DTAC's revenue-sharing varies as follows: year I-4: 12%, year 5: 15%, year 6- 15: 20%, 
year 16 - 20: 25%, and year 21 - 27: 30%. 
However, the minimum payment for the whole 
concession period must not be less than THB 17,051.84 million (or approximately GBP 244 
millions). 
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entire fixed line network within the country. But, AIS, a 25-year mobile 
concessionaire of TOT, bears a burden of 15 - 30% of revenue-sharing without 
paying any access charge 112 as it is a direct concessionaire of TOT. Obviously, 
DTAC and TAO were not able to compete with AIS because they have to collect 
an additional THB 200 on top of the normal monthly service fee. In the big 
picture, the cases of the fixed line and the mobile phone service illustrated the 
clear problem of the BTO, which led to the lack of a level playing field in the 
industry. However, it is expected that the problems from the unequal conditions 
among concessions will get worse in the future. At the moment, it seems that all 
major concessions (i. e. the fixed line and mobile phone services) already have 
some kinds of limitation that prevent them from direct competition. For example, 
DTAC and AIS provide service on different system networks and frequencies 113 ; 
for fixed line, the TA service area is limited to the Bangkok metropolitan area 
while the service area of TT&T is in the rural areas. But, in the future, when the 
industry has been fully liberalised and there are more new players getting into the 
industry, the unfair competition that resulted from the BTO will emerge more 
obviously. Given that there is no conversion of the BTOs, there will be several 
types of operators in the industry. The first is the incumbents, which tied to 
SOTEs by a number of BTO conditions (e. g. the revenue-sharing and the asset 
transfer conditions); and the second type is the newcomers, which obtained the 
operating license from the regulator and, hence, have more freedom to operate. 
112 AIS's revenue-sharing varies as follows: year 1-5: 15%, year 6- 10: 20%, year 11 - 15: 25%, 
and year 16 - 25: 30%. However, the minimum payment 
for the whole concession period must 
not be less than THB 20,388 million (or approximately GBP 290 millions). 
113 The DTAC provides mobile telephones under the 1800 MHz, PCN technology, while the AIS 
uses the GSM technology under 900 MHz frequency. Therefore, the customer who already chose 
the carrier cannot easily change to another provider and neither is the number portable. 
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Once again BTO will inevitably lead to another round of unfair competition. Not 
only will there be unequal conditions between the incumbents, but there will also 
be unequal operating conditions between the incumbents and the newcomers. 
Another flaw in the BTO scheme is derived directly from the ownership of the 
telecommunications assets. The asset transfer scheme of the BTO indirectly 
affected the operating costs of all private companies. According to Vimolvanich 
(personal interview, December 19,2004), since the private operators are not the 
owners of the assets, they are not able to use those assets to guarantee their loans, 
which make their cost of capital higher than it should be. Consequently, 
compared to other concession schemes like BOO (Build-Own-Operate) or BOT 
(Build-Operate-Transfer), the operating costs of the BTO tend to be the highest, 
which is another reason why Thai consumers inevitably have to absorb this 
premium. 
Finally, the last problem of the BTO derived from the lack of an appropriate 
institutional arrangement to support the participation of the private sector within 
the industry. The real objective of the BTO was to allow the private sector to 
provide services as an attempt to heal service scarcity. Nonetheless, the case of 
Thailand reveals that the government simply shifted the duty of service provision 
to the private sector too fast and to an excessive extent, while the country still 
lacked appropriate supporting institutional arrangements (Tangkitvanich, personal 
interview, December 28,2004). Most notably, there was no independent 
regulator to act as an industry referee in arranging an efficient and fair 
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competition among operators. Although it could be argued that BTO was 
introduced as a quick fix solution, still the government should have been more 
circumspect. In fact, none of the evidence showed that the governments had 
thought about the potential drawbacks of the BTO and tried to come up with some 
preventive measures. On the contrary, it is found that BTO was used extensively 
as a strategic tool to develop telecommunications service provision. 
Unfortunately, the BTO eventually backfired, when it turned out to be a major 
reason for the unequal competition as well as for the economic waste caused by 
double investment' 14 . Furthermore, it was also the BTO that equipped the SOTEs 
with the authority to regulate their concessionaires" 5. By acting as both the 
regulator and operator at the same time, the SOTEs had been questioned by the 
public on many occasions about lack of capability, fairness and transparency; 
especially considering the fact that the SOTEs themselves are also vulnerable to 
po itica intervention. 
114 The double investment can be clearly seen in the mobile phone business. As there was no 
agreement on the cellular system to be used within the country, TOT and CAT decided to use 
different technologies and frequencies. Consequently, the AIS and DTAC are required to have 
their own cell sites and switching circuit for their technology. It was found that in one service 
area, there are at least two kinds of cell sites; one for the AIS system and another one for the 
DTAC system. In fact, in early 2000s, there could be up to three different types of cell sites in one 
area, as there is another cellular technology introduced in Thailand (the CDMA), which also 
requires its own facility. 
"'According to Vimolvanich (personal interview, December 19,2004), the SOTEs obviously 
have a powerful influence over their concessionaires. Almost every business movement of 
concessionaires needs a prior approval from the concession owner. For example, the private 
company must possess an official approval from the SOTE before it can launch any value added 
service or even upgrade the network, which caused big frustration to the concessionaires. 
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THE NEED FOR CONVERSION 
Theoretically, it is not necessary to convert BTO concessions. None of the 
country's legislation requires such conversion; on the contrary, both the 1997 
Constitution (Section 335(2)) and the 2001 Telecommunications Business Act 
(Section 801 16 ) have honoured the validity of all existing concessions in the 
country. However, when looking at other sections of the Constitution that refer to 
the teleconununications industry (especially Sections 40 and 87), it is interesting 
to find that they ask for the creation of free and fair competition within the 
industry. The preceding section of this chapter has already explained the 
shortcomings of the BTO in relation to the telecommunications industry; therefore 
the fact that Section 335(2) of the Constitution honours the validity of concessions 
seems inconsistent with the Constitution's intention to create an efficient industry 
environment. Moreover, departing from the legislation, the need for BTO 
conversion seems more serious when bringing the real situation of the industry 
into consideration. Information obtained from fieldwork reveals that most local 
experts (e. g. Juruphan, Suebwonglee, Tangkitvanich) all agreed on the imperative 
of the conversion of the BTO, as it is an important part of the telecommunications 
reform. In fact, there are many reasons that make the concession conversion 
critical in the real practice. 
116 Section 80 of the 2001 Telecommunications Business Act states, "if the Communication 
Authority of Thailand and the Telephone Organisation of Thailand have granted permission, 
concession or contract to any person for the operation of telecommunication business before the 
effective date of this Act, such person being granted permission, concession or contract is entitled 
to operate the telecommunication business to the extent and the rights originally granted under 
such permission, concession or contract until the expiration thereof. " 
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First of all, conversion is needed in order to correct the present industry's 
distortions. Even though the country has a sound telecommunications reform 
programme, it is difficult to achieve full benefit from the reforin as long as the 
BTO concessions still exist. According to Tangkitvanich (personal interview, 
December 28,2004), the BTO contains several anti-competitive schemes such as 
revenue-sharing, transfer of concession assets, and monopoly right, which are 
obviously inconsistent with best practice in creating efficiency. Especially given 
that the SOTEs have been privatised into private companies and are operating 
commercially, it is unacceptable if the concessionaires have to pay revenue- 
sharing and be under the control of privatised SOTEs, who are already their direct 
competitors, until the end of concession 117 . It is also illogical for private 
concessionaires to keep paying the revenue-sharing and transferring assets to the 
SOTEs, while the SOTEs no longer possess a monopoly and the industry is no 
longer protected. Besides, the conversion also helps in promoting a level playing 
field among players. The SOTEs and the concessionaires will become 
independent from each other; they no longer have a common interest and 
therefore tend to compete with all their capabilities. The disparate conditions 
among the concessions will also be reset; all the incumbents as a result will be 
nil able to compete on the same ground. Lastly, the newcomers and the incumbents 
will compete on a level playing field, as incumbents will be free from the 
concession restrictions and will move to the license ones. This means they 
117 Unlike the newcomers who are going to operate under the rules stipulated by the regulator, the 
incumbents under the BTO concession also have to be under the direct control of the SOTEs. 
Therefore, it turns out that the operators under the BTO will have two different regulators in 
practice, which obviously will affect the freedom, productivity and competitiveness of these 
operators (Vimolvanich, personal interview, December 19,2004). 
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thereafter have to operate fairly under the rules and regulations stipulated by the 
regulator instead of by the SOTEs. 
Although the need to convert the concessions is apparent, the removal of the 
BTOs in order to facilitate the reform programme is not as simple as having the 
goverment order the abolition of the existing BTO concessions. The BTO 
concession is a legalised business contract. It commits two partners to follow the 
conditions that are already agreed until the end of the concession; changes or 
terminations of the BTO could not be forced or carried out unless both contract 
partners have come to an agreement (Yoonaidharma, 2003). Therefore, the policy 
to convert concessions has to be on a voluntary basis, which was the reason that 
the recent governments tried to come up with various conversion frameworks to 
induce both partners to negotiate and convert their concessions. 
THE ATTEMPTS TO CONVERT CONCESSIONS 
According to Uthaisang (personal interview, November 18,2004), although the 
governments (both under PM Chuan Leekpai and PM Thaksin Shinawatra) did 
not take the detailed steps in converting the BTOs, they did have a clear set of 
principles that the detailed plan would have to follow, which are (1) each market 
must not be limited to just one dominant operator, (2) both incumbents and 
newcomers should compete on the same plane (level playing field), (3) revenue- 
sharing should be eliminated, and (4) the conversion has to be fair to both SOTEs 
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and their concessionaires and it has to be on a voluntary basis. With these 
frameworks, it appeared that the conversion was very sensitive and complicated; it 
involved a great many financial gains and losses; and most importantly, it was 
associated with a number of industry uncertainties. Since 1998, there were four 
different conversion attempts; however, these attempts had never satisfied all the 
involved parties, which eventually led to a degree of unpleasantness. 
The MOTC made the first attempt in 1998. Without an order from the 
government, the first conversion attempt was initiated within the ministry. The 
MOTC established a working group, chaired by the Deputy Pennanent Secretary, 
Kitti Yupho, to study the alternatives to convert the existing concessions. The 
working group finally came up with three possible alternatives, together with the 
advantages and disadvantages of each strategy. However, the MOTC was not 
able to decide which alternative would be the best option for the country. 
Therefore, the MOTC decided to stall the study to gather more information; the 
ministry concluded that a concrete solution needed to incorporate more 
professional suggestions from experts and experienced consultants. 
The second study was also arranged by the MOTC in the era of PM Chuan 
Leekpai. The MOTC hired a group of consultants comprising Dhana Siam 
Securities Limited, Baring Brothers Limited, and Credit Suisse First Boston 
(Singapore) Limited to create a concession conversion framework. The final 
study was proposed on October 15,1998. The key result of the study was that the 
concessionaires would have to pay revenue-sharing to the SOTEs only until the 
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year 2006, which is the year that Thailand promised the WTO to meet standards 
for market liberalisation. After that, the concessionaires would have to lease the 
networks from the state agencies. However, the Dhana Siam proposal could not 
be put into action since it was severely criticised for favouring certain private 
operators, and threatened to create unfair competition; besides, the cessation of the 
revenue-sharing in 2006 also would have made the SOTEs lose a massive amount 
of revenue ("Can a level playing field be created?, " 2003). All these charges 
finally led to the failure of the attempt. Not long after that, the SEPO, as a 
secretariat of the SEPC, proposed that SEPC should conduct another study to 
revise and create a new conversion framework. 
In May 1999, the Thailand Development Research Institution (TDRI), hired by 
the MOF and the SEPC, proposed another set of conversion frameworks. The 
major feature of the framework is that, in order to be free from the concession 
obligation and receive a license, the concessionaire has to pay a lump-sum upfront 
"compensation" to the state agency equal to the sum of the projected annual 
revenue-shanng streams until the end of the concession period, which would be 
discounted into "Present Value" (PV) at an appropriate rate' 18. The TDRI 
framework satisfied most academics and SOTEs, as the SOTEs tend to receive a 
huge amount of upfront compensation. The framework was approved by the 
cabinet on January 25,2000. Unsurprisingly, the TDRI framework was opposed 
by most private operators as they claimed that there were too many risk factors 
involved in the compensation calculation, such as the discount rate and the 
118 Please see details in TDRI (1999). 
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projection of future revenue-sharing streams" 9, and only a small mistake in the 
calculation could lead to a catastrophe (Bencharongkakul, personal interview, 
December 3,2004). Besides, another major problem of the framework was over 
the assets that the concessionaires had already transferred to the SOTEs. The 
TDRI framework gave the concessionaires only the right to use the assets until the 
end of the concession in exchange for the upfront revenue-sharing payment, while 
giving no option to buy back those assets. The conversion negotiation under the 
TDRI's framework went on for an entire year. The result was that not a single 
concession had been converted. Basically, it was because the private companies 
refused the framework; they claimed that the framework entailed too much risk 
and would make them considerably less competitive than either the SOTEs or the 
new entrants that would enter the market after 2006 (Vimolvanich, personal 
interview, December 19,2004). In late 2000, the private operators suddenly 
ceased negotiations since they began to sense that the concession conversion 
might be done on much more favourable terms under the new Thaksin Shinawatra 
administration (Pornsutee, personal interview, December 23,2003). Such a 
prediction became true, when there was a change in goverm-nent and PM after the 
General Election in early 2001 and Thaksin Shinawatra became the 23 
Td 
Prime 
Minister of Thailand. Promptly, PM Chuan Leekpai's conversion attempt (or the 
third attempt) was officially abandoned with the resignation of his ad-hoc 
conversion committee right after the arrival of PM Thaksin Shinawatra. 
"9 The projection of future revenue streams is extremely difficult to calculate since there was no 
clue about the future industry environment and other conditions under the leadership of the 
independent regulator, which surely differs markedly from the era of SOTEs' guidance. 
201 
As for the fourth attempt, the MOTC hired another consultant, the Chulalongkorn 
University Intellectual Property Institution (CUIPI), to revise and make the 
TDRI's framework more practical. In October 2001, the CUEPI came up with the 
revised framework. Interestingly, the CUIPI's framework in many aspects was 
similar to the Dhana Siam's. The essence of the latest framework was that the 
concessionaires should pay revenue-sharing to the SOTEs only until 2006, which 
is the country's deadline for liberalisation. According to Pornsutee (personal 
interview, December 23,2003), CUM claimed that the concessionaires should 
stop paying revenue-sharing to the SOTEs when the monopoly right of the SOTEs 
has reverted to the state, which was after the promulgation of the 2001 
Telecommunications Business Act. However, the CUIPI considerately picked 
2006 as the cut off point because it wanted to allow SOTEs time to prepare them 
for real competition; it knew that stripping out the revenue-sharing instantly might 
have hurt the SOTEs severely. As for the concession assets, the CUIPI's 
framework gave the concessionaires an option to buy back the transferred asset at 
a "Re-Valued" price 120 . Unsurprisingly, the new 
framework was immediately 
agreed upon by the private operators; while, even less surprisingly, it drew severe 
criticism from the SOTEs' management, labour unions, NGOs, academics, and 
especially the public in general. They argued that the framework obviously 
favoured the private companies at the expense of state agencies 121 . Therefore, the 
concession conversion process was once again stalled. 
120 The government has never explained the meaning or the detailed calculation of the "Re- 
Valued" price though both the SOTEs and the concessionaires asked repeatedly for that definition 
(Vimolvanich, personal interview, December 19,2004). 
121 Moe (200 1), a telecom analyst at the Societe Generale Group, estimates that the state would 
lose around THB 290 billions (approximately GBP 40 billions) by following the CUIPI 
framework. 
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In conclusion, the more attempts, the more conversion frameworks, and the more 
recommendations from consultants made the concession conversion all the more 
complicated. The involved parties began to be confused about which one was 
correct, as there were many occasions when one framework came into conflict 
with another. For instance, the TDRI proposed that the concessionaires continued 
paying the revenue-sharing until the end of concession period (which could be as 
long as 2016 in some major concessions), while the CUEPI proposed that the 
concessionaires paid only until 2006. The inconsistency between frameworks 
made it hard to believe that the concession conversion would provide a win-win 
outcome for all parties. Rather, the involved parties believed that the conversion 
was a "zero sum game", where a framework could benefit one side of the partner 
at the expense of another. However, since the conversion has to be done on a 
voluntary basis, it is unlikely to happen when one side is not assured of its 
position, or is in danger of losing interest. 
THE FAILURES OF THE ATTEMPTS 
Although the Thai govermnents had put a great deal of effort into converting the 
BTO concessions, all the attempts failed. It is found that the first two attempts 
failed without any serious implementation, while the last two had been put into 
serious action, but they simply did not work. Mentioned by Bencharongkakul, 
(personal interview, December 3,2004), the first two attempts look rather like 
trial attempts; the private operators did not have even a chance to get involved in 
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any aspect. That the attempts were not seriously implemented could be because 
telecommunications reform was not the highest priority and it was still a long way 
from the liberalisation deadline. However, the story is different for the last two 
attempts, as both attempts were put into real action and seriously implemented. 
The recent governments had established the negotiation committees only to 
facilitate the conversion negotiation process. Unfortunately, due to a nuMber of 
unfavourable factors, both these attempts also ended in failure. 
The structural reason 
As explained earlier, the conversion of a BTO concession is a sensitive issue for 
both contract partners. Every action has to be done with all due caution, as only a 
minor error may lead to a major disaster. Therefore, it is ideal if both contract 
partners have all the relevant information (e. g. the amount of license to be issued, 
the interconnection regime, the license fee, the PSO, and basically other rules and 
regulations to be stipulated by the regulator), which would enable them to make a 
better decision and be subject to minimal risk from the conversion. 
The Thai telecommunications industry, especially during the time it was 
concerned about the potential of changes from the reform programme, contained a 
number of uncertainties. There was no clear picture on what the industry was 
going to look like after the reform. The delay of regulator establishment caused a 
vacuum in the regulatory reform. The lack of a new regulatory regime (e. g. the 
number of licenses to be granted, the amount of license fee, the interconnection 
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regime, and so forth) directly impacted the concession conversion. None of BTO 
partners wanted to take the risk and pursue the conversion. As explained by 
Vimolvanich (personal interview, December 19,2004), "there are too many 
uncertainties associated in converting our concession; and we, as a private 
company, are not able to bear with them. In fact, I believe that all other 
concessionaires also think the same way. " Besides, the Minister of ICT also 
comes to a similar verdict; he argues that the concession partners (both private 
companies and SOTEs) could not decide whether they should convert the 
concession as long as they do not know of all the associated costs in running the 
business under the supervision of the regulator; therefore, they prefer to wait until 
the regulator is in place (Suebwonglee, personal interview, November 25,2004). 
The political reasons 
Apart from structural unreadiness, politically related reasons also significantly 
contributed to the failures of the conversion attempts in the past. 
Indecisive policies 
According to Kusripituck (personal interview, November 24,2004), the 
government's indecisive policy was one of the principal factors that played a key 
role in the failure of conversions. At the beginning, the fact that the governments 
simply discarded the first two conversion frameworks made all involved parties 
suspect the seriousness of the government's conversion policy. Later, the 
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seriousness of the next two attempts made it clear that the recent governments had 
a real intention to convert all the existing BTOs. However, the intention by itself 
was not enough to accomplish the objective. Experiences revealed that all the 
previous governments had scarcely decided upon the sensitive issues that were not 
already mentioned in the conversion frameworks (which were actually proposed 
by the consultants). These policy ambiguities turned out to be serious risk factors 
that deterred both contract partners from pursuing the conversion process. For 
example, the governments were unable to answer what would happen if one 
company decided to convert the concession, while the others decided not to. Or 
what would happen if the concessionaires established new companies, asked for 
new licenses from the regulator, and transferred the customers to the new 
companies. 
Without certainty, both concession partners understandably had justification for 
hesitation (Juruphan, personal interview, December 14,2004). From the private 
operator's perspective, they had no guarantee of the consistency of the conversion 
policy from the current government to any subsequent one; they were not sure 
whether converting the concession at the present would be based on the same 
conditions as doing so would in the future (Bencharongkakul, personal interview, 
December 3,2004). As for the SOTEs, they were anxious to know whether or 
not, how, and how much they would be compensated for their "easy money" (the 
revenue-sharing) that would be tenninated after the BTO had been converted 
(Naksrinuan, personal interview, December 7,2004). All in all, without decisive 
policies on relevant aspects, both SOTEs and their concessionaires would prefer 
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to wait for a clear direction. It was this kind of indecisiveness that eventually led 
to the dead-end of the concession conversion attempts. 
Involvementfrom involvedparties 
Although the BTO is a legal contract signed by two partners, the process of 
conversion in practice seems not to involve only the initial two partners; there 
were a number of parties (e. g. the government, the consumers, the NGOs, the 
labour unions, etc. ) who became involved with the BTO at the later time. The 
widespread use of the BTO within the Thai telecommunications industry had 
made it part of the balance of the industry. Any change in the BTO thus had to 
impact somebody. The lack of definite parameters in the new environment made 
everybody even more vulnerable to change. As a result, all the involved parties 
became embroiled in order to protect their own interests and it was these 
interventions that eventually caused a number of problems in the conversion 
attempts. 
Lack of common interest 
In most cases, the failure of the conversion attempts can be attributed to the 
conflict of interest among reform's involved parties. As the conversion of BTO 
concessions put a huge amount at stake, the issue drew a lot of attention from 
various interested parties. It was evident that the interests among these involved 
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parties had to differ. Apparently, these parties strove hard either to promote their 
interests or to avoid getting hurt from the conversion policy. 
As stated by Bencharongkakul (personal interview, December 3,2004), one of the 
problems of the concession conversion was the lack of common interest among 
involved parties. It is arguably true that the lack of common interest is not an 
unusual situation in politics. However, in the context of the concession 
conversion, it seems that it is very difficult to reconcile all these diffused interests 
in the conversion package, especially considering the fact that, by law, no one can 
force BTO contract partners to convert their concession. This appears to be the 
case, as each party obviously cared more for personal benefit. On one side, both 
SOTE management and labour unions actually share the same standpoint that they 
do not want to convert the BTOs. Explained by Chareonwan (personal interview, 
December 14,2004), the SOTEs enjoy the revenue-sharing and the transferred 
assets; they keep the SOTEs growing strongly. Therefore, there is no point in 
trying to change it. On the other hand, the private concessionaires want to convert 
the BTO, as they find that the conditions of the BTO (e. g. the revenue-sharing and 
the limitation on the pricing) prevented them from achieving their optimal 
efficiency and competitiveness. However, according to Vimolvanich (personal 
interview, December 19,2004), no matter how much the private sector wanted to 
be free from the concession's obligations, they would convert their concessions 
only under an acceptable level of risk. 
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The lack of common interest to convert the BTO concessions became even more 
apparent when the CUIPI announced its conversion framework. It is very 
interesting to see that, with the same problem to solve, there were such big 
differences between the frameworks proposed by the two most renowned 
academic institutions of the country. When compared to TDRI's version, CUEPI's 
was almost diametrically opposed (Suebwonglee, personal interview, November 
251,2004). The TDRI's version was obviously on the side of SOTE, as the main 
concern of the TDRI framework was that the SOTEs must not be disadvantaged, 
which eventually led to the refusal by the concessionaires. On the other hand, the 
CUEPI version seemed to lean more to the private company side, which was 
equally unacceptable for the SOTEs. In fact, the CUIPI framework drew a lot of 
attention from many other involved parties, whose interests were also affected; 
together with the SOTEs' management and labour unions, the NGOs, the 
academics and, especially, the public in general began to severely oppose the 
CUEPI framework. A number of public talks had been arranged to criticise the 
framework. Surprisingly, it was the first time that the public had openly entered 
the telecommunications political arena to express their disagreement. The wide 
opposition finally led to the failure of the fourth attempt. 
All in all, although the last two attempts had been made seriously, both of them 
failed partially due to the fact that none of them was able to reconcile the interests 
of all involved parties, which consequently called for resistance and ultimate 
failure. 
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Sincerity of the involved parties 
The sincerity of the involved parties in converting the BTO is another issue that is 
worth addressing. Some industry gurus questioned if all involved parties really 
wanted a conversion. 
It is hardly surprising if the SOTEs do not agree to convert the BTOs, as it is an 
important source of growth and income. However, the situation is different for 
the private operators. Although the conversion would lead to a number of 
potential benefits for the private operators, the benefits obtained from the old 
fashioned BTO concessions are still convincing for few incumbents. Under the 
umbrella of the BTO, the concessionaires are still operating under the right of the 
SOTEs. Indeed, in the future when the regulator collects the fees from operators 
(e. g. the interconnection charge or the license fee), the BTO concessionaires will 
be exempted from all these costs since the concession owners will be responsible 
for them; besides, the concessionaires will also enjoy their exclusive rights to use 
their transferred assets until the end of concessions. These would be the reasons 
that made some incumbents prefer the old environment. They felt no rush for 
conversion, unless they were sure that they would be better off. Such an 
observation is consistent with the comment from a local telecommunications 
academic and a regulator (Yoonaidharma, personal interview, December 16, 
2004) that it is impossible to wrap up the conversion if there is no new pressing 
factor; contract partners seem to be happy and enjoy the BTO, while other 
involved parties are accustomed to the old environment and therefore still 
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maintain their composure. A high-level manager of a concessionaire 
(Anonymous D) further asserts that it is possible that the attempts of conversion in 
the past were more or less mere pretence. No one really wanted change; the 
SOTEs tried as the government ordered them to, while the private companies only 
tried to incorporate or to find imagined advantages. Nonetheless, it is further 
found that the need to convert concessions among the private companies is also 
unequal. The uneven conditions between concessions made the concessionaires 
who already had better conditions less motivated for conversion, as the longer the 
old conditions remained, the more advantage they would enjoy over other 
compe i ors 
122 
. 
Conflict of interest 
The conflict of interest is an issue that recently became most apparent after the 
arrival in office of PM Thaksin Shinawatra. According to Chareonwan (personal 
interview, December 14,2004), Chevapruek (personal interview, December 8, 
2004), and lamburnrung (personal interview, December 21,2004), they all agree 
that the fact that the PM's family is the major shareholder in Thailand's biggest 
telecommunications operator put any reform attempt, especially the concession 
conversion, under the spotlight. In fact, it is not only the PM himself who has a 
strong interest in the telecommunications industry, but his intimates, and even 
several ministers in his cabinet also have huge stakes in the telecommunications 
business. As a consultant to the negotiation committee under the TDRI attempt 
122 In this aspect, some industry experts (e. g. Reowilaisuk, 2003) even suspect that there were 
some dominant concessionaires who tried every possible way to prolong the conversion for as long 
as possible. 
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and the one who established the TDRI framework, Tangkitvanich (personal 
interview, December 28,2004) provides interesting perspectives on the potential 
conflict of interest, i. e. the attempt under TDRI's framework was suddenly turned 
down by the private companies once it looked likely that the TRT would win the 
2001 General Election and Thaksin Shinawatra was to become the new PM. Even 
more interesting, after his becoming PM, the new conversion framework proposed 
by the CUIPI leaned heavily to the private side in a very obvious way. These 
incidents were very suspicious and called forth public criticism, which finally put 
an end to the attempt. 
However, the attempt to deal with the concession issue was not ended. The 
government under PM Thaksin Shinawatra came up with another interesting 
innovative strategy in order to avoid public criticism. The measure of excise tax 
on telecommunications services was first introduced and adopted in 2003 as an 
alternative answer to BTO conversion. According to the law, instead of paying 
the revenue-sharing to the SOTEs, telecommunications operators are required to 
pay excise tax directly to the Excise Department. The amount of tax will be 
calculated as a certain percent of the total revenue of operators, depending on the 
type of service 123 . The government claimed that an excise tax was the alternative 
choice to concession conversion to improve fairness within the industry. 
Interestingly, since then, there have been no more calls for or attempts to 
implement conversion from any parties. 
123 The detailed discussion on telecommunications excise tax will be presented in Chapter 8. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that the BTO concession is one of the major problems in 
reforming the telecommunications industry of Thailand. Although it used to be an 
important strategy to develop the telecommunications industry, as time passed, 
changes in the industry's environment have undermined its original justification. 
In fact, it turned out that fair competition and optimal efficiency are difficult to 
achieve if the BTO still exists. It is deeply-rooted in the industry and very 
difficult to change. No one can force the contract partners to convert the BTO 
contract, as it is legalised and validly honoured by the country's legislation. 
Therefore, the best effort that the government could make was to encourage both 
parties to convert their concession. Unfortunately, all the previous attempts were 
unable to arrive at a mutual agreement. There were many unfavourable factors 
that deterred the conversion attempts. The indecisive policies from the 
government as well as the unclear future conditions of the industry contributed to 
the failures. With these uncertainties, the conversion is obviously too risky for 
both contract partners to pursue. Relatively speaking, they are not pressing for the 
conversion; they remain at least to some extent satisfied with the current situation. 
The SOTEs are happy with the transferred assets and the revenue-sharing, while 
some concessionaires also enjoy their exclusive rights and abnormal profits. 
None of them wanted to jeopardise their interests. 
All in all, it is not an overstatement to say that each involved party has tried to 
protect its own interests. It is not surprising to find that the SOTEs, the 
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concessionaires, the NGOs, or the public in general came out and criticised the 
conversion framework that potentially hurt their interests, which left the entire 
issue unresolved. Interestingly, apart from the fact that the conversion involves a 
huge amount at stake and a number of involved parties, the potential conflict of 
interest of PM Thaksin Shinawatra and his intimates also undermined the 
credibility of the conversion attempt, which makes the existence of an 
independent regulator and its rules and regulations the next best hope for 
resolving the issue. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY BODY 
INTRODUCTION 
The two previous chapters covered the first two refonn issues of the Thai 
telecommunications industry, which are privatisation of the SOTEs and 
conversion of the BTO concessions. This chapter will now focus on the final 
reform issue, which is the establishment of an independent regulatory body. The 
establishment of a regulator seems to be relatively the most important issue 
among the three in reforming the Thai telecommunications industry. It is 
logically the starting point to rectify the other two issues. The old-fashioned 
regulatory regime under state agency has revealed its inadequacy in supervising 
the industry under today's fast changing enviroment. In this regard, global 
practice suggests that the industry's regulatory authority should be carried out by 
a specific and independent professional organisation. Accordingly, the idea of 
regulatory refonn in Thailand has been raised on several occasions, such as in the 
1997 Constitution and the 1997 TMP, but the first concrete action on regulatory 
refon-n only emerged when the country enacted a specific law to establish a 
telecommunications regulator in 2000. After that, it is found that the 
establishment faced a number of political and technical obstacles, which resulted 
in a lengthy delay. While the law allows 120 days time for the entire 
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establishment process, it turned out that the establishment took more than four 
years in reality; certainly, the four years in conditions of rapid change have caused 
considerable damage to the industry and the country as a whole. 
THE REGULATORY REGIME UNDER THE SOTES 
Mentioned in Section 5 of the 1934 Telegraph and Telephone Act, the PTD was 
the sole body responsible for all kinds of telecommunications related activities 
within the country. Accordingly with the incorporations of TOT and CAT in 
1954 and 1976, the PTD had transferred all the tasks relating to the provision of 
telecommunications services within the country to the two SOTEs, which means 
that TOT and CAT, since then, had taken on the dual responsibility for both 
providing and regulating the telecommunications services. 
The fact that TOT and CAT had the monopoly right and were playing both the 
roles of regulator and operator led to regulatory complexity, especially when they 
later granted concessions to the private companies. It turned out that the 
concessions granted by TOT and CAT contained a number of disparities in their 
conditions 124 , which unsurprisingly these unequal standards 
led to a strange fonn 
of regulation. It seemed that the Thai telecommunications industry has two 
different regulators in operation, as each concessionaire had to listen to and follow 
the conditions of the SOTE who granted it the concession. It is undeniable that 
"' Please find more details on the unequal concession conditions in Chapter 6. 
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the regulatory regime under the supervision of SOTEs did have problems; it was 
unclear, overlapping, and complex. In other words, the roles and responsibilities 
of policy-maker, regulator, and operator were neither independent nor yet clearly 
separated. 
Problems of the regulatory regime under the SOTEs 
The first problem of the regulation under the SOTEs was the overlapping of the 
roles and responsibilities of policy-maker, regulator, and operator. The SOTEs 
were taking both the roles of regulator and operator. Being state owned 
enterprises that have to be under strict govemment rules from the beginning, the 
working attitude of both SOTEs therefore did not differ from most other 
government agencies. The slow and conservative style was embedded and 
reflected in their regulatory practices. According to Bencharongkakul (personal 
interview, December 3,2004), the conservative and out of date regulatory regime 
of SOTEs caused delay in technology development, slow response to new service 
demands, and, most importantly, lower competitiveness of the Thai 
telecommunications operators 125 . Furthermore, the fact that the SOTEs were 
actually operators with regulatory authority led to criticism over the conflict of 
interest on many occasions. Although the problem seems less significant as long 
as the BTO concession is still valid and the SOTEs and their concessionaires still 
enjoy the same amount of income, the problem tends to be more severe once the 
SOTEs have been privatised and started operating commercially. In such 
125 Consistent to Hausman (1997), he finds that the delay of the new service introduction causes 
more damage to the economy than one would expect. in fact, it is one of the most costly problems 
in the modem economy (as happened in the United States). 
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circumstances, fair competition would be even more difficult to maintain since the 
privatised SOTEs will have so much advantage over their concessionaires. They 
are still the owners of the concessions; they are still the owners of all 
telecommunications assets; and, most importantly, they are still endowed with 
their regulatory authority as before. 
The second drawback of the regulation under the SOTEs involves the 
independence of the SOTEs. Both TOT and CAT establishment laws clearly 
mentioned the superior power of the cabinet and the line ministry on the operation 
of the SOTEs. Consequently, the policy-maker did not only have a role in guiding 
the overall direction of telecommunications development, but it also had influence 
in other important aspects of the SOTEs' operations, such as the approval of 
SOTEs' high-value investment, or even the determination of rates of fees, rents, 
and service charges 126 . The question that has always arisen was whether the 
SOTEs could do their jobs independently or whether outside political power had 
intervened. One obvious example is the tariff of the fixed line calling charge 
within the same local area, that had been fixed and never been allowed to go up 
for decades; the rate is fixed at THB 3 per call (or approximately GBP 0.04) 
regardless of the duration of the call. According to Pornsutee (personal interview, 
November 12,2004), the rate was obviously unprofitable and drove TOT to a 
heavy loss; however, the loss was offset by the expensive domestic long-distance 
tariffs, which can be as high as THB 3- 18 (or approximately GBP 0.04 - 0.24) 
per minute depending on the distance. The use of profits from the expensive long 
M Please see details in the Section 23,25, and 31 of the 1954 TOT Act and the Section 21,29, and 
39 of the 1976 CAT Act. 
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distance rate that is normally used by people in suburban areas who have a lower 
income to subsidise the losses from cheap urban local calls that are usually made 
by people who have higher income is undesirable and inconsistent with global 
best practice. Interestingly, all governments tried to maintain this peculiar tariff 
structure since the changes in price may affect their political popularity. 
In summary, the current complex and overlapping telecommunications regulatory 
regime in Thailand is apparently unsuitable for the very dynamic and highly 
competitive present era. The lengthy process of decision-making, the disparate 
conditions, and the overlapping authority caused frustrations for all parties 
involved within the industry ranging from the SOTEs, private operators, investors, 
consumers, etc. Therefore, under the SOTEs' regulatory regime, free and fair 
competition together with the optimisation of industry efficiency and social 
welfare seem far from being reached. 
THE NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT REGULATORY BODY 
Global practice suggests that the modem telecommunications industry needs an 
independent regulatory body to be responsible for the regulatory function. 
Thailand is no exception; as previously pointed out, there is a body of evidence 
showing that the telecommunications industry under the SOTEs regime was no 
longer suited to the present environment. In fact, the need for a 
telecommunications regulator had been stressed on more than one occasion. 
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The first and foremost requirement is found in the 1997 Constitution. Section 40 
clearly sets out the establishment of the telecommunications regulatory body in 
order to distribute and supervise the use of frequencies, with regard to maximising 
public benefit at both national and local levels. As a consequence, a specific law 
to establish the telecommunications regulator had been promulgated in 2000, 
known as the 2000 Spectrum Act. Section 46 of the 2000 Spectrum Act further 
underlines the need for a telecommunications regulator, as it mentions that the 
country will have a telecommunications regulatory body, namely the "National 
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). " The 1997 Constitution and its 
implementing law provided the first official clue that the regulatory regime under 
the control of SOTE was about to end, which in fact the 2000 Spectrum Act 
requires the establishment of the NTC to be done within 120 days after the 
promulgation of the act. 
Secondly, the need for a regulator was also intensified from within the industry 
itself As mentioned earlier, it was quite obvious that the old-fashioned regulatory 
regime neither enhanced the optimisation of efficiency, nor corresponded to the 
more liberalised environment. Real free and fair competition was unlikely to 
occur as long as the SOTEs were still both regulator and operator. All operators 
were unlikely to be on a level playing field as long as an independent regulatory 
body was conspicuous by its absence. Consumers tended to be exploited as long 
as the industry was protected. All these problems were awaiting the new 
regulator. In fact, in addition to the 2000 Spectrum Act, Thailand also has another 
new telecommunications legislation, namely the 2001 Telecommunications 
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Business Act. It provides guidelines for the regulator on how to manage the 
industry for the sake of all stakeholders. Up to late 2004, the law was almost 
useless since only a few parts of it were in effect; the delay in the existence of 
regulator gave no one the legal right to implement it. 
Moreover, the need for an independent regulator was also indirectly urged by 
external forces like the WTO liberalisation agreement, the GATS's MFN 
conditionality, and the reputation for efficiency gained from free and fair 
competition. All in all, both internal and external factors indicated in concert that 
the regulatory regime under the control of the SOTEs had to be abandoned and 
replaced by a more efficient regime under the supervision of professionals who 
enjoy a real independence. 
THE DELAY OF THE REGULATOR 
Since the monopoly right of TOT and CAT had been repealed in 2001, the SOTEs 
and their concessionaires were literally frozen in action. None of them was able to 
expand or introduce new services to the market, unless the new licence has been 
granted by the regulator. Luckily, all the previous services were intact, as they 
were honoured by the Constitution. Unfortunately, the establishment of the NTC 
faced a number of difficulties that caused serious delay within the process. After 
four years of delay, the NTC was eventually set up in October 2004. During the 
absence of the NTC, it was hard to see a decent development within the Thai 
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telecommunications industry; in fact, the lengthy delay in the NTC establishment 
caused far-reaching undesirable consequences for the Thai telecommunications 
industry at large. 
Infringement of the Constitution and laws 
From the legal perspective, the delay in the establishment of the regulator 
infringed the 1997 Constitution, the 2000 Spectrum Act, and the 2001 
Telecommunications Business Act. According to the Constitution and the 
Spectrum Act, the NTC should have been in place by October 2000; but in reality, 
the NTC establishment process was only finished in October 2004. This long 
delay had violated and has been detrimental to the credibility of these legislations. 
The infringement of either the 1997 Constitution or the 2000 Spectrum Act 
nonetheless does not entail punitive consequences, as punishment for violations 
was never mentioned in either legislation. Furthermore, the delay of the NTC also 
affected the effectiveness of the 2001 Telecommunications Business Act, since 
only a part of the law can be adopted in practice; while the rest of the law had to 
wait for the existence of the regulator. 
The vacuum in the telecommunications industry 
The promulgation of the 2001 Telecommunications Business Act served to 
terminate the state monopoly right, which had been embodied in the two SOTEs 
since their incorporation. After its declaration, the SOTEs' authority to allow 
222 
anyone to operate within the industry as well as to regulate the industry had been 
transferred to the independent industry regulatory body. Unfortunately, the delay 
of the regulator establishment placed the Thai telecommunications industry in a 
vacuum. Without the agency to issue the new license, new operators were unable 
to enter the industry, and new services were also unable to be introduced. In such 
circumstances, the consumers and the country were likely to be the real losers. 
Consumers lost the opportunity to receive the benefits of having more operators 
competing in the market and having more kinds of service options available. The 
country as a whole was also affected because the standstill of the industry 
development inevitably hurt the country's competitiveness and the overall 
economy. The obvious example in this regard was that the government policy to 
develop the country to become the telecommunications hub in the Southeast 
Asian region (as mentioned in 7 th NESDP) was directly challenged and it may not 
even be achieved (Uthaisang, personal interview, November 18,2004). 
The continuation of monopoly 
Although the monopoly right had been reclaimed from the SOTEs in 2001, the 
regulatory vacuum within the industry still nurtured monopolisation in the real 
world situation. Without the introduction of new competitors and sound 
regulations, all incumbents still enjoyed their consistently abnornial profits. Most 
operators continued to experience a dramatic growth of subscribers each year. In 
such circumstances, Tangkitvanich (personal interview, December 28,2004) 
comments that it would make the competition in the future worse off. The longer 
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the vacuum situation dragged on, the more the incumbents could eat up the market 
share within the industry; such a situation makes the entrance of newcomers even 
more difficult when the market opens up for real competition. Moreover, another 
interesting comment from a recognised academic expert (Vongpanitlerd, personal 
interview, December 2,2004) was that the striking growth in subscribers and the 
impressive advancement in technology that usually makes the price of 
telecommunications services lower in most economies, hardly showed any effect 
in the case of Thailand. Such evidence was actually a good indicator of the 
persistence of monopoly in the Thai telecommunications market. The limited 
competition and the continual monopoly gave consumers no choice, while the 
operators still had high market power, but had no incentive to reduce the price or 
to improve the quality of service. In short, it was once again the consumers and 
the country who were the ultimate losers. 
Loss of investor confidence and business development opportunities 
A clear industry picture (e. g. the market structure and the industry rules) under the 
new regulatory regime was critical for both local and foreign investors. The 
unknown regulatory regime made investors lose confidence and they were thus 
reluctant to invest. This consequently hurt the opportunity for development of the 
industry as a whole. The delay of the NTC establishment also affected the TOT 
and CAT privatisation programmes. Moe (2002) argues that, without clear 
regulatory direction, it was impossible to sell SOTEs' stocks at the optimal price. 
Investors would perceive the regulatory ambiguity as a major risk factor, 
224 
especially considering the fact that this uncertainty would have direct impact on 
the existing concessions. Unsurprisingly, the lack of confidence in the regulatory 
regime would make investors heavily discount the value of the SOTEs' stock or 
even decide not to invest entirely. According to Juruphan (personal interview, 
December 14,2004), this was a reason that caused the delays in the privatisation 
of TOT and CAT for more than four years from the MOF's initial privatisation 
plan. 
Loss of opportunity to prepare for liberalisation 
The delay in the existence of regulator and regulations also impaired the 
competitiveness of the incumbents and the industry compared to international 
standards. Without a regulator, incumbents tended to enjoy exploiting benefits 
from a vacuum instead of trying to prepare themselves for full liberalisation in 
2006. In addition, as the privatisation of SOTEs has been stalled, both TOT and 
CAT are still wholly owned by the state, which, as described earlier, is unlikely to 
be very efficient. Besides, it is true that the later the SOTEs are privatised, the 
less time they have to change their organisations and cultures to be ready for the 
fierce competition sure to arrive in the near future. 
All in all, although the delay of the NTC establishment brought a lot of damages 
to the country, it did not face much pressure from the public. Uthaisang (personal 
interview, November 18,2004) explains that most people were not aware of the 
shortcomings of not having a regulator or the losses from the delay of its 
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existence. The absence of the independent regulatory body did a great deal of 
damage to Thailand socially and economically. It gave consumers less choice and 
they were exploited by several market dominators who had high market power. 
Importantly, it also impaired the country's competitiveness as well as the level of 
development, which made the country fall behind other comparable countries 
(Suebwonglee, personal interview, November 25,2004). 
REGULATOR - NOT A PANACEA BUT A PREREQUISITE 
The absence of an efficient regulator and regulatory regime effectively hindered 
the telecommunications reform programme of Thailand. Although the 
establishment of the regulator seemed to be a separate reform issue, it was closely 
interrelated with the country's other two reforrn issues. As revealed in previous 
chapters, it is not only political reasoning that impedes both the concession 
conversion and the privatisation, but, structurally, the absence of a regulator and a 
clear regulatory regime also contributes to the problems of both issues. 
Looking back at the first two issues, the SOTEs were unable to privatise, as the 
uncertainties over BTO concessions were too daunting. Unfortunately, the 
concessions had to be there and were very difficult to convert or eliminate, as 
there were vast uncertainties on future industry rules and regulations. Even 
though the regulator does not (and should not) have the task of converting the 
concessions, it can facilitate the action by clarifying most of the unknown factors, 
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such as the number of licenses to be granted, the license fee, the interconnection 
charge, and so forth (Juruphan, personal interview, December 14,2004 and 
Kusripituck, personal interview, November 24,2004). The presence of the NTC 
is more or less a starting point to solve the problems that had obstructed the 
reform programme for a long time. Thus, it is not an exaggeration to say that, in 
the case of Thailand, the existence of the regulator, together with clear industry 
rules and regulations, is relatively the most critical issue in reforming the 
telecommunications industry. 
However, it is certain that the presence of the NTC alone is not capable of solving 
all the industry's problems straight away; the best it can do is to stand as a good 
starting point for a sound reform programme (Uthaisang, personal interview, 
November 18,2004). Even in the worst case that the BTO concessions still 
existed and the SOTEs and other incumbents still dominated the industry, the 
discretions and the authorities of the NTC provided by law should be versatile 
enough (if used rightly) to create a fairer and freer competitive environment 
within the industry, as well as to better protect the consumers, and all Thai 
citizens from exploitation 
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. 
127 Section 51 of the 2000 Spectrum Act states the NTC's 21 authorities and duties. The section 
clearly shows that the regulator is equipped with a wide range of authority and high level of 
discretion. 
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THE ATTEMPTS AT ESTABLISHMENT 
The idea of establishing a telecommunications regulator had been raised on 
several occasions in the past. The 1997 TMP, the 1997 Constitution, the 1998 
State Enterprise Master Plan, and the 2000 Spectrum Act all required the 
existence of the telecommunications regulator. Unfortunately, although the NTC 
was supposed to be in place since 2000, a number of difficulties occurred that 
made the establishment process only completed in the late 2004. Along the way, 
there were two official attempts of establishment. The first attempt began in 
August 2000 and was annulled in January 2003, while the second attempt was 
made in May 2003 and ended in August 2004. 
The first attempt at establishment 
The steps to the establishment of the NTC are addressed in the 2000 Spectrum 
Act; Section 49 states that the selection of the candidates to be members of the 
NTC must be carried out by a specific committee, namely the "Selection 
Committee". The Selection Committee has a duty to screen the qualifications of 
all applicants from open recruitment, select the most appropriate 14 candidates, 
propose a shortlist to the Senate for further investigation and choose the final 
seven NTC members (see Figure 7.1). 
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Figure 7.1 
Steps to establish the NTC 
The Office of The Selection The Senate 
Permanent Committee chooses the final 
Secretary of the selects the NTC seven NTC 
* li d members and OPM set up a P- app cants an 
Selection nominates the 14 send the shortlist 
Committee NTC candidates for the Royal 
to the Senate Appointment 
Note: *OPM = Office of the Prime Minister 
The NTC 
Although the law clearly provides steps to establish the NTC, it fails to provide a 
clear guidance in selecting the 14 candidates. The Selection Committee therefore 
set up selection criteria according to their own judgement, and performed the 
selection in the manner they deemed appropriate. In October 2000, the Selection 
Committee came up with the list of 14 NTC candidates, which was handed to the 
Senate for final selection. Unfortunately, the attempt did not work out as 
expected, when the Senate passed a resolution to reject all the candidates. There 
were two reasons for the rejection, as will be seen. 
Firstly, the Senate noticed that there were some candidates who potentially had 
conflicts of interest in being a NTC member since they had close relationships 
with some telecommunications companies. As revealed by the secretary of the 
Selection Committee (Vorathitipong, personal interview, January 6,2005), there 
were some candidates who were also members of the BOD of the private 
telecommunications companies at the same time the selection process was 
ongoing. The second reason was derived from the concern whether or not the 
shortlist proposed by the Selection Committee was legitimate. To be more 
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precise, the Senate doubted that the composition of the Selection Committee was 
legal, especially regarding the representatives from the academic field 
(Ounsamran, personal interview, December 15,2004). The Senate claimed that 
the four representatives from academic institutions in the Selection Committee 
were chosen unlawfully; they should have been chosen from more than 20 
institutions around the country, rather than from only seven institutions from 
which the four representatives were actually selected from 128 . Responding to 
notices from the Senate, PM Thaksin Shinawatra brought the issues to the Council 
of State 129 to see whether the applicants who had relationships with 
telecommunications companies were eligible to be NTC candidates and whether 
the composition of the Selection Committee was legal. Subsequently, the Council 
of State replied and announced the validity of both the eligibility of all 14 
candidates and the composition of the Selection Committee. 
Nevertheless, the problems over the attempt did not come to an end as one of the 
applicants, Pramut Sutrabutra, who failed to be shortlisted, complained about the 
Selection Committee to the Central Administrative Court regarding the fairness 
and transparency of the selection procedure. Sutrabutra, charged the Selection 
Committee with making several changes in the selection criteria, which had 
already been announced to the public, in favour of specific candidates. In 
February 2002, the Central Administrative Court decided to nullify all 14 NTC 
128 The 2000 Spectrum law requires every academic institution that teaches telecommunications 
subjects at bachelor level to present one representative; from them, only four representatives will 
be elected among themselves to become members of the Selection Comn-iittee. 
12' The Council of State is a legal advisor of the state. It was originally commissioned to advise 
the executive on matters relating to public administration and law drafting, and to consider and 
adjudicate administrative cases where private individuals became aggrieved in the course of public 
administration. However, the adjudicative function of the Council of State was transferred to the 
Administrative Court upon its establishment in 1999. 
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candidates proposed by the Selection Committee. The court found that the 
process of selecting the candidates was neither transparent nor fair as had been 
accused with justification by the prosecutor. As a consequence, the Chainnan of 
the Selection Committee, Tawil Phuengma, filed an appeal with the Supreme 
Administrative Court in March 2002 to override the ruling. However, the 
Supreme Administrative Court ruled in January 2003, standing by the previous 
decision to nullify the selection process and the 14 NTC nominees. As a result, 
the whole NTC establishment process had to start again from the beginning. The 
summary of the important signposts of the first establishment attempt is shown in 
Figure 7.2. 
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Figure 7.2 
The important events of the first NTC establishment attempt 
The 2000 Spectrum Act was promulgated I 
(March 2000) 
1 
The selection of the Selection Committee was started I 
(June 2000) 
1 
The Selection Committee finished the selection of 14 NTC candidates I 
(October 2000) 
1 
The law requires the country to have a NTC I 
(October 2000) 
1 
The Senate set up a Committee to scrutinise the selection process and the 
qualifications of the 14 candidates 
(March 2001) 
A disqualified applicant complained about the Selection Committee to the 
Central Administrative Court 
(April 2001) 
The Senate reported a resolution rejecting all the NTC candidates I 
(Mav 2001) 
1 
PM brought the matter to the Council of State I 
(June 2001) 
1 
The Council of State announced the rightfulness of both the selection process 
and composition of the Selection Committee 
(December 200 1) 
The government resubmit the same candidates to the Senate with the comments 
of the Council of State 
(January 2002) 
The Central Administrative Court nullified the 14 NTC candidates I 
(Februarv 2002) 
1 
The Selection Committee appealed the verdict of the Central Administrative 
Court to the Supreme Administrative Court 
(March 2002) 
The Supreme Administrative Court ruled standing by the Central 
Administrative Court's verdict 
(January 2003) 
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The second attempt of establishment 
The resignation of the first Selection Committee to take responsibility for the 
failure officially ended the first selection attempt. The new Selection Committee 
had been carefully chosen and began to take on its responsibilities in May 2003. 
Mistakes from the first attempt were rectified and became valuable lessons for the 
second Selection Committee (Vorathitipong, personal interview, January 6,2005). 
To promote transparency, the second Selection Committee conducted the public 
hearing on its new selection criteria to ensure the transparency and fairness in the 
selection process (Mongkolporn & Supsomboon, 2003). After spending 
considerable time setting up the criteria, the NTC selection process began again at 
the end of September 2003. The new set of the 14 NTC candidates were 
announced to the public in December 2003 and handed to the Senate in February 
2004. In March 2004, the Senate appointed an ad-hoc committee, who examined 
the backgrounds and qualifications of all candidates. After close examination, the 
Senate eventually chose and approved the seven members of the NTC in August 
2004. However, the historic date of the Thai regulatory reform was actually on 
October 1,2004, when the seven NTC members received the Royal Assent from 
the King, which rightfully gave Thailand its first telecommunications regulatory 
body. 
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Figure 7.3 
The important events of the second attempt of NTC establishment 
The selection of the second Selection Committee began I 
(May 2003) 
1 
The second Selection Committee commenced work I 
(June 2003) 
1 
The application period began 
(October 2003 - November 2003) 
The second Selection Committee finished the selection of 14 NTC candidates 
(December 2003) 
The shortlist was sent to the President of the Senate I 
(February 2004) 
1 
The Senate appointed a committee to examine the backgrounds and 
qualifications of the 14 NTC candidates 
I 
(March 2004) 
The Senate approved the final seven NTC members 
(August 2004) 
The seven NTC members received the Royal consent from the King I 
(October 2004) 
1 
THE DELAY OF THE ATTEMPT 
In order to set up the first telecommunications regulatory body, Thailand took 
seven years from the first official mandate (which was the 1997 Constitution). 
Almost four whole years were used in the establishment process; it is interesting 
to examine the reasons that so greatly delayed the establishment of the regulator. 
Superficially, one can observe that the delay was attributed to flaws within the 
legislation and tardiness within the judicial system. However, with a closer look 
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and by incorporating the remarks obtained from direct interviews with a number 
of industry gurus, it is found that there are actually two main reasons that 
obstructed the establishment process. 
The structural reasons 
The first reason is the incompleteness of the law that was responsible for the 
establishment of the NTC itself. The 2000 Spectrum Act was actually the first 
legislation on the establishment of an industry's independent regulatory body in 
Thailand. As the country had no experience in such practice, it was not strange 
that the law to establish the NTC was not quite robust and contained some 
ambiguities. 
According to Suebwonglee (personal interview, November 25,2004), these flaws 
led the establishment to serious problems and delayed the whole process. At the 
outset, the 2000 Spectrum Act failed to clarify at least three different aspects; the 
qualifications of the persons who were eligible to be on the Selection Committee, 
the details of the procedures to select the 14 NTC candidates, and the level of 
discretion of the Selection Committee. These ambiguities actually backfired in 
the implementation stage. Firstly, since the law does not provide a clear working 
procedural framework for the Selection Committee, the committee had to set up 
their own selection criteria, which at a later stage they decided to make several 
changes to the criteria that they had already announced to the applicants and the 
public. The Selection Committee claimed that those changes were valid under 
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their discretion; they changed the criteria based on reasons of appropriateness and 
for the good of the entire selection process. Unfortunately, the public and some 
NTC applicants were not impressed by this claim. The inconsistency of the 
selection criteria implied bias which therefore seriously impaired the credibility of 
the candidates as well as the Selection Committee itself This eventually led to 
the lengthy dispute settlement in the Administrative Court. 
Moreover, another loophole also appeared in the composition of the Selection 
Committee. Although the law clearly mentions the composition of the 17 
committee members 130 5 the appointment of the committee members was still 
obscure in practice. As pointed out by Senator Ounsamran (personal interview, 
December 15,2004), apart from the representatives from the five Ministries 
(group 1), the rest of the representatives from other groups were not easily picked. 
The law does not provide enough detailed guidance to do so. For example, the 
most ambiguous group was that made up of representatives from academic 
institutions. The law fails to provide the criteria that make an institution eligible 
to nominate a representative. It is unclear how many credits taught or how many 
telecommunications related subjects an institution has to have in order to be 
counted in. This vagueness appeared to be the case when the Senate raised it as 
130 The Selection Committee is consisted of 17 committee members from four different groups of 
relevant areas, which are (1) representatives of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education, 
Ministry of Information Communications and Technology (former Minister of Transport and 
Communications), Ministry of Commerce, and the National Security Council; (2) representatives 
of pennanent lecturers teaching telecommunications subjects in State or private universities that 
teach telecommunications at bachelor level, with one representative from each university; 
however, only four representatives will be elected among themselves; (3) representatives of 
telecommunications, computer, information technology or electronics professional associations, 
with one representative each, four representatives will be elected among themselves; and (4) 
representatives of private or non-profit organisations whose objective is to give protection to the 
consumer in respect of telecommunications or to use telecommunications for the public interest, 
with one person from each organisation, four representatives will be elected among themselves. 
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one of the reasons to refuse the shortlist from the first attempt. Further explained 
by Ounsamran (personal interview, December 15,2004), the Senate found out that 
the list of eligible academic institutions used by the Selection Committee did not 
cover all the telecommunications-teaching institutions in the country. For 
example, the most reputed university of Thailand - Chulalongkorn University - 
was excluded from the list of eligible institutions, as the name 
"telecommunications" does not appear in the name of any department, whilst in 
fact "telecommunications" is taught as part of the Electrical Engineering 
Department at Chulalongkorn University. In fact, the representatives from groups 
3 and 4 also contained similar ambiguities; there were no clear criteria to 
categorise which professional association or which private or non-profit 
organisation was eligible to nominate representatives. Once again, this came to be 
the case when several Selection Committee members who represented groups 3 
and 4 were criticised as unlawful, as their original associations or organisations 
did not even match the law's intention. For example, one member of the first 
Selection Committee was a representative of the "Sawang Boriboon 
Dharamasatarn", a professional association that collects the dead without family. 
Additionally, the inexperience of the country and the incompleteness of the law 
led the NTC establishment to involve another impediment, which was the 
country's judicial system. Once the issue was under judicial process, this meant it 
was completely out of any individual's hands. The verdicts on the case as well as 
the duration of the proceedings were simply uncontrollable; the process of 
investigation was independent and had its own protocol. That the industry 
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desperately needed a regulator was irrelevant in the judicial process. In this case, 
the court finally ruled to nullify the first establishment attempt and spent almost 
three years on the investigation process. 
The political reasons 
The second reason, although less explicit than the first, is based on comments 
from persons directly involved with the real events. Such comments insisted that 
political reasons were also critical and played an important role in hindering the 
NTC establishment. The establishment of the NTC inevitably became a political 
issue because the existence of the regulator impacts every party involved in the 
telecommunications industry. The SOTEs (who hold the monopoly right and 
were the market dominators) and the concessionaires (who enjoy the protected 
business and limited competition environment) seemed to be the most affected 
parties. Therefore, it is not surprising if these parties were not happy with the 
approaching drastic change of the industry. 
However, the situation was different after the promulgation of the 2001 
Telecommunications Business Act, as it froze the entire situation and put the 
telecommunications industry in a vacuum. It was soon found that the absence of 
the NTC provided even more substantial benefits to some specific parties. As 
long as the NTC did not exist, no new license could be granted; BTO contracts 
were still intact; SOTEs were not able to privatise to become more efficient and 
commercially oriented companies; competition was still limited; tariff was still 
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controlled and not responsive to the market mechanism; and interconnection and 
license fee were still uncharged. In other words, the longer the delay in the 
establishment of the NTC, the more opportunities some parties had to reap 
benefits from the industry's peculiar conditions. 
This led to public suspicion as to whether former players were attempting to 
protect their interests by delaying the establishment of the NTC for as long as 
possible. In fact, this suspicion did not seem far-fetched according to comments 
from a senator (Pinthong) and a government official (Reowilaisuk). Senator 
Pinthong (2002) claims that the procrastination of the NTC establishment would 
harm the country as a whole; only several telecommunications companies gained 
from the further delay. As for Reowilaisuk (2003), he comments that the delay 
within the NTC establishment process seemed like deliberate continuous attempts 
starting from the severe criticisms of the background of candidates at the 
beginning to the challenge to the Selection Committee at the end. Interestingly, 
not only was there a similar comment from senator and government official, even 
the comments from some private operators (Anonymous D and E) also point in 
the same observation, i. e. that there were attempts to further exploit the industry 
nil abnormalities by trying to keep the vacuum for as long as possible. 
Looking at the flip side of the coin, although it was true that there were some 
parties who were expecting benefits from the existence of the regulator (e. g. the 
public and the prospective newcomers), unfortunately, their support perhaps was 
of little significance compared to the support from parties that were still enjoying 
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the old enviromnent. In this respect, the thought of Becker (1983) that the 
competition among interested groups (or policy opponents vs. proponents) 
contributes to the survival of policies that raise social output may not be held. 
The fact that the groups were not equally large and skilful at exerting political 
influence enhances the ability of the more politically powerful and well-organised 
groups (e. g. the special interest groups) to be winners over the less powerful and 
loosely-organised group (e. g. the consumers) in the policy making. The 
regulatory reform in Thailand rather seemed to be consistent with the interest 
theory of Olson (1982), which the outcome of the conflict may not necessarily 
raise the social outcome. Instead, it could distort efficient resource allocation, 
increase deadweight costs, which eventually would lead to productivity 
slowdowns and sluggish growth of the industry in the long run. 
CONCLUSION 
The chapter reveals that the Thai style telecommunications regulatory regime 
under the state and SOTEs' control is no longer suitable for the industry in the 
modem era. The need for changes became more apparent than ever in the late 
1990s when internal demand, together with pressure from the outside, clearly 
indicated that telecommunications regulatory reform was inevitable and had to be 
carried out without further delay. 
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The Thai governments realised the need and therefore responded with the 1997 
TMP and 1997 Constitution, which were basically the first official concrete 
policies reforming the old-fashioned regulatory regime. However, carrying out 
the regulatory reform entailed numerous problems, causing lengthy delays almost 
every step of the way. Keeping in mind the dynamics of the industry under the 
present ever changing environment, the opportunity that Thailand lost from the 
lack of a proper regulatory regime is vast. The delay in the establishment of a 
regulator is also significant in another aspect; it is the starting point to resolve the 
chronic and problematic telecommunications reform. Considering the other two 
reforra issues, it is found that they were unable to be solved, as they needed a 
regulator and regulation as prerequisites. 
Focusing on the obstacles of the establishment of the regulator, the country's 
structural impediments (such as the inexperience of the country, the problems 
embedded in the legislation, and the delay within the judicial system) are 
obviously the first culprit; however, the chapter further discloses that politics is 
another hidden ground. In fact, it was an important factor in the failure of the first 
establishment attempt and in driving the success of the second attempt. It is 
interesting to find that not only did the politics within the reforrn programme 
influenced the establishment of a regulatory body, but, when looking back to the 
two previous chapters, it is also found that the other two reforin. issues were also 
affected by industry politics in the similar fashion. 
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Interestingly, with closer consideration of the obstacles within the three refonn 
issues, it is possible to stress the importance of institutionalism on the reform 
process. It is found that the unwieldy political enviromnent and the conflicting 
interest among interested parties were the dominant institutional problems of the 
reform. The earlier analysis of this research revealed that each political regime 
yields different consequences for the reform process. It is found that political 
settings, either under the bureaucratic or pluralistic regime, were unfavourable in 
dealing with the interest dispersion problem; instead, both settings contained a 
number of loopholes. They allowed the affected parties, who were usually 
politically powerful, to exercise their powers either to protect or to promote 
personal interests at the expense of national benefit. However, the case of 
Thailand became even more interesting after a radical change in the country's 
politics in 2001. The coming of PM Thaksin Shinawatra drove Thailand and its 
telecommunications industry towards a new political regime. The old industry 
institutional arrangements that had been considered unfavourable to the reform 
were largely affected and changed to the new outlook. As shown in Chapter 3, 
the hegemonic regime makes political instability and weak government no longer 
a problem. However, it is still interesting to further study whether the hegemonic 
environment would have any meaningful consequences for the dispersion of 
interest among major interested parties and therefore for the reform programme as 
a whole. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE HEGEMONIC ERA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
ON THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM PROGRAMME 
INTRODUCTION 
The country's commitment to liberalise the telecommunications industry in 2006, 
combined with the considerable damage done to the country resulting from 
sluggish telecommunications development, made the need for industry reform 
more urgent than had previously been envisaged. The reform progress made in 
both the bureaucratic and pluralistic eras seemed to be insufficient to keep up with 
global change or even with the development of comparable countries in the 
region. Earlier in the thesis, it was already disclosed that the political settings 
(both at the national and industry levels) had been changed from being weak and 
unstable to very well-insulated, strong and centralised. As for this chapter, it 
rather focuses on another crucial institutional problem of the reform - the interest 
dispersion. It is interesting to understand the interrelationship between the new 
telecommunications politics and the patterns as well as the degree of involvement 
from various interested parties. It is undeniable that the telecommunications 
reform programme has seen a great deal of progress in this new regime. Upon 
close consideration, it is found that this impressive progress must be attributed to 
two main factors: firstly, the high level of insulation of the government that 
effectively prevented other involved parties from interfering in the reform and 
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secondly, the government's ability to exploit its political strength when dealing 
with the existing reform problems. Indeed, there was a body of evidence 
suggesting that the govenunent was able to utilise its political superiority to 
overwhelm most reform participants who had once been active in the 
telecommunications political arena. This chapter therefore will cover the further 
studies on the consequences of the new political regime for the former powerful 
involved parties, as well as those on the three refonn issues. 
THE IMPACTS OF THE NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLITICS 
ON THE INVOLVED PARTIES 
The new telecommunications politics appeared to directly affect all of the 
involved parties. It is not surprising that such impact had brought the Thai 
telecommunications reforrn programme to another outlook, as, when seen from 
the historical institutionalist framework, the behaviour of these politically 
powerful actors are believed to be influential in identifying causal mechanisms. 
Therefore, the study of the involvement of these parties under the pluralistic era 
and hegemonic era obviously portray different pictures. In the pluralistic era, the 
involved parties included various groups who had an interest in the 
telecommunications industry. The degree of involvement of these parties varied 
from one reform issue to another; unsurprisingly, they put more effort into 
influencing particular issues that directly affected their main interests. Since the 
reform involved a number of parties, the tension that mounted from the dispersion 
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of "self-interest" among these involved parties usually became problematic for the 
whole refonn process. 
However, in the hegemonic setting, it seems that the government is able to deal 
with the dispersion of interest very effectively. In this respect, the fieldwork 
insights obtained from most interviewees was that under the era of PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra, it is difficult to find any party that is able to stand out independently 
and resist the government's demand. Therefore, while the straightforward 
question in this regard would be how it came about that the various involved 
parties simply disappeared from the telecommunications political arena, the 
straightforward answer would be that they have not disappeared; they are merely 
subdued. The high level of stability and insulation from outside interferences of 
the government enables the PM to practice a centralised style of administration, 
and thus far it seems that the PM extensively utilises it. 
Under the hegemonic regime, most of the former major involved parties either 
became weaker or less active as compared to the previous era. There is a great 
deal of empirical evidence which convincingly suggests that their movements 
were subdued by some forms of superior political pressure. Most of the involved 
parties have been captured by some kinds of political apparatus, either directly or 
indirectly, in order to make them defer to the government. This phenomenon, in a 
way, recalls the "capture" of Stigler (197 1) when he proposed the chance of the 
regulator being captured by some strong interested parties (usually the private 
companies). However, what happened in the case of Thailand is that capture is 
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not only limited to the regulation, and it was not the private companies who tried 
to carry out the capture either. Instead, it was the hegemonic government who 
was able to utilise all its capabilities to capture every other involved party, either 
to make it defer to the government or to at least remain quiet. To justify this 
claim, every major involved party in the pluralistic era will be listed and analysed 
as to how and to what extent the new telecommunications politics have affected it. 
Political parties 
As the closest groups to the PM, both the government coalition parties as well as 
the opposition parties are directly affected by the new politics of PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra. It could be said that the situation was very calm compared to the 
previous era. Both the politics within the TRT itself as well as within the 
government coalition were centralised by the premiership, while conflict with 
opposition political parties was minimal due to the government's ability to exploit 
both its political superiority and the loopholes of the 1997 Constitution. 
Focusing on politics within the TRT itself, the fact that PM Thaksin Shinawatra 
collected almost 200 MPs from various political parties when he established the 
TRT in 1999 caused the TRT to consist of many political factions. Among these, 
the biggest and most powerful faction was "Wang Nam Yen", led by Snoh 
Thienthong; this faction had around 45 MPs, mainly comprising Central and 
North-eastern representatives. However, all the factions within TRT were 
dominated at a later time, by the newly established but stronger "in-house" 
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faction, namely "Wang Bua Ban". Yaowapha Wongsawat (the Wang Bua Ban 
leader and sister to the PM) was assigned to be the Northern campaign manager, 
where she managed to collect over 60 MPs by July 2001 131 . She was widely seen 
as a force to counterbalance every influence within the TRT. Apart from the 
strategy to dominate other political factions within the TRT, PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra also utilised his financial strength in "providing a handsome return to 
the party's members in order to keep them in control" (Tailuctai, 2004, p. 256). 
According to Chang Noi (2004), it is estimated that TRT pays an extra THB 
200,000 (approximately GBP 2,700) monthly allowance for each MP on top of the 
normal salary, which means this could amount to as high as a billion baht 
(approximately GBP 14.3 million) in total per annum. Consequently, all these 
factors keep TRT internal politics calm and totally centralised under the party 
leader. 
In the larger picture, the politics among the coalition govermnent parties was also 
peaceful and united. The fact that TRT alone could form its own government 
significantly reduced any dishannony (and also political bargaining) within the 
government coalition. Accordingly, TRT policies usually became the country's 
policies. Suebwonglee (personal interview, November 25,2004) argues that, 
The unity within the government is very strong. The coalition political parties joined the 
government because they believe in PM Thaksin Shinawatra as a person and in TRT's 
policies; thus, there has never been any division of ideas among the government coalition. 
131 Yaowapha's faction not only had MPs from Northern provinces. In fact, she (with the close 
cooperation of Suriya Jungrungruengkit - the TRT Secretary-General) was able to convince a 
number of MPs from Snoh's faction (and other small factions) to move into her Wang Bua Ban 
faction. 
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However, such unity can also be explained from another perspective in that the 
coalition political parties realised their political inferiority and their need to bend 
to the core party if they wanted to keep their places in the cabinet, and avoid being 
expelled from the government. The case of the National Development Party 
(NDP) can serve as an example. The NDP joined the government coalition in 
March 2002; however, it was expelled from the government coalition in 
November 2003 after the attempt to merge the NDP with TRT failed. The NDP 
rejoined the government coalition again in June 2004 and eventually merged with 
the TRT in September 2004. On closer consideration, it appears that the PM 
effectively applied the "building more alliances" strategy to strengthen his 
political power and insulation. In fact, this is not the first time for this kind of 
technique, as it is more or less the same technique he used in gathering a number 
of local giant corporations to establish TRT in the first place. 
As for the opposition political parties (e. g. the Democrat Party), they became 
weak when their popularity dramatically declined after having been the 
government during the economic crash between 1997 and 2001. They were 
severely criticised for their old-fashioned style and over-obedience to Western 
demands. Moreover, the new Constitution further complicates the job of 
opposition political parties. They are unable to officially scrutinise the PM's 
decisions specifically because they do not have enough MPs to submit a motion of 
a no-confidence debate against the PM. They can only initiate a general debate on 
a member of the cabinet, which is not where everything is centralised. In fact, 
with regard to the specific issue of the telecormnunications reform programme, 
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the opposition political parties are even more reluctant to criticise as it was the 
Democrat Party itself that put the telecommunications reform programme high on 
the agenda and led the country towards its international commitment (Uthaisang, 
personal interview, November 18,2004). Moreover, the fact that TRT's network 
alliance is expanding and growing stronger has resulted in the opposition parties 
facing more financial hardship. None of the political patrons wanted to be on the 
opposite side of the goveniment. It was hardly surprising to see the major 
longstanding backers of the Democrat Party like Chaleao, Yoowittaya (owner of 
"Red Bull" energy drink) and Charoen Siriwadhanabhakdi (owner of "Beer 
Chang") shift their support from the Democrat Party to the TRT from 2003 
("Kam Tom Tua, " 2003). 
In a nutshell, with the majority of MPs and strong political insulation, PM 
Thaksin Shinawatra and TRT seemed to dominate the lower house of parliament. 
Internal resistance both within the TRT and the government coalition parties has 
significantly subsided, while on the other hand the battle with the opposition 
parties was also minimal as they became too weak politically and financially. 
Government officials 
The new politics in Thailand also directly impacted government officials. As a 
normal practice, the govemment officials have to follow orders from their 
superiors, above all, the minister who represents the government. Frankly 
speaking, government officials in practice cannot avoid being involved in politics; 
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whether beneficial or hazardous to their status. There were several cases when 
high-level government officials were demoted without a solid explanation from 
the government. The most notorious case occurred in July 2003 when the cabinet 
agreed to transfer two Permanent Secretaries, namely Dr. Wanlop Thai-Nua (the 
Pennanent Secretary of Education) and Prodprasop Surasawadee (the Pennanent 
Secretary of National Resources and the Environment), to inactive positions at the 
Office of the Secretariat of the PM with the justification that they could not 
effectively respond to government policies ("Demotion of Prodprasop, " 2003). 
This case was extraordinary since the transfer or demotion of high-level 
govenunent officials non-nally has to pass through many committees and involve 
a number of lengthy investigative stages. 
A high-level government official (Anonymous F) explains that most govenunent 
officials are put under pressure and indirectly intimidated by the overbearing 
government. Singkanati (2004, p. 280) further describes the situation, 
The institution of the governinent official has already been destroyed. They are losing their 
long-time prestige. The role of the government official is to follow what the politicians 
demand, which, in such circumstances, further strengthens the centralised characteristic of the 
govemment. 
Such influence also applies to goverranent officials responsible for the 
telecommunications refonn programme. The hegemonic character of the 
government made the government officials, both in the MOTC (later the MICT) 
and the MOF, play a less active role in the reform process and merely follow 
direction from the politicians. One good example is that, in the past, there were 
always conflicts between the MOF (which takes care of the country's finance) and 
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the MOTC (which takes care of the SOTEs) over the privatisation and concession 
conversion. Pornsutee (personal interview, November 12,2004) raises the case of 
the concession conversion, 
Each ministry was trying to do its job. The MOTC tried to convert concessions, while the 
MOF, as the owner of SOTEs, tried to maximise the proceeds. But unfortunately, the 
framework proposed by MOTC was not acceptable to the public and the MOF, while the 
framework endorsed by MOF was basically too rigid and impractical. 
However, PM Thaksin Shinawatra's administration hardly encounters a single 
instance of disharmony between government officials. The strong unity within 
the government (also within the cabinet) made the policies of both ministries more 
synchronised, which consequently led the government officials in both ministries 
to adhere strictly to their superior's orders. Reflected by the party who can see the 
situation thoroughly, a SOTE employee accuses government officials in both 
MOF and MOTC of giving up working for the sake of the industry or the country; 
whereas now, a number of them are now working under the shadow of some 
powerful politicians in the government (Anonymous F). 
The Senate 
Although the Senate (or the Upper House) has virtually nothing to do directly 
with the telecommunications reform programme, it does have some indirect (but 
very important) involvement in some critical aspects of the reform. Firstly, as 
designated by law, the Senate has a duty to select the telecommunications 
regulator as well as to scrutinise whether the initial selection process, which was 
conducted by the Selection Committee, had been carried out fairly and lawfully. 
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As discussed in Chapter 7, the rejection of the shortlists in the first NTC 
establishment attempt clearly showed how the Senate had an impact on the reform 
programme. Apart from the relation to the establishment of a telecommunications 
regulatory institution, the Senate also has a crucial role in the legislative process. 
The passage of new laws or the amendment of telecommunications laws need 
approval from the Senate. Due to the Senate's legislative power, it appears that 
the government needs at least two rounds of cooperation from the Senate in the 
near future. Firstly, it is expected that the government is going to propose an 
amendment on the limitation of foreign ownership in the telecommunications 
companies from the current 25% to 49% 132 . Secondly, the government 
is going to 
need the Senate's approval on the already promulgated King's order on the 
telecommunications excise tax that the government has already enforced as a law 
(the details will be discussed later in the chapter). As such, the government 
realised that support from the Senate is necessary to smooth the whole reform 
programme. Consequently, it was believed that the Senate has been drawn into 
involvement with the new politics and there is in fact some convincing evidence 
to back up such a claim. 
Though an accusation against the govermnent made by Singkanati (2004) that its 
misuse of power has destroyed the autonomy and neutrality of all independent 
organisations seems excessive, it may not be a complete exaggeration. The fact 
that the 1997 Constitution requires that the senators be directly elected from the 
people presumes a Senate with real independence and neutrality, which is why the 
132 Obviously, the 25% foreign ownership in the telecommunications business is an important 
limitation on the liberalisation. 
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Constitution assigns to the Senate a number of highly important tasks (e. g. the 
selection of every independent regulatory body, including the NTC). However, 
the independence and neutrality of the senators has become uncertain lately since 
they also tend to be overwhelmed by the government's political power. 
Singkanati (2004) proposes five different reasons that make it difficult for a 
senator to escape entirely from government influence 133 , thus making it difficult 
for them to maintain independence and neutrality. Generally speaking, partisan 
senators are not unusual in Thai society; in fact, the term "government-side 
senator" is commonly seen in the political articles of most local newspapers. 
Focusing on the telecommunications reform programme, the chronic problem of 
the establishment of the regulator looked to be easily accomplished in the era of 
PM Thaksin Shinawatra. In the first attempt at establishment, there were two 
occasions on which the Senate rejected the shortlist proposed by the Selection 
Committee, as it claimed that there were some industry stooges on the list, and 
also that the composition of the Selection Committee seemed to be unlawful 134 . 
Unlike the first attempt, the second attempt, which was restarted in the era of PM 
Thaksin Shinawatra, progressed amazingly well, especially in the final selection 
stage that was related to the Senate (Vongpanitlerd, personal interview, December 
25 2004). The 14 names on the shortlist were handed to the Senate in February 
2004 and, without any reservation, the Senate voted for the final seven NTC 
members in August 2004. Although it is conceivable that it was the experience of 
133 The five reasons are as follows: (1) family linkage, (2) business benefits, (3) personal interest 
protection, (4) furtherance of career in politics, and (5) financial compensation. For more details, 
please see Singkanati (2004, pp. 270 - 3). 134 Although the two rejections happened in the time of PM Thaksin Shinawatra, it also should be 
noted that the selection process of the first shortlist was carried out under PM Chuan Leekpai. 
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the first attempt which made the second attempt proceeded more smoothly, it is 
difficult to explain why the names and the vote scores of all seven NTC members 
were published in several local newspapers (e. g. Dailynews, Telecom Journal, and 
Thairath) before the Senate actually voted. Even more interesting, all the 
predicted names were correct ("X-Ray Jed Kor Tor Chor, " 2004), while the vote 
scores were only slightly different' 35 . One of Bangkok's senators comments that 
he regretted the NTC vote result; at least four out of seven were obviously 
industry proxies and obviously had a conflict of interest. The vote scores 
undeniably weakened the Senate's credibility, as it was almost impossible that the 
majority of senators would have an identical set of seven candidates at the first 
ballot (Pinthong, 2004). McCargo and Pathmanand (2005) further assert that the 
selection process for the NTC showed that the Senate is far from acting as an 
impartial and transparent arbiter dedicated to the public good; in other words, the 
Senate demonstrated that it had been captured by vested telecommunications 
interests. 
SOTE management 
The SOTE management used to be one of the highly influential groups in the 
telecommunications reform programme of Thailand. When the SOTEs possessed 
the monopoly right, the industry was practically under the domination of the 
SOTEs. In the past, they expressed quite clearly that they agreed with neither the 
135 The vote was arranged so that all 186 senators could vote for seven candidates out of the 14. 
The seven candidates, who earned the highest vote scores (which also has to be higher than 100 
votes) would be the NTC members. The result was quite surprising when all seven candidates 
were selected only after one ballot and all of them had very close vote scores. 
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divestiture nor the conversion of BTO concessions. Without cooperation from the 
SOTE management, the reform hardly showed any progress. The BTOs were 
unable to convert since doing so requires agreement from both contracted 
partners. Neither can the privatisation nor the sale of SOTE stock could be done 
as long as the management did not agree. Therefore, as long as the SOTEs still 
dominated the industry and the private operators were still closely tied in with the 
SOTEs, any concept of fair and free competition did not exist. 
Nonetheless, the situation has recently changed. Several new industry features 
successfully reduced the power of the SOTE management in the reform arena. 
Firstly, the promulgation of the 2001 Telecommunications Business Act stripped 
the monopoly power from the SOTEs. Both SOTEs consequently became merely 
ordinary telecommunications service providers which had to compete with other 
private operators without any privileges. This being so, the SOTE management 
realised the need to improve efficiency within their organisation, but they still did 
not agree with the concession conversion. The second reason that effectively 
subdued the SOTE management was done via the BOD. Like the old regime 
under the military era, overwhelming the BOD is always a classic and effective 
method to gain control over the management team 136 . In this regard, 
insight 
obtained from interviews with key employees of both SOTEs confirms that the 
appointment of the BOD of most SOEs in the hegemonic era needs pre-approval 
from the government prior to official appointment by the MOF (Anonymous G 
and H). The last feature that the government used to control the SOTE 
136 For example, concurrent with the coming of TRT as the core government party In January 
2001, the BOD of TOT was also reshuffled. The Chairman was changed from Sornbut Uthaisang 
to Supachai Pisitvanich, who was also an advisor to the Minister of Finance at the same time. 
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management was exploitation of the 2000 Qualifications of Board of Director and 
Officers of State Owned Enterprise Act. This law stipulates that, instead of 
promotion from within the organisation as before, the top-level management of 
the SOTEs now has to be selected by the MOF, which could be anyone; either an 
SOTE employee or any expert from outside, and the final approval would have to 
come from the cabinet. Although the law intends to pull in capable managers 
from the outside, it also contains a significant loophole for political 
intervention 137 . 
On the whole, it does not seem to be an exaggeration to say that there are a 
number of loopholes that the powerful government exploited to gain and maintain 
influence over the SOTE management. These incidences could be the reasons 
why one member of the SOTE management revealed a degree of resentment that 
political intervention in the telecommunications industry is now more intrusive 
than ever (Anonymous A). 
Private operators 
The role of private operators in the telecommunications industry has also changed 
recently. In the previous era, all telecommunications operators had only a certain 
level of political power and were involved in telecommunication politics via the 
137 This was clearly the case, when the selection of CEOs of both TOT Corporation Plc. and CAT 
Telecom Plc. experienced a lot of problems. The selections were made and cancelled many times 
In fact, like the selection of the NTC members, there were several prosecutions filed by the failed 
applicants at the Administrative Court over the unfairness of the selection process. According to 
larnburnrung (personal interview, December 21,2004), the problems within the selection process 
hurt SOTE; in the case of CAT Telecom Plc., the damage of not having a CEO during the last two 
years is incalculable. 
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political parties (or the proxies). According to McCargo and Pathmanand (2005), 
before the 1997 crisis, all major telecommunications operators were very similar 
in terms of financial and political strength. They had to compete with each other 
for concessions and benefits. However, the crisis created a new structure among 
the private operators where SHIN Corp became a leader whose economic and 
political status was superior to that of other players 138 
The involvement of private operators in telecommunications politics changed 
dramatically in the era of PM Thaksin Shinawatra. It was the first time that a 
number of telecommunications operators entered politics directly and openly. 
Several telecommunications tycoons (e. g. Adisai Podaramic and Pracha 
Maleenond) decided to join the TRT from the beginning, and subsequently 
became members of the Thaksin cabinet. Henceforth, these operators seemed to 
have no further need for proxies in the executive administration branch (even 
though they probably still need front men or intermediaries in some other areas 
such as the regulatory branch). 
However, there seemed to be divided opinions on the country's politics among the 
private telecommunications operators. Some (e. g. SHIN, Jasmine, and BEC 
World) believed in the new system as one where they should come out from the 
shadows and directly access the political system, while others (e. g. UCOM and 
SAMART) still believed in the old system and avoided direct involvement. 
Unfortunately, the old-fashioned thinking appeared to be misguided. By having 
138 Unlike most private operators, SHIN Corp wisely hedged all of its foreign debts. Therefore, it 
was least affected from the devaluation of Thai Baht in 1997. 
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direct political support, the "new-thinking" operators became more politically 
powerful than before. On the other hand, those who adhered to the "old-thinking" 
seemed to be increasingly excluded from the telecommunications political arena, 
as their "proxies" (the politicians) were also struggling with loss of power in 
national politics. Tangkitvanich (personal interview, December 28,2004) 
explains that the rise of the political power of the private sector in 
telecommunications politics did not confer any advantage on the private 
companies across the board; only a few companies gained, while the rest were on 
a par or even worse-off. Under the new telecommunications politics, the 
operators with no powerful alliance (e. g. UCOM and SAMART) had barely any 
involvement in the political arena. A high-level management of a 
telecommunications operator (Anonymous E) reveals that, for some operators, 
there was no need to talk about the search for more benefits. They hardly made 
any move. What they did do was to follow more powerful operators and hope any 
benefit might be shared with them. 
Labour unions 
History clearly shows the considerable power and high level of involvement of the 
labour unions in the telecommunications reform programme of Thailand 
(Petrazzini, 1995). Since the beginning, the labour unions of both TOT and CAT 
were very strong and effectively did their job in protecting the interests of SOTE 
employees. They were strongest in status when they were backed by the military 
during the bureaucratic era (Niyomsilpa, 2000). Reform attempts proposed in that 
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era usually provoked the threat of a national strike and most of the time the threats 
appeared to be effective since the government always retreated (please find more 
details in Chapter 3). Later, when the power of the military significantly declined 
in the pluralistic era, the labour unions became correspondingly weaker. 
However, they were still able to retain close links by finding new alliances such as 
NGOs, academics, or labour unions from other SOEs. 
The attitude to the reform of SOTE's labour unions has recently altered. They 
cooperate well with both MOTC and MOR Privatisation is welcomed 139 though 
the attitude towards concession conversion is still split. Upon closer inspection, 
there seem to be several factors that brought about the change in their attitudes. 
First of all, as suggested by Chevapruek (personal interview, December 8,2004), 
the continuous public relations on the necessity of the reforin that had been 
practised for years started to pay off. In fact, such an attempt was started and 
extensively carried on since PM Chuan Leekpai's government; however, the 
return on it only began to be apparent in PM Thaksin Shinawatra's time. 
Secondly, employees were satisfied with the very generous privatisation 
compensation package offered by the government. According to the presidents of 
SOTE labour union (Chareonwan, personal interview, December 14,2004 and 
lambumrung, personal interviews, December 21,2004), they admit that the 
compensation package that consisted of both financial reimbursement (also 
"9 According to MOF's government official (Juruphan, personal interview, December 14,2004), 
there is now a situation where the labour union now keeps asking the MOF when their 
organisations will be traded on the stock market. 
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known as the 6,21,2 package 140 ) and guaranteed job securityl4l was a key 
inducement that attracted most employees. The last factor was that the employees 
started to realise the necessity of having an efficient organisation (Pornsutee, 
personal interview, November 12,2004). Without monopoly rights as before, it 
seems likely that SOTEs may face problems from their embedded inefficiencies, 
which could well make them collapse in the near future; at any rate, the same old- 
fashioned operations are now known to be unlikely to help them to survive and 
flourish in the new industry environment. 
All in all, considering the previous record of the labour unions in the 
telecommunications reform programme, it can be said that they have more 
recently become surprisingly easy to deal with. Although they seem neutral on 
the concession conversion, they became one of the supporters of the privatisation. 
This could be why a renowned academic (Anonymous B) states that the SOE 
labour unions have all been destroyed; they became more concerned with their 
personal interest rather than the benefit of the organisation or society as a whole. 
The media 
The media used to exert a great deal of influence on the telecommunications 
reform programme. Unlike some other involved parties (e. g. the labour unions or 
the NGOs), the media did not actually come out to either support or oppose the 
140 The 6,2,2 package comprises of (1) ftee cash equivalent to 6 months' salary, (2) free SOTE 
stock (once it is traded in the stock market) equivalent to 2 months' salary, and (3) special price of 
SOTE stock (at the Initial Public Offering (IPO) price) equivalent to 2 months' salary. 
14 1 The government guaranteed that there would not be any lay-offs during the first three years 
after privatisation. 
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refonn directly. Rather, its role was to critically analyse the situation of the 
govenunent reform policies for their audiences. However, with their ability to 
reach the majority of the people, the media usually made a considerable impact. It 
had the ability to call for allies or public discussion, with the intention of 
promoting or opposing a particular issue. Binding the media to the government 
side thus seemed a sound strategy. Not only could it reduce the chances of 
resistance created by the media, but it could also be used as a tool to build 
govemment allies. 
According to McCargo (2000), PM Thaksin Shinawatra applied both "carrot" and 
"stick" approaches to capture the media. It is found that the carrot approach was 
used to curry favour with the media in his earlier political career. He built up 
good relations with most reporters' 42 . However, when he later became PM and 
the media started to criticise him more strongly, he also applied a range of sticks 
to discourage critical reporting and dissent. In this regard, there is a variety of 
evidence in support of such a claim. 
With the state power in hand, the govenunent of PM Thaksin Shinawatra easily 
captured most of the public media. The free television and the radio stations in 
the country are owned by either the government agencies (e. g. the Government 
Public Relations Department) or the military. The fact that the Chief Commander 
of the army, General Chaisit Shinawatra, is the PM's cousin and that two out of 
six television stations are run by the PM's intimates enabled the government to 
142 McCargo and Pathmanand (2005) provide examples as follows: Thaksin Shinawatra used to 
give out free mobile phones to reporters covering his work. He also used to give out free gold 
necklaces hidden in pieces of cake at a business reporters' party. 
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control the broadcasting industry 143 . As for the press, they are also not too 
difficult to capture as long as the government is able to control the advertising 
budget of every government agency, and as long as TRT key figures still include 
businessmen whose companies pay a huge amount of money to the press for 
advertising every year 144 . The statement issued by the Thai Journalists' 
Association (TJA) strengthens the claim, 
It is known to the public that the Thai government and members of the cabinet are interfering 
with the media by using economic bargaining through government agencies' advertising 
budget and stock acquisition, therefore, there is growing concern about the editorial 
independence being threatened by the political forces (the TJA, 7 September 2005, 
www. jig.. or. th 
Phipitkul (2004) further mentions that interference from the government began as 
early as its arrival in office in 2001 145; it also appeared that the degree of 
intervention has been increasing from one year to another. One of the obvious 
examples of intervention was the removal of all the television programmes 
produced by "The Nation " from the ITV timetable in 2001. This action was 
widely criticised, as The Nation usually produced programmes that criticised the 
govenunent on various issues. Since then, audiences who want to watch The 
Nation's programmes had to set up separate antenna specifically to receive the 
channel. In fact, not only were the Nation TV programmes removed from non-nal 
143 There are six free television channels in Thailand. Channel 3 is run by BEC World Plc. 
(whereby the family of "Pracha Maleenond" - the Deputy Minister of Interior - is the major 
shareholder); channel 5 and 7 is owned by the Army; channel 9 is owned by a SOE (Mass 
Communication Authority of Thailand); channel II is owned by the Government Public Relations 
Department; and ITV is owned by SHIN Corporation (whereby the family of PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra holds the majority of the stocks). 
144 The income from advertising is critical for most press companies. On average, it accounts for 
approximately 70% of total income (Trirat & Chaiwat, 2003). 
145 In fact, the media intervention (via the "stick" approach) started as early as 2000 when the 
SHIN Corp took over the ITV and shortly after that, when more than ten ITV outspoken reporters 
who corresponded with Shinawatra's acquisition of power were fired (McCargo & Pathmanand, 
2005). 
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broadcasting, "The Nation Newspaper" was also heavily impacted by a significant 
decline in advertising income. All this finally led "The Nation Group" to an 
operating loss. In 2002, the Nation Group suffered total losses of about GBP 3.5 
million, compared to a profit of GBP 1.5 million in the previous year. Because of 
this heavy loss, in 2003, it appeared that a relative of the TRT Secretary-General 
(Suriya Jungrungruengkit) took further action to capture this media by purchasing 
around 20% of shares - more than twice as large a holding as the next two leading 
shareholders - of the Nation Group (McCargo & Pathmanad, 2005). 
The fact that PM Thaksin Shinawatra received a letter from the Intemational 
Federation of Journalists (IFJ) in March 2004 asking for a cessation of media 
intervention could also support the allegations of blatant attempts to capture the 
media by the govemment. With both carrot and stick approaches, it seems that 
most media companies have already been "tamed and co-opted" by the 
govenunent (Rojanaphruk, 2003). Phipitkul (2004) surnmarises the situation as 
one where the media companies are now changing their role from being a 
consumer watchdog to a capital and politics poodle. 
Academics and NGOs 
The independence and the neutrality of academics and NGOs under the new 
politics are also questionable. In the past, these parties used to have a high level 
of involvement in various political issues, including telecommunications reform. 
The fact that these parties usually ally themselves with labour unions and the 
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public enhanced the voice of academics and the NGOs. Pronouncements from 
famous academics or NGOs usually drew a lot of attention from society. 
Therefore, previous governments, especially the unstable ones, were quite 
considerate and usually paid attention to these groups. 
As one of the parties who used to be influential in the political arena, the roles of 
both academics and NGOs have been challenged by the power of the new politics. 
Focusing on the telecommunications reform programme, these parties have a 
relatively low profile compared to what it used to be in the previous era 146 
Although the Minister of ICT (Suebwonglee, personal interview, November 25, 
2004) explains that this was because these parties started to understand the 
government's determination and appreciate the benefits of the government reform 
policies, an argument obtained directly from the academics themselves provides a 
different explanation. Vongpanitlerd (personal interview, December 2,2004), 
Tangkitvanich (personal interview, December 28,2004), and Teeralarp (personal 
interview, December 20,2004) all unanimously claim that both academics and 
NGOs have fewer opportunities to express their opinions and there are fewer 
channels for them to do so, and those who dared to express them risked 
46excommunication"147 (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005, p. 108). Moreover, not 
only were opinions from academics and NGOs hardly taken into consideration, 
146 The last time these parties actively moved was in 2001 when the government tried to use the 
CUIPI's framework to convert concessions, which obviously favours the private operators with the 
cost of the SOTEs and the country. The TDRI, who established the previous conversion 
framework, was the first who raised the issue to the public, and was able to call for a lot of public 
attention (see details in Chapter 5). In this respect, Vorathitipong (personal interview, January 6, 
2005) reveals that, "There may not have been any resistance at all, if the TDRI did not start 
tackling the issue. The rest of the academics or NGOs were either too weak or already on the 
same side as the government. " 
147 A prime example was Ammar Siamwallar, one of Thailand's leading economists, who then 
took a vow of public silence on the subject of PM Thaksin Shinawatra. 
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but there were also many times when PM Thaksin Shinawatra fiercely reacted 
against those opinions. One good example is cited in Phongpaichit and Baker 
(2004, p. 156)5 
When Thirayuth drew attention to the government's authoritarianism, Thaksin snapped back 
that "these people feel proud to be accorded quasi-hero status when in fact they have done 
nothing useful to the society. " When Thirayuth criticised him again, Thaksin wondered, "I 
don't understand why he still lives on a public salary. " 
Therefore, it is not surprising that there are only a few academics who consistently 
criticise the government and PM Thaksin Shinawatra, and even less surprising 
that, their voices might not even be heard at all. 
Consumers 
It appears that the term "public" understood as meaning the Thai citizen may not 
be appropriately raised as one of the interest groups in telecommunications 
politics; the majority of Thai people (especially those who live in rural areas) have 
little opportunity to be part of the action in telecommunications politics. 
Therefore, in the context of telecommunications reform, the "consumer" seems to 
be more appropriately the group of people who are directly involved with 
telecommunications (and therefore telecommunications reform) 
148 
. 
Obviously, consumers are relatively the largest group involved in 
telecommunications industry reform. Although they are large in size, they 
probably have the least degree of involvement with the reform programme. 
148 Interestingly, it is difficult to find concrete evidence suggesting direct involvement from the 
business consumers who played a key role in the cases of the UK or the US. 
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According to Uthaisang (personal interview, November 18,2004), this could be 
derived from the fact that they are accustomed to limited services and the high 
prices set from the beginning. As telecommunications had been monopolised and 
dominated by the SOTEs for a long time, the industry's inefficiencies were 
already internalised and perceived as the industry standard by most. The fact that 
the shortage of telecommunications services in the late 1980s had been greatly 
alleviated by the introduction of BTO concessions already made the people feel 
satisfied with such an improvement. As for a more recent example, the intense 
selling campaigns among several major operators deceived people about the 
existing level of competition within the industry, while in reality it was only 
competition in marketing techniques, not in the quality of service or in the price 
(Teeralarp, personal interview, December 20,2004). As such, it is unlikely that 
the consumer in general would come out and call for their rights in the 
telecommunications political arena (Uthaisang, personal interview, November 18, 
2004). 
At the same time, the consumer seems to be the group that remains most 
impervious to political influences. The considerable size and the scattered 
interests of individuals make them difficult to be captured. Although 
Thaksinomics policies seem to work well in creating popularity among many, it 
does not mean that such policies can exclude telecommunications consumers from 
telecommunications politics. In fact, the middle and high-levels consumers have 
a tendency to participate in telecommunications politics, as they tend to be 
knowledgeable and know their rights. Therefore, the fact that the govenunent 
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gained popularity from the majority of people does not necessarily mean that the 
telecommunications consumers would be totally captured. The case of the public 
resistance to the concession conversion in 2001 was a good example. After the 
TDRI stirred up the issue by raising the issue of the country's potential damage if 
the conversion were to follow the CUIPI's framework,, it was the first and only 
time, which finally forced the government to retreat. Therefore, it seems that the 
telecommunications consumers are the only party that the powerful government 
cannot directly control. The best the govemment can do is to build up popularity 
and expect obedience from them. With the exception of the concession 
conversion under the CUIPI framework, the government seems to be doing a good 
ob up to date. 
Figure 8.1 
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In summary, the new telecommunications politics have changed the degree of 
involvement among involved parties compared to the previous era. The 
predominant role of PM Thaksin Shinawatra's government overwhelms most 
involved parties. It is arguable that, in politics, popularity and political power 
could easily dissipate. However, the impacts on the telecommunications industry 
as well as on the reform programme already made by the PM Thaksin Shinawatra 
and his government are not easy to overlook. In this particular era, most involved 
parties become less active in the telecommunications political space (please see 
Figure 8.1); in fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the govermnent capitalises on 
its superior power to capture most involved parties and subdue them from 
involvement in reform politics. To do this, the government applied different 
strategies such as the use of administrative authority, financial inducement, 
compulsory inducement, and so forth. Apart from these direct capture actions, 
indirect capture is also used as another effective tool. The political networks that 
the government had prepared throughout society in almost every field also 
perfonn theirjobs (see Appendix B). In brief, the power of the state in the hands 
of government, combined with the power of its networks and proxies, effectively 
pose a threat to anybody who is set on disobeying the govenunent. The roles of 
parties who are involved in the telecommunications reform programme have been 
kept to a minimum in this era, as they are either suppressed by state authority or 
by indirect threat. 
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CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLITICS 
FOR THE REFORM ISSUES 
Until 2001, the three telecommunications reform issues had made only modest 
progress. However, the fact that the new telecommunications politics altered the 
previous industry institutionalism made the whole situation change. The 
decreasing strength of the involved parties who used to actively participate in the 
reform apparently enhanced the progress of each reform issue. Although it is too 
soon to see the end results of the overall refonn. programme when the refonn has 
not yet been completed, it is clear thus far that the political settings under the era 
of PM Thaksin Shinawatra make reform proceed faster and more smoothly. 
The consequences for the concession conversion 
The new telecommunications politics affected the conversion of the BTOs since it 
had not actually arrived. The conversion attempt during the Chuan Leekpai 11 
government failed partly because the private operators expected the victory of PM 
Thaksin Shinawatra; they simply put off negotiations and hoped for a more 
favourable conversion from Thaksin Shinawatra's government (Pornsutee, 
personal interview, November 12,2004). 
Those expectations were realised when PM Chuan Leekpai's concession 
conversion committee quit without a single case of successful conversion. The 
new conversion committee, chaired by Deputy PM - Pongpol Adireksarn - from 
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the TRT, was set up to be responsible for the conversion 149 . The new advisory 
team of the new conversion committee, the CUIPI, was also specifically hired by 
a special procurement method 150 . The new round of conversion negotiation was 
carried out under the CUIPI's framework, which was very controversial as regards 
favouritism for the private sector. The conversion under the CUIPI framework 
did not progress rapidly, as there was strong resistance led by the TDRI. The 
resistance worked well to a surprising degree since it was the first time that a 
number of ordinary people (who were enthusiasts in telecommunications) joined 
the telecommunications political arena to protect their interests' 51 . Asa result, the 
government did not persist: it abandoned the conversion attempt by passing the 
152 buck to the regulator . The actions taken were very sensible since PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra. knew that he and his cabinet were quite vulnerable on the issue, 
especially when a number of people had been involved. 
Although the government did not succeed in converting the BTOs in the way it 
proposed, it finally came up with an innovative alternative option in dealing with 
the inappropriateness of the revenue-sharing scheme. The King's Order on the 
excise tax on telecommunications services was introduced in January 2003. 
14' The concession conversion conunittee during the time of PM Chuan Leekpai was obviously 
free from conflicts of interest. The committee members were chosen from among qualified 
persons in various fields who had no background in telecommunications. In contrast, PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra's conversion committee is consisted of many politicians as well as a lot of high-level 
government officials from MOTC and MOF. 
"0 The special procurement method was quite unusual as the selection of the consultant was 
normally open. 
151 The TDRI, together with many industry analysts (e. g. Richard Moe from SG Securities) 
forecasted that the SOTEs would lose considerably if they followed the CUIPI conversion 
framework. 
15' By law, although the regulator cannot and does not have a duty to convert the existing 
concessions, it has a duty to create a level playing field among players within the industry. 
Therefore, the new industry outlook as well as the regulatory regime stipulated by the regulator 
should be convincing enough to awaken both BTO partners to resume the conversion negotiation 
with a more serious approach. 
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According to the legislation, every service provider on the designated services 
(which are the fixed line and mobile phone services at the introductory stage) is 
expected to pay a certain percent of its revenue (which are 2% for the fixed line 
service and 10% for the mobile phone service during the trial period) as excise 
tax. The tax will be paid directly to the state coffers via the Excise Department. 
Unlike the old system where the whole amount of revenue-sharing was paid to the 
SOTEs, the amount of excise tax to be paid will be directly deducted from the 
amount of revenue-sharing that the concessionaires are supposed to pay to the 
SOTEs. The government put forward two main reasons to justify the use of 
excise tax on telecommunications services. Firstly, it is a measure to improve the 
level playing field among operators, as the private operators do not have to pay 
the whole amount of revenue-sharing to the privatised SOTEs (or in other words, 
their own competitors). Secondly, it is a measure to protect the state's interest. 
The government claimed that, once the SOTEs have been publicly traded on the 
stock market, the real beneficiaries from the revenue-sharing would be investors, 
not the state or the public in general (Suebwonglee, personal interview, November 
25ý 2004). Investors will enjoy the extra revenue that the SOTEs gained since the 
monopoly era, which, in fact, the amount of revenue-sharing that is beyond the 
real cost of SOTEs of having concessionaires 153 should be sent directly to the state 
coffers to use for public purposes. Although it is true that the trial rates of 2% (for 
the fixed line service) and 10% (for the mobile phone service) are only small in 
proportion compared to the percentage of the revenue-sharing, the legislation 
153 SOTEs also bear some costs of having concessions (e. g. the billing system or the call centre). 
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allows the government to use its discretion to increase such rates up to a ceiling of 
50% at a later time. 
Unfortunately, despite a number of benefits, the excise tax policy was not proven 
to be a win-win solution for all stakeholders. The legislation states that the 
amount of the tax paid can be directly deducted from the amount of the revenue- 
sharing. That means the use of the excise tax does not make any difference in 
financial terms for the concessionaires, as they will have the same amount of 
expense. The policy on the other hand directly hurt the SOTEs; not only did they 
have to pay taxes like other operators, but they also received less revenue-sharing 
from their concessionaires. Unsurprisingly, TDRI and some other academics 
opposed this idea, but without support from the public (as was the case in the time 
of CUIPI's concession conversion) or even the SOTEs themselves, the opposition 
from the academic perspective was unable to win over the government at this time 
(Vongpanitlerd, personal interview, December 2,2004). Since then, there has 
been no additional attempt; in fact, no one else has even mentioned the conversion 
of BTOs. 
In summary, the concession conversion might well be an issue where the 
government could not intervene much since it was very sensitive for the 
government. Although the new politics were unable to make the conversion 
happen, they were capable of enhancing the introduction of the controversial 
alternative policy on the telecommunications excise tax. Obviously, if it was not 
for PM Thaksin Shinawatra's government, such an alternative was unlikely to 
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occur. The introduction of an excise tax needed strong political backing; 
experiences in the past clearly indicated that an amendment or promulgation of 
the law is extremely difficult, especially for a weak or coalition government' 54 . 
Besides, while the alternative policy virtually has no impact on private 
incumbents, it obviously created more burdens for the SOTEs and newcomers; 
however, once again, it seems to be the government's power that makes the 
disadvantaged parties acquiesce. 
The consequences for the privatisation 
Apart from the technical reason of the unresolved concessions, the resistance from 
SOTE management, labour unions, academics, and NGOs was simply another 
main reason that previously had put off the privatisation of Thai SOTEs. On each 
occasion that the government mentioned the topic of privatisation, it was usually 
attacked by these parties for selling off national assets, jeopardising national 
security, or being too obsequious to the Western trend. Therefore, there was not 
much progress in the privatisation of the SOTEs in the past. 
However, the fact that the political activity from these involved parties has 
decreased since 2001 has provided a good chance to push the privatisation 
forward. The clear policy on privatisation from the government was transmitted 
154 In fact, the introduction of the telecommunications excise tax through the King's Order even 
more strongly stressed the confidence of the government. Generally, the use of King's Order is a 
very rare case, as the government has to resign if either the Lower House or the Upper House does 
not agree with the legislation that was already promulgated. Therefore, the government must be 
very confident with its proposal, and that it would not be disagreed by either the Lower or Upper 
House. 
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directly to the ministers and government officials, respectively. Unlike before, the 
clear policy with serious follow-up forced the MOF and MOTC (later MICT) to 
work together with minimal disagreement. To cite an example, the long 
unresolved privatisation compensation package for SOTE employees was settled 
when the MOF easily went along with the MOTC's 6,2,2 proposal. Without 
strong support from the politicians, the MOF would not have accepted such a 
package. It was much better than the stipulations that the MOF already 
announced; it was also much better than what had been given to other SOEs that 
were already privatised (e. g. the Petroleum Authority of Thailand or Internet 
Thailand). As affirmed by Juruphan (personal interview, December 14,2004), the 
6,2,2 package is the best ever privatisation compensation package; after seeing it 
used with TOT and CAT, all other SOEs that are about to privatise have called for 
a similar reimbursement. Besides, the government also provided another 
convincing encouragement to SOTE employees by assuring a no lay-off policy 
during the first three years after the privatisation. The entire package appealed to 
the strongest party such as the labour unions; it hit the right point as the 
employees were most concerned about their job security and remuneration 
rewards (Chareonwan, personal interview, December 14,2004 and Naksrinuan, 
personal interview, December 7,2004). Since then, the resistance from the labour 
unions has dramatically subsided. 
At the same time, the objections from the academics and NGOs over privatisation, 
which used to be found in all kinds of media, started to become minimal. The 
Minister of ICT (Suebwonglee, personal interview, November 25,2004) explains 
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that the resistance over privatisation has lessened from the previous era because 
the resistant parties started to realise the necessity of privatisation and take 
account of the good intentions of the govenunent. It is however hard to 
completely believe such a claim, especially considering the evidence surrounding 
the capture issue discussed previously. In any case, with minimal levels of 
resistance, both SOTEs were eventually corporatised as public companies under 
PM Thaksin Shinawatra. However, both the TOT Corporation Plc. and the CAT 
Telecom Plc. have been unable to sell their stocks on the stock market since there 
was still substantial uncertainty over the concessions. It appeared that the excise 
tax on telecommunications services was not the final answer for the investor; it 
looked rather like a stop-gap policy (Naksrinuan, personal interview, December 7, 
2004). Most investors want a more concrete commitment from the government 
and from the regulator in order to decide whether to invest in the SOTE stocks. 
All in all, in the context of privatisation under the new telecommunications 
politics, it can be said that progress is visible. The govemment has pushed 
forward the issue as far as it could. The SOTEs are already corporatised, the 
labour unions are in agreement with the privatisation, and most importantly the 
other involved parties have already acquiesced. 
The consequences for the establishment of a regulator 
Resulting from the 2000 Spectrum Act, the NTC was supposed to be in place 
within 120 days after the promulgation. However, problems seemed to emerge at 
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each step of the establishment process. Not only did problems arise in relation to 
the various participants in the establishment process, they also arose from flaws in 
the law itSelý 55. Yoonaidharma (personal interview, December 16,2004) 
explains that the inexperience of the country as regards establishing an 
independent industry regulator caused a number of loopholes in the establishment 
process, which allowed some parties who still preferred the old monopoly 
environment and wanted to prolong the new regime to exploit it, which effectively 
caused serious delays. 
While the first establishment attempt began under PM Chuan Leekpai II and 
failed in Thaksin Shinawatra's premiership, the second attempt was initiated and 
accomplished by Thaksin Shinawatra. The establishment of the NTC in October 
2004 can be accounted the magnum opus of the government in 
telecommunications. The government's strong insulation from other involved 
parties proved its worth; the establishment procedures went smoothly from the 
beginning to the end without a hitch. According to Tangkitvanich (personal 
interview, December 28,2004), "it was amazingly easy. It was totally opposite to 
the previous attempt. " In fact, the insight obtained from the fieldwork reveals that 
the ease of the last establishment attempt raised a great deal of suspicion among 
industry insiders in every related field. There was suspicion surrounding the 
selection process, both in the Selection Committee and the Senate, in terms of 
155 Tangkitvanich (personal interview, December 28,2004) explains, "The gist of Thailand's new 
Constitution to involve more participants in any political activities was also reflected in the 
drafting of the 2000 Spectrum Act. There were many participants involved in the draffing process, 
which made this law less robust and lacking in sufficient academic back up, such as Section 51 of 
the 2000 Spectrum Act that allows the NTC to have the power to set policies which may later 
cause conflicts between the NTC and the government. In fact, there were many other problems 
that already emerged and caused delay in the establishment of the regulator. " 
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whether there was intervention by a hidden superior power. Most importantly, 
there was serious doubt about whether the regulator would be able to work 
neutrally with full independence under the powerful government. 
Unsurprisingly, the government insisted that the selection process was carried out 
lawfully with full transparency. The smoothness of the procedure was attributed 
to the experience gained from the previous failure (Suebwonglee, personal 
interview,, November 25,2004). The Senate, which has a high level of 
involvement in this issue, also assured its honesty. According to Senator 
Ounsamran (personal interview, December 15,2004), the fact that the 
liberalisation deadline was closely approaching allowed less room for errors; it 
forced the Senate to carry out the selection by the book, even though rushed at the 
time. In addition, he explains that he has no idea why the names of the seven 
NTC finalists as well as their vote scores had been published in the newspapers 
before the judgement day; it was possibly only a mere coincidence. 
Even though there were strong suspicions, there is no clear evidence to support 
any particular allegation. However, the insight gained from the NTC 
establishment experience is that the powerful and well-insulated government 
mattered a great deal in the establishment process. This was unlike the first 
attempt where McCargo and Pathmanand (2005, p. 46) explain that, "numerous 
people closely affiliated with telecoms companies or associated interests sought 
election to the NTC, thereby politicising the selection process. The initial 
selection process begun under the Chuan government in 1999 was badly flawed". 
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The minimal involvement from outside parties in the second attempt finally made 
the establishment successful after four years in the making. 
In summary, telecommunications politics under PM Thaksin Shinawatra clearly 
differed from those of previous times. The most obvious difference is the 
decrease in strength and the level of involvement of interested parties. The 
benefits of less strong involvement were reflected in the progress of each refonn 
issue. It has reached the limit where the government cannot push it any further. 
The NTC is already established. The SOTEs are already corporatised and ready 
for full privatisation. The BTO, though it has not yet been converted, has put up 
with the alternative policy of the excise tax. Therefore, by setting aside the 
unproven suspicions on the NTC's neutrality, its recent presence is expected to 
move the Thai telecommunications reform programme to the next level. The 
unfinished concession conversion and privatisation seem to have better chances of 
being solved since the prolonged bottleneck (the absence of regulator and 
regulatory regime) has now been loosened (please see Table 8.1). In short, it 
would not be an exaggeration to say that, in the case of Thailand, the 
telecommunications politics under the hegemonic era has permitted the more 
enhancing arrangement than either the bureaucratic or pluralistic eras had. It is 
undeniable that all the problems within the industry could not have been 
completely solved by the coming of PM Thaksin Shinawatra. However, it is quite 
clear thus far that the country's new political setting is capable of suppressing 
most of the political dissent that used to be the major root of all the reform issues, 
278 
which seems to be the reason that there has been significant progress made in the 
telecommunications reform programme only in this particular era. 
Table 8.1 
The summarv of the imnortant reform actions and their Droblems during the last two governmento 
Chuan 11 government Thaksin I government 
(Nov 1997 Feb 2001) (Feb 2001 - Jan 2005) 
Action(s) Problem(s) Action(s) Problem(s) 
Privatisation - The promulgation - Resistance frorn - The - No clear picture on 
of the 1999 SOTEs management corporatisation the concession 
Corporatisation Act and labour unions of TOT and CAT conversion 
- Resistance from 
NGOs and 
academicians 
Concession - The first conversion - Resistance from - The second - Resistance from 
Conversion attempt under the private operators conversion TDRI and the public 
TDRI framework - Uncertainties from attempt under - Uncertainties from 
not having a the CUM not having a 
regulator framework regulator 
- The introduction 
of excise tax on 
telecommunicati 
ons services 
Establishment The first - The Senate had - The nullification - n/a 
of the regulator establishment reached its full-term of the first 
attempt before the final shortlist 
selection - The start of the 
second selection 
attempt 
- The NTC has 
been established 
THE NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLITICS AND THE REFORM 
PROGRAMME 
Reflected from the new politics at the national level, the new telecommunications 
politics under the PM Thaksin Shinawatra era has some features that differentiate 
it from the previous eras. The exploitation of popularity, the utilisation of 
financial strength, the coalition of political and economic networks, the use of 
authority power are all aimed at creating political power. Although it seems that 
the political power of the govemment (or of the PM) came from arguable sources, 
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the government's hegemonic character, paradoxically, emancipated the 
telecommunications reform programme of Thailand from the long-term 
unresolved problems. 
Looking at the reform progress made during PM Thaksin Shinawatra's 
administration, such achievements were simply unable to be brought to fruition 
under the previous political environments. For example, weak goverriments were 
unlikely to order the MOF to accept the labour unions' 6,2,2 compensation 
package; weak governments were unlikely to withstand the political friction from 
the anti-reform coalition (e. g. academics, NGOs, and most importantly opposition 
political parties); and weak governments were unlikely to unify even their own 
coalition political parties. Although the government's hegemonic style of 
administration could be criticised as to whether it affects the country's democratic 
character, one could also argue that the TRT and PM Thaksin Shinawatra came to 
power lawfully under the democratic system. The majority of Thai people trusted 
156 
and chose them as the head of the executive branch 
However, responding to the question on whether the change in political 
environment in the time of PM Thaksin Shinawatra means a fundamental change 
in Thai politics, the reasonable answer is likely to be "no". Focusing specifically 
on telecommunications politics, the decrease of involvement from other actors in 
the reform arena does not necessarily mean that they are already eliminated. The 
examples raised before reveal that they are only suppressed to some extent by 
156 The results on the General Elections on the Party's list basis could be good evidence. TRT was 
voted 40.6% in 2001, while its popularity increased to 60.7% in 2005 (source: the ECT). 
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superior political powers. However, these political superiorities are unlikely to be 
transferred to the next PM or next government (even though he/she will probably 
come from the TRT). It is worthwhile to note that the power and the insulation of 
the govemment exist because of PM Thaksin Shinawatra. McCargo and 
Pathmanand (2005) argue that the strong power of the govenunent is entirely 
dependent upon - and subordinated to - Thaksin Shinawatra's personal power and 
authority. There is no prospect of it becoming institutionalised; it relates entirely 
to a single individual and is based largely on patronage 157 . 
In fact, considering PM Thaksin Shinawatra's administration, it is possible to 
158 
make a theoretical link to the "charismatic leadership" of Weber (1947) , which 
is usually found in various authoritarian states, autocracies, dictatorships and 
theocracies. Weber finds that even though the charismatic leader tends to have a 
high degree of influence on his followers, charismatic authority is inherently 
unstable and tends to easily disappear with the person who created it. Sooner or 
later, it is true that the era of Thaksin Shinawatra has to come to an end. 
Therefore, responding to the further question on what is going to happen in Thai 
politics post-PM Thaksin Shinawatra, McCargo and Pathmanand (2005, p. 233) 
propose that, "Whenever, Thaksin's political power comes to an end, the network 
157 Although PM Thaksin Shinawatra assigns crucial roles to several of his relatives (Yaowapa 
Wongsawat within the TRT and the Parliament, Chaisit Shinawatra within the army, and 
Priewphan Damapong within the police), all of these roles are supporting acts. He does not share 
power with these relatives; he assigns them power, which they simply exercise on his behalf 
(McCargo & Pathmanand). 
158 Weber defines the term "charisma" as "resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism 
or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the nonnative patterns or order revealed or 
ordained by him" (1978, p. 241). Kendall, Murray and Linden (2000) further explain the power of 
charismatic leader that it legitimised on the basis of a leader's exceptional personal qualities or the 
demonstration of extraordinary insight and accomplishment, which inspire loyalty and obedience 
from followers. 
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he has created will either completely collapse or assume an entirely new form. " 
Anyhow, it cannot be confirmed at this stage whether telecommunications politics 
will go back to what it used to be before the coming of PM Thaksin Shinawatra. 
Progress made during the hegemonic era has largely affected the industry 
institutionalism as well as the structural power of the many involved parties. For 
example, the involvement from the labour unions may not be as strong as before 
because they have already become companies' employees; or, the resistance from 
the NGOs or academics may be no longer useful as the reform has been too far 
advanced. 
However, what can be reasonably expected after the end of the hegemonic era is 
that the end of centralisation of power should release all the suppressed actors, 
which means more or less the recall of the multiple-participant political 
environment. If it really happens, the return of pluralism after a number of reform 
actions have been carried out, should offer different prospects for the reform 
programme. At least, the crucial reform issues that seemed to be a deadlock in the 
previous era have already been dealt with in the PM Thaksin Shinawatra era. For 
example, the telecommunications regulator has already been established, the 
SOTEs were corporatised and made ready for further divestiture, the SOTEs no 
longer have a monopoly or any special privileges, and the problem of the BTO 
obstructing fair competition was alleviated by both the introduction of an excise 
tax on telecommunications services and the existence of the regulator. The 
revival of interested parties from suppression in the hegemonic era, in a way, 
tends to offer some benefits to the industry. At least, it can be supposed to 
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improve the industry's democratic character (especially, the counterbalance of 
power among the involved parties). For instance, the corporatised SOTEs, 
together with the newcomers, that obviously lost out from telecommunications 
excise tax policy would become able to voice their grievances to the regulator (or 
even the Administrative Court); the NGOs, academics, media, and political parties 
would become able to regain their freedom to work. As such, Thai 
telecommunications politics would thus more resemble that of most democratic 
countries where there is no particular actor dominating the whole industry politics. 
Perhaps, the return of political actors to telecommunications politics after the 
crucial reform issues had been dealt with could be a positive scenario compared to 
the continuance of hegemonism; however, the unanswered and largely 
unanswerable question is, when will the power of PM Thaksin Shinawatra and 
TRT be dissipated from Thai and from telecommunications politics? 
CONCLUSION 
In reforming an industry, it is not extraordinary to find that each involved party 
tries to exercise its power to intervene in the reform actions for the sake of its own 
interest. The reform experiences in Thailand reveal that it was difficult to 
reconcile the interests of every interested party, as they were usually diffuse and 
conflicted with each other. At the same time, it is also found that the reform 
hardly progresses if some of the politically powerful parties are against it. In fact, 
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it appears that these unsolved problems were the main reasons for the stumbles 
within the Thai telecommunications reform programme from the beginning. 
However, the situation in telecommunications reform turned out differently under 
PM Thaksin Shinawatra. The hegemonic character of telecommunications 
politics cannot only help defend the reform programme from other involved 
parties' interventions, but it is also able to yield influence over those dispersed 
interests. The Thai experience reveals that the govenunent utilised its political 
strength to capture most of the involved parties that used to be actively 
participated in the reform politics. Consequently, since the resistance has either 
become neutral or even cooperative, some reform progress can be seen under PM 
Thaksin Shinawatra's premiership. However, the government's hegemonic 
management style is inevitably criticised, especially considering the shadow of 
interests in telecommunications of many senior figures in the government. In fact, 
from time to time, the government was criticised in terms of whether it used the 
resources at its disposal (e. g. authority power, political power, financial pressure, 
and so forth) with full honesty. That the government's controversial moves were 
not illegal does not justify the appropriateness of the policies or the 
straightforwardness of its actions; the real intentions of the government on reform 
policies as well as the possible consequences of those moves are instead more 
important and required to be considered closely. 
The minimal resistance from other politically powerful actors allowed the 
government to progress the telecommunications refon-n programme to the next 
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step. As of 2005, the government has pushed forward all the key reform issues 
(the privatisation, the concession conversion, and the establishment of NTC) to a 
point where further development requires only minimal involvement from the 
government. From this point, the government is supposed to take only the role of 
guiding the country's overall direction, and let the regulator, operators, and 
market mechanisms do the rest. Nevertheless, whether the hegemonic 
government will take only the role of steerer or will continue to enjoy dominating 
telecommunications politics, remains yet to be seen. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
INTRODUCTION 
The thesis has presented a study of the Thai telecommunications reform 
programme during the last two decades (between 1986 and 2005). It has 
contributed to the existing body of research in two main ways. Firstly, it has 
highlighted the major reform problems as well as the unresolved reform issues 
that the reform programme has experienced. It has also stressed the institutional 
arrangements (both structural and political) that had significant influences on the 
refonn process. Secondly, it has explored one of the least investigated areas in the 
literature, which is the impact of the different temporal political settings within a 
broad perspective derived from historical institutionalism and therefore impacts 
on the reform programme itself This concluding chapter will recapitulate the key 
strands of the previous chapters in order to provide an overview of what has been 
observed in the study. It will identify the academic implications that can be 
drawn from the case. Towards the end, the chapter will finally discuss the 
limitations of the current research, as well as suggest further interesting research 
opportunities to be explored in the future to enrich the study of the 
telecommunications reform programme in relation to politics. 
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FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The analyses provided in the central chapters (Chapter 4- 7) clearly showed the 
picture of the telecommunications reform Programme in Thailand as well as its 
unresolved reform issues. These chapters revealed that although Thailand has 
several specific industry arrangements (e. g. the BTO and the industry structure) 
that have been developed and are deeply rooted within the industry settings, these 
arrangements did not lead the country to have a unique reform Programme in 
terms of both the major reform issues and the causes of the existing reform 
problems. Like most countries in the world, the main issues experienced in the 
refonn debate were how to bring about privatisation, how to create a satisfactory 
system of regulation, and how to ensure greater competition and liberalisation. 
Ultimately, the study of the Thai case also revealed that the impediments that 
hindered the process of reform derived from both structural and political causes. 
The thesis further stressed the connection between the telecommunications reform 
programme and the country's political enviromnent. The Thai experience 
revealed that local political contexts and the reform programme are closely 
interrelated. Different political enviromnents produced varying consequences for 
domestic contextual factors and therefore the reform process. In fact, the case of 
Thailand seemed to be a perfect example of the attempt to study such a 
relationship. The rapid change of the political environment from an open and 
politically vulnerable govenu-nent under PM Chuan Leekpai to the closed, 
centralised and well-insulated government of PM Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001 was 
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sudden enough to keep most other affecting factors constant. For instance, the 
attitudes towards telecommunications reform among the interested parties (e. g. 
labour unions, academics, or SOTE management) were unlikely to change much 
in such a short period of time (nor was there any evidence of any substantial 
change). It is therefore arguable that any change in the level of involvement or 
any change in the involved parties' attitudes was derived mostly from the effects 
of the new industry environment created by the new politics. 
Although the thesis used the Thai reform experience as a case study, it is also 
argued that, as the thesis investigated domestic politics (which is essential because 
national institutional change involves debates and decisions by actors within 
countries) in relation to their consequences for other institutional arrangements, 
this is actually able to provide some insights that are relevant in a wider context. 
The detailed study of this topic is situated within the broader research paradigm of 
institutionalism, or more specifically historical institutionalism, which argues that 
domestic institutions (as well as their contextual factors) contribute a great many 
influences on a given policy such as a reform programme of a particular country. 
The telecommunications reform programme in Thailand 
Before 1997, the eagerness to reform telecommunications in Thailand seemed to 
be of a fairly limited nature. The initiation of the BTO concessions in the mid 
1980s to alleviate the telecommunications crisis made the need to reform to meet 
local consumer demands less strong than might have been expected. 
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Vongpanitlerd (personal interview, December 2,2004) explains that the granting 
of the BTO was somewhat comparable to a light degree of industry privatisation, 
as certain kinds of service had come to be provided by private operators. Most 
local interested parties appeared to be satisfied with the industry framework after 
the introduction of the BTO concessions (Uthaisang, personal interview, 
November 18,2004). The parties who seemed to be disadvantaged by such an 
environment (e. g. the consumers) either did not appear bothered (or, as a 
relatively diffuse interest, could not be mobilised), while the parties who benefited 
substantially (e. g. the SOTEs and the concessionaires) were undoubtedly satisfied 
with the protected and monopolised environment. Therefore, if there had been no 
reform pressure from other sources, it was possible that the Thai 
telecommunications industry would have remained unchanged until the end of all 
the concessions. Although the idea to improve the telecommunications industry 
for the sake of greater efficiency and competitiveness was a policy preference 
held by the governments, the fact that the country already enjoyed impressive 
growth during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, combined with the resistance 
from some interested parties, was strong enough to suppress the necessity for 
telecommunications reform during that time (Niyomsilpa, 2000). 
The seriousness of the need for reform increased significantly after 1997. Apart 
from the domestic pressure that arose from the inefficiency of the monopolised 
service provision (e. g. high prices, cross-subsidisation, or limited competition), 
several other factors also significantly contributed to the opening up of 
opportunity for outside pressures to enter the country. The result of the major 
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economic crash in 1997 that forced the country to accept a bail-out package from 
intemational financial institutions, as well as the global ideational emphasis on 
globalisation and liberalisation, appeared intense enough to force Thailand into a 
serious attempt at telecommunications reform. In fact, it is reasonable to claim 
that the exogenous pressure was the real trigger for the full scale reform attempt in 
Thailand'59. Since then,, the Thai goverment has put in a great deal of effort (e. g. 
the new telecommunications legislations, the SOTE's privatisation schedule, the 
conversion of the BTO concessions) to implement the reform. Unfortunately, the 
external pressures (e. g. the Asian financial crisis, the Washington Consensus, the 
IMF, or the WTO) that were able to overcome the national institution's inertia in 
the first place were unable to push the reform through to final success. Rather, it 
appeared that the reform momentum created by these forces was usually 
intercepted by a number of domestic problems that were embedded deep within 
the industry. 
Focusing on the domestic problems hindering the reform, it is found that even 
though Thailand had some distinctive local institutional features, the unresolved 
issues were not dissimilar to those encountered in other economies. There are 
three distinct but closely related issues, which are SOTE privatisation, industry 
liberalisation, and regulatory reform. The analyses provided in the central 
chapters revealed that the reasons that kept these issues alive derived internally 
from both structural and political causes. In terms of structural impediments, the 
159 According to Dempsey (2000), the high economic growth of Thailand during the mid 1980s to 
the mid 1990s made the need for economic reform less pressing. The inefficiency of SOTEs, the 
insufficiency and low quality of services were simply over shadowed by the economic boom and 
the high growth of the GDP. 
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study showed that the lack of a regulator, as well as regulatory regime, was the 
most important factor. It bottlenecked the solving of the other two critical issues. 
Although it was not impossible to privatise the SOTEs or to convert the BTOs in 
the absence of the NTC, the results of doing so might not have been as good or 
might even be worse than what the industry was used to 160 (Vorathitipong, 
personal interview, January 6,2005). Therefore, among the three unresolved 
reform issues, it can be concluded that the establishment of the NTC was the most 
important issue that had to be solved first. 
Apart from the structural problems, politics within the telecommunications 
industry also showed up as a common reason for every reform issue. It appears 
that the country's (and industry's) political environment and the dispersion of 
interest among involved parties are appeared to be the two main factors that have 
always been heavily influenced the reform process. It can be contended that the 
dispersion of interest among the involved parties, who usually had a certain level 
of political power, if only to veto or block change, was a foremost problem in 
reforming the telecommunications industry. Under the bureaucratic regime, the 
reluctance to reform from the militarist government who were more concerned 
about the loss of national security as well as the benefits to the state were the main 
reason for the failure. Nonetheless, later on, politics within the industry became 
more open to involvement from more political actors (in other words, became 
exposed to more pertinent institutions). It was not surprising to find that a party 
who tended to be affected by the reform sought to involve itself in the reform 
160 Not only in Thailand is the claim that a well-defined regulatory regime is needed in the early 
stage of reform, but it is also true in other countries. Experiences from some Latin American 
countries (especially Argentina) can be raised to strengthen this claim (see Hill & Abdala, 1996). 
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process in order to either protect or promote its particular interest, which was 
usually found to be in conflict with others. Unfortunately, the country's weak 
politics and weak government in the past were basically unable to withstand such 
political friction or to conciliate the interests of these parties in the reforrn 
package, which eventually led to the chronic failure of the reform programme. 
However, the arrival of the hegemonic regime in 2001 changed the situation of the 
telecommunications reform programme greatly. Unlike all the previous 
governments, PM Thaksin Shinawatra's government was, in the period studied, 
very stable, centralised, and well-insulated from outside political interferences. In 
fact, it was not only that the government became stronger so that other reform 
actors were unable to have any substantial influence on it, but it was also the case 
that the government became capable of having influence over the various industry 
actors. It is true that the strong goverm-nent was unable to solve all the problems 
by conciliating interests of every party; however, the fact that the strong 
govenunent was capable of utilising its political resources to suppress the 
involvement of most reform actors was sufficient to drive the reform to make 
some progress. In fact, the government of PM Thaksin Shinawatra had already 
pushed every key reform issue to the furthest point under the government's 
responsibility. As such, it appeared that from this point, the only duty left for the 
government was to set the industry direction in broad strategic terms (or as a 
"policy maker"), while the rest of the jobs supposedly have to be done by the 
regulator, operators, and consumers (see the proposed reformed structure in 
Figure 9.1). 
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Figure 9.1 
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In summary, the Thai telecommunications reform experience reveals an 
interesting finding that local politics within the telecommunications industry was 
the key reason that hindered the reform programme between 1986 and 2001, but 
equally, it becomes the reason that enabled good progress afterwards. Local 
demand, the trend for liberalisation, and pressures to reform from the outside 
could only put the reform idea into action, but they were not the key determinants 
of the success of the reform. Even though the reform momentum generated by 
these factors was strong enough to put pressure on the government to treat 
telecommunications reform as a priority, the reform flow in real practice was 
intercepted by the problematic industry conditions and, more importantly, the 
dispersion of interest from interested parties. Later, when the interest dispersion 
had been contained by the powerful and centralised government, it appeared that 
the reform could make a lot of progress. All in all, as suggested by the Thai 
experience, it would be appropriate to stress the importance of the arrangements 
within the industry itself (especially, political enviromnent and 
dispersion of 
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interest) as the key determinants of the reform progress, although it was ultimately 
forces exogenous to the sector, but not to the country, that accelerated reform. 
Telecommunications reform and politics 
During the past two decades, the telecommunications reform of Thailand has 
passed through three different political eras: the bureaucratic, the pluralistic, and 
the hegemonic. It was found that these eras produced different institutional 
arrangements within the industry, which therefore entailed different consequences 
for the refonn programme. 
As claimed by Petrazzini (1995), in the late 1980s, the telecommunications 
industry of Thailand had the poorest overall conditions compared to other similar 
countries in the Southeast Asian region. Although such a claim was based on the 
situation of the late 1980s, it was found that, by 2005, the situation within the Thai 
telecommunications industry was still somewhat poorer than other comparable 
countries. Countries in the region actually started the refon-n programme almost 
simultaneously, which was around the end of the 1980s; however the reform 
programmes in Malaysia, Indonesia, or the Philippines are in some respects ahead 
of that of Thailand 161 . Even though Thailand could manage to make significant 
progress after 2001, the overall industry enviromnent was still inferior to these 
neighbouring countries. To cite examples, although the new telecommunications 
161 Please see Brown et al. (2004) and Singh (2000) for details of the telecommunications reform 
programme of these countries. 
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laws were promulgated, they were still not fully enforced 162 ; although TOT and 
CAT were corporatised, they were still wholly owned by the state; although the 
telecommunications regulator was established, it was still very inexperienced and 
not fully functioning; although the SOTEs were no longer a monopoly, the 
unsolved problem of the BTO still hindered real free and fair competition. 
Interestingly, considering the similarities among these countries in that they had 
comparable fundamental economic backgrounds (e. g. per capita income and gross 
domestic product) and that they were all severely hit by the 1997 Asian Crisis 
(which therefore were influenced by the Bretton Woods organisations to reform 
their economies), the lagging telecommunications refonn programme of Thailand 
could suggest some problems within the country itself 
The Thai experience shows that politics, either bureaucratic or pluralistic, 
inhibited the reform. Both regimes shared the same feature that appeared 
unfavourable to progress telecommunications reform: the dispersion of interest 
from the parties who were politically powerful in the telecommunications political 
arena and insufficient central authority to overrule them or at least a willingness to 
incur the political costs of doing so. At one extreme, the fact that the party which 
had absolute political power refused to push the reform programme was the main 
reason for the failure in the bureaucratic era. At another extreme, too much 
162 The two new telecommunications laws of Thailand are not fully enforced at the present, as 
there are a number of duties that were under the responsibility of the "joint commission" between 
the telecommunications regulator (the NTC) and the broadcasting regulator (the NTSBC) such as 
the duty to arrange and allocate the radio frequency. As of the beginning of 2005, the 
establishment of the NTSBC is still in process. In fact, the NTSBC establishment experiences an 
even longer delay than the NTC's, as both of them were set up as a consequence of the same 
legislation. 
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involvement from a number of politically powerful parties in the pluralistic era 
also resulted in the stalling of the programme on many occasions. 
The bureaucratic era was overthrown by the mass uprising in 1992, which gave 
rise to pluralist governments. After being acknowledged as the country's symbol 
for a decade (Niyomsilpa, 2000), the pluralistic regime ended unexpectedly with 
the landslide victory of Thaksin Shinawatra and the TRT in 2001. Since then, a 
hegemonic political regime was introduced to Thailand at both the national and 
the industry levels. Such a rapid transition could raise doubts as to whether the 
new regime has been deeply rooted in the country's politics. In this respect, the 
Weberian idea of the general instability of charismatic authority would suggest 
that the hegemonic regime might have a limited survival time, indeed it may be 
easily ended when the popularity of the PM declines or when the PM has stepped 
down from his post' 63 . Nevertheless, the mere fact that the Thaksin Shinawatra I 
government was the first government in the history of Thailand that served out its 
whole four year tenn (2001 - 2005); that PM Thaksin Shinawatra and the TRT 
managed to achieve an even greater victory in the 2005 General Election; and that 
the telecommunications reform programme experienced extensive progress after 
the arrival of PM Thaksin Shinawatra would be enough to stress the significance 
of the hegemonic regime of Thailand. Even though opposition to the PM 
mounted after the end of the study period, one of the government's lasting 
achievements may still be an impressive telecommunications reform. The regime 
163 Ockey (2003) proposes that the new politics of PM Thaksin Shinawatra will not be sustainable. 
It will turn out to be only an expensive experiment of PM Thaksin Shinawatra. Ockey still 
believes that the keys to political power in the Thai context are still the political factions and the 
associated local electoral networks. 
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appears to have had very distinctive consequences which cannot be overlooked by K' 
anyone who wants to study any aspects of Thai politics either at the national or 
telecommunications industry level. 
The hegemonic regime apparently produced different consequences for reform 
from the previous two eras. It was able to exploit its political strength to 
overcome (or suppress) the previous major reform's non-enhancing arrangements. 
Although it could be alleged that Thai telecommunications politics has moved 
backwards to the beginning when the military dominated the whole of politics, 
close consideration shows that they are not a similar situation. They actually have 
a different mindset towards the reform programme. The bureaucratic government 
opposed the reform, while the hegemonic govemment tries to promote it; the 
bureaucratic government exercised its power (via labour unions, the BOD, and the 
SOTE management) to put off the reform, while the hegemonic government 
exerts its political power to push forward the refonn. Moreover, the difference is 
also found when comparing the progress made under the hegemonic and 
pluralistic regimes. The progress made during the four-year period of hegemonic 
authority compared to the progress made during the last whole decade of a 
pluralistic environment indicates that hegemonism provided a more suitable 
industry arrangement for carrying out the telecommunications reform of Thailand, 
where the industry was divided between the interests of a number of political 
powerful actors. 
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In fact, experience reveals several ways to deal with the interest dispersion 
problem. The UK experience could be raised as one of the ways. The interest 
conciliation method was strategically used in the time of PM Margaret Thatcher in 
dealing with the resistance to reform from interested parties. The UK government 
decided to privatise BT intact as an integrated and dominant firm in order to 
appease BT's labour union and management and smooth the way for the 
privatisation programme (Armstrong et al., 1994). Although such a move 
suggested an anti-competitive environment, it was offset to some extent by 
effective regulation and the creation of an initially asymmetric duopolistic 
competitive structure. On the other hand, the Thai experience shows another way 
to deal with interest dispersion. It represents a more autocratic solution in that the 
government exploited its political superiority to deal with the problems. It 
provides a lesson that, apart from the government's political will, strong and 
centralised politics seems to be an effective apparatus in advancing the reform 
programme in Thailand (and probably in other economies that have similar 
settings), as opposed to the previous open and decentralised one. 
Implications 
It can be seen that the current thesis is different from some other historical 
institutionalist studies which try to identify the importance of institutionalism on 
industry reform programme by using cross-national comparisons (e. g. those of 
Thatcher, 1999; 2000; 2002; 2005). Rather, this thesis explores the Thai 
telecommunications reform experience under the different political regimes to 
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reveal the significance of institutional arrangement. The findings found are 
largely consistent with those of the studies using cross-national samples. For 
instance, the Thai reform experience shows that domestic institutional 
arrangements (as well as their contextual factors) have a strong influence on 
reform policy-making, the problems within the process, and the outcome of the 
reform. It also strengthens the claim that existing institutions are resistant to 
change and difficult to be altered (e. g. the dispersion of interest among interested 
parties). However, the recent experience of Thailand also reveals that, though 
they are believed to be deeply-rooted, most institutions (apart from the monarchy) 
are actually not permanent. They can be overwhelmed by a force that is strong 
enough under the right circumstance (e. g. the change of political regime). 
Moreover, although the telecommunications reform programme of Thailand has 
not yet been completed, the experiences gained since the mid 1980s to the mid 
2000s are able to provide some interesting analytical findings. Among those, 
there are some pieces of evidence that substantiate the "already- found" findings, 
while on the other hand there are some other pieces that challenge existing 
knowledge. 
The political environment 
Most of the existing literature on Thai telecommunications reform proposes that 
political instability and weak government were the main reasons for the 
disappointing results. This thesis agrees with them to some extent; however, close 
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consideration of the more recent developments reveals some more interesting 
findings. 
The historical institutionalist study on the Thai telecommunications reform 
experience reveals that the dispersal of interest among powerful involved parties 
and the non-enhancing political settings were the dominant problematic 
arrangements in the past. It is unsurprising to see minimal progress in the 
bureaucratic era since the governments (along other powerful interested parties 
like labour union) did not really want the reform. As for the pluralistic era, even 
though the government might have had good intentions, obvious reform progress 
was hardly seen because the governments were simply too weak while other 
interested parties were too strong and diffuse, producing a gridlock. The 
institutional arrangements in this era thus appeared to be unfavourable to enhance 
an effective reform. Most reform attempts were usually undermined one way or 
another by an interested party whose interest was potentially worse off from such 
policy. The problem was very difficult to solve since the dispersion of interest 
appeared deeply-rooted and difficult to alter. Therefore, without a super-strong 
central force, reform under the pluralistic regime could not be achieved. In fact, 
the supranational or transnational forces, which appeared to be an effective force 
to overcome national institutionalism in other places' 64 , were also unable to carry 
out the Thai telecommunications refonn programme. The problematic 
institutional arrangements that were embedded within the industry appeared to 
164 For example, Thatcher (2004, p. 752) argues that, "in an internationalized world, there are also 
powerful cross-national forces that affect decision making within domestic arenas. These forces 
are broader than economic globalization. They can provide impetus for institutional reform and 
operate regardless of existing national settings. Hence, they may overcome national institutional 
rigidities to produce change and convergence across nations. " 
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counteract effectively against these external forces. It could therefore be argued 
that domestic institutions were the real explanatory factors that brought about the 
reform. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to find that the change of political regime from 
pluralism to hegernonism made a great deal of impact to the industry 
environment; the strong policy and centralised style of administration of the new 
regime were not only able to overcome the institutional inertia of the industry, but 
they were also able to push forward a number of reform activities to the next step. 
Although the new industry settings were unable to completely solve every reform 
problem, it was able to suppress the major problem and give the reform an 
impressive progress. In other words, according to the Thai experience, it is 
possible to propose that the hegemonic character of the latest political regime is a 
necessary condition to execute reform. In fact, such finding in a way consistent to 
the ideas of Petrazzini (1995) and Williamson and Haggard (1994), as they 
propose that, among developing countries, a closed and centralised political 
environment is more suited to carrying out reform than an open and decentralised 
165 
At the same time, the finding on the new political environment of Thailand also 
contradicts every existing work that stigmatises Thai politics for weakness and 
instability. Although such claims, for example, the ones proposed by 
Keeratikrainon (2002); Niyornsilpa (2000) and Petrazzini (1995) might be true in 
165 However, some other scholars (e. g. Duch 199 1) proposed the opposite finding when using the 
developed countries as case studies. Please find the detailed discussion in Chapter 2. 
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their time, the current thesis has shown their inappropriateness after the year 2001 
until, at least, the decline of PM Thaksin Shinawatra's political power and 
networks (which cannot be forecast at the time of writing this thesis). In the 
meantime, the hegemonic political environment did not seem to be a hindrance to 
advance the reform as did the politics in the pluralistic era; instead it turned out 
that the autocratic and centralised characters of hegemonism contributed to 
substantial progress in the refonn. 
Moreover, the new politics of Thailand further suggests another interesting 
finding that there seems to be a revolution in the structure of politics. Looking at 
the structure of the TRT., it was a coalition of giant local private entrepreneurs 
(refer to Figure 3.7), which was led by the most successful businessman in the 
country, Thaksin Shinawatra. The fact that most senior figures of these 
corporations only entered politics for the first time suggested that the business 
166 class began to get directly involved in electoral politics . The ability to exploit 
their financial strength as well as their business knowledge (e. g. the populist 
policies or the modem marketing strategies) easily helped them to gain ground 
over the old political actors and to become the new "ruling class"' 67 of the 
country. This observation leads to two implications. Firstly, it suggests the 
weakening of the career politicians from the traditional political class and the 
166 In this regard, the situation in Thailand is not distinctive. It is also reminiscent of Berlusconi's 
intervention in Italy. Interestingly, the recent politics in Thailand (under PM Thaksin Shinawatra) 
and Italy (under PM Silvio Berlusconi) share a number of similar features. Both of them are 
largely dominated by successful business tycoons who are able to effectively utilise their 
advantages (e. g. financial strength or modem marketing campaigns) to achieve political power. 
For more details on Italian politics, see Lane (2004) or Ginsborg (2004). 
167 According to Mosca (as cited in Berry, n. d. ), there has never been a genuinely democratic 
regime. Every political society has two classes, a ruling class and a class that is ruled. He argues 
that a "revolution" is nothing more than the substitution of one ruling class for another. 
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associated political parties. The opposition political parties were unable to 
operate efficiently as they had only a handful of MPs and very limited financial 
resources (since many of their former patrons became united and joined the TRT 
party). As for politics on the government side, most highly-ranked positions both 
at the government level and the party level are taken by "businessmen turned 
politicians 95 ; consequently, career politicians become more or less the subordinate 
base for the new political power. Secondly, it suggests the decline of the old 
proxy system. Under the new politics, the private sector does not want to be 
dependent on proxy alike before. They doubt whether the old-fashioned career 
politicians would be capable of handling the modern economy effectively, 
especially in a situation where the market is more open and competition is more 
intense; the stakes of their business are too high to take such a risk. In other 
words, the private sector seems no longer to see career politicians as the strategic 
tool to access power and gain advantages like in the past. They rather choose to 
transform their business power into political power by entering directly into 
politics, which seemed to be easier, quicker, and more effective. 
All in all, although these changes (e. g. the more stable government or the end of 
the proxy system) could be seen as a shift to greater modernity within the Thai 
political system, it also could be argued that changes were done in a highly 
particular way and were potentially susceptible to the use of public office for 
private gain. Unless the consequences are unveiled in the longer teryn, such a 
query is difficult to precisely answer in either the short or even the intermediate 
tenn. 
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The capture 
The case of Thailand shows that new power in politics can effectively deal with 
the problem of interest dispersion, which used to be the most problematic factor 
previously. As already shown in Chapter 8, most interested parties began to veer 
from their long-term stance and finally became either inactive or acquiesced in 
goverm-nent reform policy. Such a finding suggests a situation where the reform 
pressure created by strong policy and centralised style of administration was 
strong enough to overcome the dispersion of interest among the involved parties. 
By considering analyses provided in the previous chapter, it would not be an 
exaggeration to say that this expected shift was a consequence of a kind of capture 
phenomenon, which occurred among the interested parties who found themselves 
with fewer political resources than the strong government. 
The Thai experience reveals that the hegemonic character of the PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra's government is a necessary condition to execute the reform, as it 
ap ears to be an effective way to deal with the long-term unresolved arrangement 
. rp 
- interest dispersion. It is also possible to propose that that the way in which the 
hegemonic goverment utilised its power to capture other parties who held a stake 
in the reform programme in order to pursue a particular goal has reconfigured the 
capture theory to some extents. What happened in the case of Thailand is not that 
the regulator is captured by private companies to work in their favour. Rather, the 
incidents indicating "the capture" within the Thai telecommunications reform 
could actually be seen at an even earlier stage and it was not done by the private 
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operators. Close analysis discloses that there was a capture of the reform's 
interested parties to subdue their involvement. Therefore, if there is any capture, 
it is not of the regulator, but of the objects of regulation by the government, a 
capture in reverse. In other words, the Thai case tells a story that in order to deal 
with interest dispersion, not only does the government have to be well-insulated 
from the influence of interested parties, but it must also be able to exert influence 
over them (or capture them). In the nutshell, the Thai experience is persuasive in 
that the pressures to reform and the well-intentioned efforts of the governments 
were not enough on their own to accomplish the reform; rather, it is found that the 
exploitation of the government's political strength also seems to be another 
necessary condition to deal with problems within the reform process. 
All in all, the capture may not only be limited to the case where private companies 
exploit their power to capture the regulator to work in their favour or to promote 
their interest. Capture, with a slight reconfiguration, is also capable of explaining 
the situation where the govermnent exerts its political superiority over 
problematic parties to weaken their influence and to make the regulatory 
framework happen. A wide range of strategies was applied in the attempt at 
capture (e. g. authority power, direct or indirect pressure, financial inducement, 
and so forth). Apparently, the capture seemed to work well with most involved 
parties ranging from the opposition political parties, political factions, SOTEs 
management, labour unions, academics, or even the media. It was however found 
that the powerful government had difficulties in capturing the consumers. Their 
vast number with scattered interests made the consumers unlikely to be wholly 
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captured; unfortunately, at the same time, the facts of the size, the diversity of 
interests, the disorganised structure, and the passive nature of the consumer group 
have prevented them from active involvement in the telecommunications political 
space. 
In summary, the Thai experience reveals that the industry arrangements under the 
pluralistic environment were not suitable for carrying out the country's refonn 
programme. Although having more participants is supposed to provide more 
thorough reflections and be more consistent with democratic politics, involvement 
from a number of politically powerful actors who tried to be involved in the 
process for their own interests instead caused a lot of problems. The advent of 
hegemonic politics in 2001 yielded a different picture of the telecommunications 
reform of Thailand as it produced a significant impact on the previous industry 
settings. The strong government effectively utilised its political superiority to 
abate the disputes within the reform process, which consequently resulted in 
impressive reform progress. Many persistent disputes were resolved (or at least 
alleviated), such as the case of the approval of the privatisation compensation 
package or the introduction of the telecommunications excise tax. On the flip 
side, the fact that the government is so powerful and extensively involved in the 
telecommunications reform programme also leads to areas of concern. The 
doubts as to whether or not the reform has been proposed with honest intentions 
and whether or not the government has used its political power to serve any 
hidden agenda were usually raised in society. Although some moves (e. g. the 
excise tax on telecommunications services) might look suspicious, the explanation 
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from the government did not sound entirely nonsense either 168 . Therefore, it is 
inappropriate to make a final verdict on the unknown and unproven future. It 
seems unfair for the government to be accused of corruption or rent-seeking at the 
stage where there is no such concrete evidence available or where the results of 
those suspicious moves are not even clear. Anyhow, the clear answer from the 
Thai experience is that, under the old bureaucratic or pluralistic arrangements, it 
was almost impossible to see the same level of progress in telecommunications 
reform. It is true that there might be an exploitation of political power to bring 
into line (either voluntarily or compulsorily) other interested parties, which may 
be seen as undermining democracy; however, if looking specifically at the 
previous unresolved reform problems, it is quite obvious that strong and 
centralised politics offered a better opportunity in solving those problems and 
making progress than that of the previous political eras. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The current thesis has been conducted within a definite time scale and is subject to 
some limitations. The fact that the telecommunications reform programme in 
Thailand is not complete at the time of writing means that some information is 
simply unavailable. However, as for this thesis, it was rather designed to put its 
168 The introduction of telecommunications excise tax in Thailand could be categorised as a 
"regulatory innovation". The policy fits well with the definition of regulatory innovation proposed 
by Black (2005, p. 4) being that, "the use of new solutions to address old problems". Black further 
argues that the outcome of innovation is thus unforeseen and unanticipated at the time of 
introduction; it could be either a success or failure. In any case, time is usually needed to conclude 
the clear outcome since analysing regulatory innovation should involve the analysis of not just 
enactment of ideas, but also their impact. 
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focus on the refonn obstacles as well as the consequences of different industry 
enviromnents for the refon-n programme, for which the information available at 
the cut-off point (at the beginning of 2005) did provide sufficient evidence. 
Nevertheless the thesis does have some limitations but opens the way for further 
research in the relevant area. 
Limitations 
The analyses in the main text suggested that the telecommunications reform of 
Thailand needs a strong political power and centralised decision making in order 
to deal with the reform problems, and it appeared to be true when the hegemonic 
settings were able to produce a lot of progress. However, such a finding is unable 
to indicate the ultimate outcome of the refonn, due to two main reasons. Firstly, it 
is difficult to accurately analyse the long-tenn consequence of the progress 
achieved by the exploitation of government's political strength at the cut-off 
point. To be fair, one has to keep in mind that the outcome of the strong 
66 govenunent-led" policy does not necessarily have to be undesirable; there are 
examples elsewhere (e. g. the East Asian Economic Model: EAEM) where the 
government-led economic reform yielded a successful result (Singh, 2000). On 
the other hand, although it is arguably true that Thailand's centralised 
telecommunications reform may arouse some suspicions, no concrete evidence 
has been shown for the accusation of corruption or rent-seeking charge. 
Therefore, what the thesis can do is to point out the potential for such downside 
risks, while leaving the final judgment to the readers and future researchers. 
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Secondly, the thesis is unable to tell with any certainty what is going to happen to 
the telecommunications reform and to telecommunications politics after PM 
Thaksin Shinawatra's era. Given Weber's insight on the inherent instability of 
charismatic leadership, it is possible that all the changes of industry arrangement 
during the hegemonic era may not endure. Many of the changes could be easily 
dissipated once PM Thaksin Shinawatra's charismatic sway over events declines 
(and when that will be is unknown). Once this happens, the industry 
institutionalism may change to another form whereby it cannot be predicted at this 
stage what the arrangements (as well as the reform programme) are going to look 
like in the next political era. 
Moreover, the fact that the country's liberalisation deadline is nearing potentially 
caused the collective findings for the thesis. Although the thesis has provided a 
substantial amount of evidence to explain the capture phenomenon among 
interested parties after the arrival of the new power structure in 2001, it cannot 
absolutely argue that the decrease in the level of interest dispersion was the au 
consequence of a powerful government alone. The fact that certain interested 
parties (e. g. the labour unions or the SOTE management) began to agree with the 
reform would also partially be explained by the upcoming telecommunications 
liberalisation deadline in January 2006. It was very difficult to clearly disentangle 
the time pressure effect from the political pressure effect on these interested 
parties. Even though the interviews with either the SOTE management or the 
labour unions did not show much concern about the upcoming competition 169 (in 
"9 According to interviews with Naksrinuan (December 7,2004) and Chevapruek (December 8, 
2004), the privatised SOTEs are ready for the real competition. Both TOT and CAT have realised 
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other words, the time pressure effect) and they rather appeared to be more 
concerned about the reform compensation package' 70 , it does not mean that the 
time pressure had no effect at all. Therefore, if the thesis is able to distinguish the 
time pressure effect out of the collective finding, it could be able to better exhibit 
the impact of the new politics on the interested parties. 
Future research 
Apart from the main focus of the thesis, there are several other relevant aspects 
that have been touched upon, but have not been explored in great detail. That was 
either because such aspects were not directly relevant to the main focus of this 
study or because the data required was unavailable and could not be readily 
obtained at the time of doing this research. However, these unexplored aspects 
are also interesting and surely deserving of further exploration in order to build a 
more comprehensive picture of the Thai political economy in relation to 
telecommunications industry reform. Proceeding from the current thesis, there are 
at least several major aspects that could be raised as future research opportunities. 
The first future research opportunity derives directly from the limitation of the 
current thesis. Even though there was a lot of reform progress during the first 
four-year period of PM Thaksin Shinawatra, the telecommunications reform is 
still on-going. It is interesting to study further what the industry (and probably the 
it is coming and prepared for it a long time ago; besides, they also claimed superiorities in terms of 
their experiences within the industry, their brand recognition, and their skilled employees. 
170 Direct interviews with Chareonwan (December 14,2004) and Naksrinuan (December 7,2004) 
reveal that the 6,2,2 compensation package was very influential to SOTE's employees; they said 
the package made the management easier to talk with the employees. 
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reform programme) is going to look like in the future, given the fact that some of 
the reform progress had been forced to happen by the hegemonic power. The 
scrutiny of whether the refonned industry contains any distortion (or inefficiency) 
within the competition, regulation, and consumer protection would be good 
indications of the achievements of the hegemonic politics as well as of the PM 
Thaksin Shinawatra's regime on the reform programme. In fact, in order to have 
a better picture, further analyses of sectoral policies in other industries (especially 
the ones that have less connections to the powerful politicians) would also be 
helpful to settle the argument as to whether Thaksin Shinawatra and his 
hegemonic regime have been desirable or not. 
Secondly, it has been argued in the current thesis that compared to the 
bureaucratic and pluralistic regimes, the hegemonic political regime is relatively 
the most suitable environment for carrying out the telecommunications reform 
programme of Thailand so far. The progress made during the hegemonic era was 
more than what had been achieved during the last two decades of the previous 
eras. Unfortunately, as the reform is still not complete, it cannot be concluded at 
the time of writing this thesis whether the government-led economic development 
under the Thai context will be ultimately beneficial to the industry or even the 
country as a whole in the long run, especially given the possibility of corruption, 
or different fonns of it, by the high-level politicians (as was criticised in the work 
of Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004). Only once the reform outcome has clearly seen 
will it be possible to tell whether the government-led economic development in 
Thailand is a success or failure. In any case, regardless of the outcome, the Thai 
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telecommunications reform experience can be even more interesting and useful 
for later researchers or enthusiasts if it is broadened out in scope to incorporate the 
comparison between the government-led reform programme of Thailand and 
those of other East Asian countries, which are widely recognised for their 
successful approach. Performing a cross-national historical institutionalist study 
would be academically useful as it would provide a clear picture on whether these 
countries have any similarities or differences in their institutional arrangements, 
and to what extent these institutions would have impacts on the policy formation 
as well as the policy outcomes. 
Finally, as mentioned in the main text, there has recently been a major change in 
the Thai political structure. The advent of new form of politics under PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra suggests a regime change where successful businessmen became 
interested in directly entering politics, rather than accessing it via political proxies 
as before. In other words, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the business 
class in Thailand began to fuse with the political class and became the country's 
new 66ruling class". The Thai telecommunications industry could be further used 
as an appropnate example to study the phenomenon. As suggested by the 
sobriquet of the era "telecom tycoons turned politicians", a number of 
telecommunications businessmen are taking high positions in this hegemonic 
government. It would be interesting to deepen the study to understand whether 
there were any particular reasons or incentives that drove them to become policy 
makers. A number of reasons could be presumed; whether for failing belief 
in the 
old politics' ability to care for the country's economy, for desiring to ensure their 
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businesses operate and compete in a better and more efficient industry 
environment, or for the ulterior motives of exploiting political power for the 
advantage of their business. The in-depth study in this particular aspect should be 
of value not only to Thailand, but also to other emerging economies. It appears to 
offer a good opportunity to visualise the extent that the development of the 
economy (the economic reform, to be precise) would have consequences for the 
outlook of the politics (both at the national and industry levels) of the reforming 
economy. 
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Appendix A 
The detailed list of interviewees 
Table 1: 
List of interviewees and their positions in the first round of fieldwork 
Name 
(Date of interview) 
Field Position 
Bencharongkakul Private operator Co-CEO of Total Access Communications 
Vichai Plc. (DTAC) 
(8 January 2004) 
2 Juruphan Pornpimol Government Deputy Director of the State Enterprise Policy 
(5 January 2004) official Office (SEPO), MOF (responsible for the 
(MOF) privatisation of SOTEs) 
3 Kusripituck Government Candidate to be the member of the National 
Sedthaporn official Telecommunications Commission (NTC) 
(29 December 2003) (PTD) Former Director General of the PTD 
4 Pomsutee Kraisorn. Government Deputy Pennanent Secretary of the MICT 
(23 December 2003) official Former Deputy Permanent Secretary of the 
(MICT) MOTC 
Former the Chairman of the Board of the CAT 
5 Uthaisang Sombut Policy maker and Former Advisor to the Minister of MICT 
(19 December 2003) government Former Deputy Minister of the MOTC 
official Former Deputy Permanent Secretary of the 
MOTC 
Former Director General of the PTD 
Former Chairman of the Board of TOT and 
CAT 
6 Yupho Kitti Government Former Deputy Permanent Secretary of the 
(22 December 2003) official MOTC 
(MOTC) Former Director General of the Post and 
Telegraph Department (PTD) 
Note: Positions mentioned are as of the interview date 
Table 2: 
List of inter-viewees and theirDOSItions in the second round of fieldwork 
Name Field Position 
(Date(s) of interview) 
Bencharongkakul Private operator Co-CEO of Total Access Communications 
Vichal Plc. (DTAC) 
(3 December 2004) 
2 Chareonwan Mittra SOTE labour Chairman of the TOT labour union 
(14 December 2004) union Former a member of the concession 
conversion committee (under PM Chuan 
Leekpai's era) 
3 Chevapruek Ormsin SOTE Senior Vice President of Thailand Post Plc. 
(8 December 2004) management Former Deputy Governor of the CAT 
(responsible for telecommunications, 
related tasks) 
Former a member of CAT's concession 
conversion negotiation team 
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Name Field Position (Date(s) of interview) 
4 lambun-irung Wattana SOTE labour Chairman of the CAT labour union 
(21 December 2004) union Former a member of the concession 
conversion committee (under PM Chuan 
Leekpai's era) 
5 Juruphan Pornpimol Government Deputy Director of the SEPO, MOF 
(14 December 2004) official (responsible for the privatisation of 
(MOF) SOTEs) 
Former a member of the concession 
conversion committee (under both PM 
Chuan Leekpai's and PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra's eras) 
6 Kusripituck Regulator The member of the NTC 
Sedthaporn Former Director General of the PTD 
(24 November 2004) 
7 Naksrinuan Wichean SOTE Senior Executive Vice President of the TOT 
(7 December 2004) management corporation Plc. (former the TOT) 
Former a member of TOT's concession 
conversion negotiation team 
8 Ounsamran Sakesan Senator The Senator 
(15 December 2004) Member of Committee on Communications, 
the Senate 
9 Pornsutee Kraisom Government Permanent Secretary of the MICT 
(12 November 2004) official Deputy Permanent Secretary of the MICT 
(MICT) Former Deputy Permanent Secretary of the 
MOTC 
Former the Chairman of the Board of the CAT 
10 Sookmongkol Industry expert Senior telecommunications analyst, Bualuang 
Kusumaporn Securities Plc. 
(20 November 2004) 
11 Suebwonglee Policy maker The Minister of MICT 
Surapong 
(25 November 2004) 
12 Tangkitvanich Academician and Research Director for Information Economy 
Somkiat industry expert at Thailand Development Research 
(28 December 2004) Institution (TDRI) 
13 Teeralarp Anuparb Academician and Director of the School of Telecommunications 
(20 December 2004) industry expert Business Management, Mahidol University 
14 Uthaisang Sombut Policy maker and Former Advisor to the Minister of MICT 
(18 November 2004) government Former Deputy Minister of the MOTC 
official Former Deputy Permanent Secretary of the 
MOTC 
Former Director General of the PTD 
Former Chairman of the Board of TOT and 
CAT 
15 Uthaisang Cherdpong Senator The Senator 
(15 December 2004) Member of Committee on Communications, 
the Senate 
16 Vimolvanich Wanlop Private operator Senior Advisor of the Chareon Pokphand 
(19 December 2004) Group (CP, the parent company of the TA 
and the TA Orange) 
17 Vongpanitlerd Academician and Research Director for Telecommunications at 
Sumeth industry expert Thailand Development Research 
(2 December 2004) Institution (TDRI) 
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Name 
(Date(s) of interview) 
Field Position 
18 Vorathitipong Anand NGO Member of both the first and second NTC 
(6 January 2005) selection committee 
Secretary General of the Telecommunications 
Association of Thailand Under the Royal 
Patronage 
Member of the National Economic and Social 
Advisory Council 
Member of the 1997 Telecom Master Plan 
Drafting Committee 
19 Yoonaidharma. Regulator, The member of the NTC 
Sudharma industry expert, Former Director General of Chulalongkorn 
(16,21 December and legal expert University Intellectual Property Institute 
2004) (CUIPI) 
Former a member of telecommunications laws 
drafting committee (both 2000 Spectrum 
Act and 2001 Telecommunications 
Business Act) 
Associated professor at the Faculty of Law, 
Chulalongkom University 
Note: Positions mentioned are as of the interview date 
Table 3: 
List of anonymous interviewees 
Name Field 
Anon ymous A A manager of a privatised SOTE 
Anon ymous B An acaderriician and telecommunications expert 
Anon ymous C A high level government official 
Anon ymous D A manager of a private telecommunications operator 
Anon ymous E A manager of a private telecommunications operator 
Anonymous F A high level govenunent official 
Anonymous G A SOTE employee 
Anony mous H A SOTE employee 
Anony mous I An academician and telecommunications expert 
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Appendix B 
Selected high-level officials who have close relationship with the PM. 
Name Current Relationship Public's suspicion position to PM 
I General Commander-in- Cousin Came into position from the army 
Shinawatra Chief of the engineers, which was unusual since 
Chaiyasit Army the Commander-in-Chief is normally 
promoted from the Deputy positions 
or from a combat unit. 
2 Police Deputy Brother-in- Was promoted to be a Deputy 
General Commissioner- law Commissioner-General from the 
Darnapong General least senior Assistant Commissioner- 
Priewpan General, and expected to be Police 
ConuTiissioner-General soon. 
3 Mrs. Member of the Sister Came from nowhere to be the 
Wongsawat Parliament Deputy Leader of the TRT party and 
Yaowapa the leader of the biggest fraction In 
the TRT to balance the power of 
other fractions within the TRT. 
4 Mrs. Chairwoman of Sister Came from nowhere, while the 
Shinawatra the National chairwoman of the NCWT normally 
Yaowares Council of is a person whose merits and 
Woman of contributions have been evident for a 
Thailand long time and must be accepted by 
(NCWT) the public. 
5 Wongsawat Permanent Younger Has been in the same position for 
Somchai Secretary of the brother-in- longer than 6 years, under 2 special 
Ministry of law extensions after his age of retirement 
Justice (60 years old), which is quite 
unusual for a big and powerful 
ministry. 
6 Police Deputy Prime Close friend Used to be a university lecturer 
Captain Minister before becoming the Minister of 
Piernsomboon Interior and Deputy Prime Minister, 
Purachai respectively 
7 Police Deputy Close friend Was transferred from the Assistant 
General Comnýiissioner- Cominissioner-General to be the 
Wannasatit General Secretary General of the Office of 
Chitchai the Narcotics Control Board before 
moved back to be the Deputy 
Commissioner-General. 
8 police Major The Director of Classmate Resigned as Comn-iissioner of the 
General the Government Crime Suppression Division and 
Sungkapong Lottery Office became the Director of the 
Surasit Government Lottery Office, which 
controls a lot of money to finance 
various government projects. 
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Name Current 
position 
Relationship 
to PM 
Public's suspicion 
Police Assistant Husband of Was promoted from Deputy 
Lieutenant Commissioner- the Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
General General of the Minister of Police Bureau to Conunissioner of 
Maneerm Royal Thai Education the Central Investigation Bureau and 
Vongkot Police (and also the to Assistant Commissioner-General 
treasurer of within 3 years. 
the TRT 
party) 
10 Air Chief Commander-in- Husband of Was predicted to be the next 
Marshal Chief of the Air personal Minister of Defence 
Wantana Force secretary of 
Kongsak PM 
Thaksin's 
wife 
Source: Leading newspapers in Thailand and Tailuctai (2004). 
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Appendix C 
List of BTO concessions granted since 1986 
Type of service Concessionaires 
Concession 
issuers 
Concession 
Term (years) 
Concession start 
year 
Eiýxed line 
- 2.6 million Telecom Asia Corporation (TA) TOT 25 1991 
lines 
- 1.5 million Thai Telephone and TOT 25 1992 
lines Telecommunications (TT&T) 
Public card Advance Info Service (AIS) TOT 10 1990 
phone Lenso Phone Card CAT 15 N. A. 
Cellular Advance Info Service (AIS) TOT 20 1990 
Telephone Total Access Communication CAT 22 1990 
(TAQ 
Pa2int! 
- Packlink Pacific Telesis/Percom Service CAT 10/15 1986/1990 
- Phonelink Shinawatra Paging TOT 15 1989 
- Page Phone Hutchison Telecommunications TOT 15 1990 
- Easy Call Matrix (Thailand) CAT 15 1990 
- World Page World Page TOT 15 1993 
- Post Tel Samart Paging PTD 20 N. A. 
VSAT Samart Telecoms PTD 15 1988 
CompuNet PTD 15 1988 
Acumen TOT 15 1991 
Slam Satellite Network CAT 15/22 1992 
USAT CAT 22 N. A. 
World Sat Corporation CAT 22 N. A. 
Trunk mobile Radio Phone TOT 15 1992 
Total Access Communication CAT 15 1992 
JAC) 
Data Shinawatra Datacom TOT 10 1989 
communication United Communications CAT 20 N. A. 
(Mobile Date) 
Satellite Shinawatra Satellite MOTC 30 1991 
Optical fibre Comlink (Thailand) TOT 20 1990 
network Jasmine Submarine TOT 20 1991 
Telecommunications 
Others 
- Videotex Line Technology (Thailand) TOT 15 1992 
- Telepoint Fonepoint (Thailand) TOT 10 1990 
(CT2) 
- Directories Shinawatra Directories TOT 5 1989 
Source: The TOT Corporation Plc., the CAT Telecom Plc., the PTD, and the MOTC. 
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Appendix D 
Comparison of selected telecommunications services 
Table 1: 
Comparison of the cost of mobile phones per month 
Unit: THB per month 
Minutes used 
th 
Thailand Singapore The Philippines Hong Kong Malaysia (per mon ) AIS DTAC TAO Singtel SMART HK Orange Celcom 
100 942 914 775 682 864 1,157 613 
200 1 1,242 1,164 965 682 1,547 1 1,157 991 
300 1,362 1,314 1,075 966 2,231 1,179 1,369 
400 1,642 , 1,614 1 1,075 1,251 2,915 1,448 1,747 
Source: The TDRI 
Note: (1) The cost of mobile phone per month includes the price of handset and monthly fee 
and airtime charge. 
(2) All figures are as of May 2002 
(3) Singtel, SMART, HK Orange, and Celcom are the leading telecommunications 
operators in each mentioned country 
(4) The service fees and exchange rates are as of May 2002 
Table 2: 
Comparison of the price of mobile handsets 
Unit: THB 
Model Thailand 
The 
Philippines Singapore Hong Kong Malaysia 
AIS DTAC TAO SMART Singtel HK Orange Celcom 
Ericsson T68 23,900 23,900 - 8,616 10,413 16,385 10,721 
Ericsson 
A3618 5,100 7,900 5,400 - - - 3,949 
Ericsson T29 7,400 7,900 7,400 - 4,288 
Motorola 
T190 4,900 4,900 - I - 
4,288 - 
Motorola V66 13,900 13,900 19,900 9,462 9,787 8,464 
Motorola V70 27,900 27,900 - 18,734 19,685 16,928 
Nokia 33 10 5,900 5,900 3,999 - 4,516 4,288 2,948 
Nokia 5210 15,900 15,900 - 3,879 8,749 8,138 7,568 
Nokia 65 10 18,900 18,900 - 9,047 13,741 13,086 11,968 
Nokia 8250 15,900 14,900 9,900 6,465 6,609 9,787 8,448 
Nokia 83 10 17,900 , 19,900 , 
19,400 7,323 10,413 14,186 11,968 
Source: The TDRI 
Note: The prices are as of May 2002 
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Appendix E 
Selected foreign investment of Thai telecommunications corporations 
Country/ 
Group Company name service Project 
area 
Shinawatra Cambodia Cambodia - Joint venture with Cambodia 
group Shinawatra Co. Ltd government to install mobile network 
Laos Shinawatra Laos - Provision of GSM mobile telephone, 
telecom Co. Ltd. public phone, fixed line telephone, 
international gateway, and paging services 
Isla Communications The - Provision of fixed line network, GSM 
Co. ltd Philippines mobile telephone, international phone call, 
and paging services 
Microwave India - Provision of GSM mobile telephone 
Comi-nunications and Paging services 
Co. Ltd 
Etc. 
Jasmine TP Mobile Telecom Indonesia - Provision of Trunked mobile Radio 
group Co. Ltd - Provision of Satellite Mobile 
(TT&T) telephone 
Digital The - Provision of fixed line telephone in 
Telecommunications Philippines Luzon area 
Corporation Co. Ltd. - Provision of radio paging services 
NewTel Co. Ltd Vietnam - Production of telecommunications 
equipment 
JT Mobiles Co. Ltd India - Provision of GSM mobile telephone in 
Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka areas 
Nepal - Radio paging services 
Etc. 
UCOM Cell Call Core United - Production of cellular handset 
group Co. Ltd. States 
UCOM International Myanmar - Trading Company 
Myanmar Co. Ltd. 
National India - Provision of paging service 
Telecommunications 
Co. Ltd. 
Inter-city Paging SriLanka - Provision of paging service 
Co. Ltd 
Etc. 
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Group Company name 
Country/ 
service 
area 
Project 
CP group Telecom Holding The - Provision of 300,000 lines of fixed 
Co. Ltd Philippines line telephone in Manila and Luzon areas 
China - International Gateway Operator (IGF) 
service 
- Provision of Very Small Aperture 
Terminal (VSAT) and paging services 
Jai Ti International China - Joint venture in Apstar satellite project 
Communication with APT Satellite Co. ltd 
Co. Ltd 
Etc , SAMART Cambodia Samart Cambodia - Selling of telecommunications 
group Co. Ltd equipment and mobile telephone handsets 
Cambodia Samart Cambodia - Provision of NMT 900 mobile 
Communication telephone under the 35-year concession 
Co. Ltd period 
Malaysia - Selling of telecommunications 
Samart Malaysia equipment and mobile telephone handsets 
Co. Ltd 
Myanmar - Selling of telecommunications 
equipment and mobile telephone handsets 
Samart Myanmar 
Co. Ltd 
Etc. 
Source: Companies' annual reports and web sites 
343 
